If God is completely transcendent, how can we say anything meaningful about Him?

This is one of the deepest paradoxes in philosophy of religion: if God is truly transcendent—that is, radically different from everything we know in the world—how can limited human language describe Him? Are not our words drawn from our limited experience? When we say "God is merciful" or "God is all-knowing," are we speaking about something with actual meaning, or are we merely playing with words? This question has occupied theologians and philosophers for centuries, and remains alive in contemporary discussion.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some believers:

"We understand God's attributes perfectly from the Qur'an/Bible." This is excessive simplification. Even classical scholars disagreed about the meaning of divine attributes. The Ashʿarites said that God's attributes are not like ours ("laysa kamithlihī shayʾ"), the Muʿtazilites denied attributes additional to the essence, and the Ḥanbalites affirmed them "bilā kayf" (without asking how). If the matter were completely clear, this historical disagreement would not have existed.

"Transcendence does not mean impossibility of knowledge." Partially correct, but it ignores the depth of the problem. The question is not "Can we know anything about God?" but "How can limited language describe the unlimited?" Jumping over this dilemma weakens the religious position because it appears unaware of the complexity of the issue.

From some naturalists:

"If we cannot describe God, then He does not exist." This is a logical fallacy. Inability to provide complete description does not mean non-existence. We cannot describe consciousness or quantum mechanics with complete precision, but no one denies their existence. The linguistic problem is separate from the existential problem.

"Religious language is merely poetry and emotion, with no cognitive meaning." This is excessive reductionism. Even if religious language contains poetic and symbolic elements, this does not negate the possibility of its carrying cognitive meanings. Poetry itself can carry deep truths in ways that literal language cannot.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They share in ignoring the real tension at the heart of the matter: how can the limited speak about the unlimited? Superficial responses either deny the problem (as if religious language were completely clear) or deny the solution (as if religious language were completely empty). Serious philosophy acknowledges the tension and searches for ways to deal with it.

Serious Positions in the Discussion

First, the theory of analogical language. Developed by Thomas Aquinas and still influential. When we say "God is wise," we do not mean that His wisdom is exactly like ours (univocal), nor that the word is meaningless (equivocal). Rather, there is proportion and partial similarity. We understand something about God's wisdom from our wisdom, while recognizing the radical difference in degree and nature.

Second, negative theology (apophatic theology). An ancient tradition in Eastern Christianity, Islam, and Jewish mysticism. Instead of describing what God is, we describe what He is not: not limited, not ignorant, not unjust. This negation brings us closer to understanding transcendence without claiming to grasp the divine essence in our concepts.

Third, symbolic theory. Religious language works primarily through symbols and metaphors, not literal description. When we say "God is light," we do not mean that He is photons! Rather, the symbol points to a reality deeper than literal language. Paul Tillich developed this by saying that religious language "points beyond itself."

Fourth, the mystical position. Direct religious experience transcends language. Mystics in all traditions speak of "the inability to comprehend as comprehension." Language points to experience but does not contain it. Ibn ʿArabī, Eckhart, and Nicholas of Cusa developed complex languages to point to what transcends language.

Fifth, the contemporary Wittgensteinian position. Those influenced by the later Wittgenstein see religious language as having its own special "language game rules," different from scientific language. Meaning comes from usage in religious context, not from correspondence with external reality. This does not negate religious truth, but redefines how we understand this truth.

Where We Stand in This Discussion Today

The discussion about religious language remains alive in analytic philosophy and contemporary philosophy of religion. There is no consensus, but most serious philosophers reject both extremes: saying that religious language is completely clear like scientific language, or that it is completely empty of meaning. The prevailing position is that religious language works in special ways—symbolic, analogical, negative—that allow for real but partial and limited knowledge about the divine.

For Advanced Reading

If you wish to delve deeper:
─ Intermediate level: The theory of names and attributes in Ashʿarite and Māturīdite theology
─ Advanced level: "Existence and Essence" in Ibn Sīnā and its influence on theology
─ William Alston's book, "Divine Nature and Human Language" (1989)
─ "Religious Language" family page on the website