Does absolute power include the power over logical impossibilities, or is it limited to what is logically possible?

The question of absolute power and its relationship to logical impossibility is among the deepest issues in philosophy of religion. The seemingly simple question — "Can God create a rock so heavy that He cannot lift it?" — opens the door to a complex philosophical discussion that has continued for centuries.

Inadequate responses to avoid

From some believers:

"God can do everything without exception, even contradictions." This extremism in transcendence leads to problems. If God can create a square circle, logic itself collapses, and all statements become meaningless.

"Questioning God's power is insolence and disbelief." This rejects legitimate philosophical discussion. Classical Islamic scholars discussed these issues in depth (al-Ghazālī, al-Rāzī, Ibn Rushd). Thinking about God's attributes is not insolence but deepening faith.

From some critics:

"The stone paradox proves that absolute power is impossible." This is a logical leap. The paradox shows the need for a precise definition of absolute power, not its impossibility.

"If God cannot do logical impossibilities, then He is limited." This confuses external limits with internal nature. Logic is not an external limit on God, but a reflection of His rational nature.

Why these responses are inadequate

They fail to deal with the philosophical complexity of the issue. Absolute power requires precise conceptual analysis, not general slogans.

The two main philosophical positions

Position One: Absolute power includes logical impossibilities

Defended by Descartes and some later Ashʿarites. The argument: God is above logic, creator of logic itself. He can make 2+2=5, or create a triangle with four sides.

The problem: This position leads to the collapse of meaning. If God can make truth falsehood and falsehood truth, then every statement — including "God exists" — loses its meaning.

Position Two: Absolute power is limited to what is logically possible

Defended by Thomas Aquinas, Anselm, and most contemporary philosophers of religion (Swinburne, Plantinga, Craig). This is the position of the majority of classical Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn).

Precise definition: God has power over everything that is logically possible and possible relative to His perfect nature.

Aquinas's classical analysis

In Summa Theologica (I, Q.25, A.3), Aquinas distinguishes between:

1. Absolute impossibility: what involves self-contradiction (square circle, number that is both even and odd).
2. Relative impossibility: what conflicts with the nature of a particular thing (human flying without means).

God does not "have power" over absolute impossibilities, because they are not "things" at all. "Square circle" is merely a verbal construction without real referent.

Contemporary development in Plantinga

In "The Nature of Necessity" (1974), Plantinga provides a precise formulation:

Absolute power = power to actualize any state of affairs S where:
1. S is logically possible
2. The description of S does not necessarily include God's inability to actualize it

This solves the stone paradox: "a rock that an omnipotent being cannot lift" is a self-contradictory description, like "square circle."

Position of classical Islamic philosophy

Al-Ghazālī in "Tahāfut al-Falāsifa": God has power over every possibility, but self-impossibilities are not "things" for power to relate to.

Al-Rāzī in "al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya": distinction between "impossible in itself" (logically impossible) and "impossible due to something else." Divine power relates to the latter, not the former.

Ibn Rushd in "Tahāfut al-Tahāfut": Logic is not an external constraint on God, but an expression of divine wisdom itself.

Response to common objections

"So God is limited by logic?" No. Logic is not an external authority limiting God, but a reflection of God's rational nature. God does not "submit" to logic; rather, logic flows from His nature.

"The Qur'an says {Indeed, Allah is over all things competent}?" Yes, and "thing" in language and philosophy refers to what is possible in existence. Self-impossibilities are not "things" but pure non-being.

"What about miracles?" Miracles violate natural laws, not logical laws. Splitting the sea is logically possible (though extraordinary), while "a sea that is both dry and wet" is logically impossible.

Philosophical importance of the distinction

This distinction is crucial for several reasons:

1. Preserves meaningful language: without it, all statements lose meaning.
2. Preserves divine rationality: God is not an arbitrary being but wise and knowing.
3. Enables philosophical dialogue: we can think about God in a coherent way.
4. Resolves apparent paradoxes: such as the stone paradox and absolute power.

Contemporary positions

Most analytic philosophers of religion (Swinburne, van Inwagen, Hasker, Craig) adopt the second position: absolute power is limited by logical possibility.

Some "very conservative" philosophers (James Ross, Barry Miller) attempt to defend modified versions of the first position, but they are a minority.

The "mystical" position (influenced by Eckhart, Ibn Arabi) transcends both logic and contradiction, but this is an experiential rather than philosophical position in the strict sense.

The deeper philosophical point

The question reveals tension between two desires: maximizing God without limits, and preserving rationality and meaning. The most mature solution recognizes that rationality is not a limit on God but an expression of His perfection.

Where we stand in this debate today

Near-total consensus among philosophers of religion: absolute power means power over everything logically possible, not over self-impossibilities. This does not diminish God's greatness but preserves the coherence of the concept of divinity.

For advanced reading

- Advanced level: possible worlds and logical necessity in Kripke and Lewis
- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, Q.25
- Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford UP, 1974)
- Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford UP, 2016)
- الغزالي، تهافت الفلاسفة (المسألة الثالثة عشرة)
- الرازي، المطالب العالية (الجزء الثاني، في الإلهيات)
- "Formulation: Divine Omnipotence" page on the website