How do some Muslim philosophers (Taha Abd al-Rahman, Nasr) utilize the concept of "nafs" (soul) in Islamic tradition to establish a theory of personal identity that differs from Anglo-American traditions?

This question addresses contemporary philosophical attempts to establish an Islamic theory of personal identity, grounded in Islamic tradition and offering an alternative to prevailing Anglo-American discussions. The philosophical project of both Taha Abd al-Rahman and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (along with other thinkers) seeks to recover the concept of "nafs" from Islamic tradition and reformulate it as a foundation for understanding personal identity in ways that transcend contemporary Western dualities.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of tradition:

"The Islamic theory of the soul is completely superior to Western theories." Claims of absolute superiority require precise philosophical defense. Different theories answer different questions and proceed from different assumptions. Absolute superiority is a strong claim.

"The West has lost understanding of the soul, and Islam alone preserves it." A misleading simplification. Western tradition contains deep discussions about the soul (from Plato to contemporaries). Claims of cognitive monopoly weaken philosophical dialogue.

"The concept of nafs in tradition is clear and unified." Inaccurate. Islamic tradition contains great diversity in understanding the soul (al-Ghazālī, Ibn Sīnā, Mullā Ṣadrā, Ibn ʿArabī) with different emphases.

From some critics:

"Islamization attempts are merely intellectual regression." Hasty dismissal. Serious philosophical projects (such as Taha Abd al-Rahman's) present philosophical arguments deserving discussion, not ideological rejection.

"Anglo-American discussion is more precise and clear." Assumes certain criteria for precision. The analytical tradition has its strengths, but also its limitations (especially in deep existential matters).

"The concept of nafs is an obsolete metaphysical concept unsuitable for contemporary philosophy." Assumes that being contemporary means abandoning metaphysics. Many contemporary philosophers are rehabilitating metaphysics.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They fail to understand the nature of the philosophical project: it's not merely a "return" to tradition, but a creative reformulation responding to contemporary questions with updated traditional tools.

The Anglo-American Philosophical Landscape of Personal Identity

Contemporary discussion in analytical philosophy revolves around:

The Psychological View: Personal identity rests on psychological continuity (memory, personality, beliefs). Representatives: Sydney Shoemaker, Derek Parfit.

The Somatic/Biological View: Identity rests on bodily or brain continuity. Representatives: Eric Olson (animalism), David Wiggins.

The Narrative View: Identity is constructed through self-narration. Representatives: Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul Ricoeur (though he's continental).

The No-Self View: Denial of the existence of essential personal identity. Parfit in "Reasons and Persons" approaches a Buddhist position.

These theories face dilemmas: thought experiments (fission, teleportation), the problem of reductionism, difficulty explaining the phenomenal unity of consciousness.

The Concept of Nafs in Islamic Tradition

Islamic tradition developed a rich understanding of the soul that transcends dualities:

Hierarchical Plurality: The nafs is not one simple thing, but has levels:
- The vegetative soul (vital powers)
- The animal soul (perception and movement)
- The rational soul (intellect and reasoning)
- The self-reproaching/tranquil soul (moral levels)
- The spirit (rūḥ) (the highest level)

Unity in Plurality: Despite plurality, the soul is one. Ibn Sīnā in "The Soul" from al-Shifāʾ explains how multiple powers belong to one essence.

The Relational Nature: The soul is not an isolated "thing," but a relationship with God, the world, and others. Mullā Ṣadrā develops this in "The Four Journeys."

Substantial Motion: The soul is not static but in constant motion toward perfection. This transcends the "permanence vs. change" problem in Western discussion.

Taha Abd al-Rahman's Project

In "The Question of Ethics" and "The Spirit of Modernity," Taha Abd al-Rahman develops a theory of identity based on:

The Trusteeship Human: Personal identity is not individual "property," but a "trust" (amāna) one is entrusted with. This shifts the question from "what am I?" to "what am I entrusted with?"

Purification as Foundation: Identity is not a fixed given, but a continuous ethical-spiritual project. Purification (tazkiya) is the process that realizes true identity.

The Guided Intellect: Not abstract reason (Cartesian) nor instrumental reason (modernist), but intellect connected to revelation and values. This redefines "rationality" in the context of identity.

Living Memory: Not mere information storage (as in psychological theory), but memory connected to meaning and purpose. Memory "lives" through ethical action.

Taha's critique of Western theories:
- Reducing humans to one dimension (psychological or physical)
- Ignoring the spiritual-ethical dimension
- Excessive individualism
- Rupture with religious tradition

Seyyed Hossein Nasr's Project

In "Traditional Islam in the Modern World" and "Knowledge and the Sacred," Nasr presents:

The Soul as Divine Image: Humans are "vicegerents" (khalīfa) carrying the image of divine attributes. True identity is realized by fulfilling this vicegerency.

Ontological Hierarchy: Humans are "barzakh" beings between the material and spiritual worlds. Personal identity encompasses all levels, not just one.

Knowledge by Presence: Knowledge of the soul is not objective knowledge (subject-object), but knowledge by presence. This transcends subjectivity-objectivity problems.

Realization not Theorization: Personal identity is not only a theoretical matter, but practical-spiritual realization. Sufism provides a method for this realization.

Specific Philosophical Contributions

Transcending Body/Mind Dualism: The nafs in Islamic tradition is not "mind" versus "body," but an essence encompassing multiple levels. This solves problems of Cartesian dualism.

Solving the Continuity Problem: Substantial motion (Mullā Ṣadrā) allows for change while preserving identity. The soul moves and remains itself.

The Ethical-Existential Dimension: Identity is not an abstract metaphysical matter, but an ethical project. This connects ontology to ethics.

Theological Foundation: Personal identity is founded on the relationship with God. This provides a solid foundation for human dignity and responsibility.

Responding to Contemporary Challenges

The Artificial Intelligence Problem: Can machines have personal identity? Islamic theory connects identity to spirit and moral responsibility, fundamentally distinguishing humans.

The Cultural Pluralism Problem: How do we understand identity in a pluralistic world? The concept of "fiṭra" provides a common foundation while respecting diversity.

The Posthuman Problem: Challenges of human enhancement and genetic manipulation. Islamic theory emphasizes "trust" and "vicegerency" as ethical limits.

Critique and Challenges

The Methodological Challenge: How do we reconcile traditional language with contemporary philosophical language? This requires precise conceptual translation.

The Applied Challenge: How do we transfer this theory from the theoretical level to practical solutions (medical ethics, law)?

The Critical Challenge: Some traditional concepts (such as levels of the soul) need reformulation in light of contemporary knowledge (neuroscience, psychology).

Recent Developments and Prospects

Dialogue with Neuroscience: Some researchers (Muhammad Yusri in "The Contemporary Muslim Mind") attempt to connect the concept of nafs with contemporary consciousness research.

Dialogue with Phenomenology: The convergence between knowledge by presence (Nasr) and intentional consciousness (Husserl) opens new prospects.

Ethical Applications: Developing applied ethics based on this theory (in medicine, education, politics).

From the Perspective of Rational Preferability

These attempts don't claim to "prove" the superiority of Islamic theory, but offer an alternative framework worthy of consideration. Potential advantages:
- Integration of multiple dimensions of human existence
- Grounding in transcendent foundation
- Emphasis on moral responsibility
- Dynamic rather than static conception

Where We Stand in This Discussion Today

Between 2020 and 2026, this field witnessed notable activity on several levels. First, increased international academic interest in Taha Abd al-Rahman's project, especially after parts of his works were translated into English and French, enabling broader dialogue with analytical and continental philosophy. Second, new works emerged attempting to connect the traditional concept of nafs with contemporary consciousness studies, particularly in criticizing physicalist reductionism that faces mounting challenges from within analytical philosophy itself (such as Philip Goff's work on panpsychism). Third, developments in generative artificial intelligence (2022-2026) raised new questions about personal identity and consciousness, in which some researchers found an opportunity to re-present the Islamic approach that connects identity to moral responsibility and spirit, not mere information processing. However, the greatest challenge remains: these projects mostly remain general philosophical discourse lacking the precise technical formulation required for dialogue with contemporary analytical philosophy. The discussion has not been settled, but the philosophical space has become more open to theoretical pluralism, and less willing to accept Anglo-American tradition's monopoly on formulating questions of personal identity.