How do Mark Linville and Stephen Evans respond to Street's objection by arguing that evolution under divine guidance explains the reliability of moral cognition better than pure naturalism?

The response of Mark Linville and C. Stephen Evans to Sharon Street's evolutionary debunking argument represents one of the most prominent contributions to the contemporary debate on the relationship between evolution and moral knowledge. This response does not merely defend the possibility of moral knowledge within a theistic framework, but goes further to propose that evolutionary theism provides a superior explanation for the reliability of our moral perceptions compared to pure naturalism.

Inadequate Responses to Be Avoided

From some defenders of the theistic position:

"Evolution is a false theory, so the entire debate is baseless." This is an avoidance of serious philosophical discussion. Linville and Evans accept evolution as an established scientific fact and build their argument on this foundation. Rejecting evolution removes one entirely from contemporary academic discourse.

"God implanted moral knowledge in us directly, independently of evolution." This is a reductive oversimplification. Linville and Evans propose a more sophisticated explanation: God used the evolutionary process itself as a means to develop reliable moral capacities. This requires a precise understanding of the relationship between divine providence and natural processes.

"Street's argument collapses because it presupposes naturalism." This is a misreading. Street does not presuppose naturalism but explores its implications. Her argument is conditional: "If naturalistic evolution is correct, then our moral perceptions are unreliable." An effective response must deal with the logical structure of the argument, not accuse it of circularity.

From some naturalists:

"Linville and Evans resort to a 'god of the gaps'." This is a superficial accusation. Their argument is not "We don't understand morality, therefore God exists," but rather "The theistic explanation of the relationship between evolution and morality is more coherent than the naturalistic explanation." This is inference to the best explanation (IBE), not an argument from ignorance.

"Evolution explains everything, including morality." This is a dogmatic claim that ignores the genuine philosophical challenge. The question is not "Can evolution explain the existence of behaviors that appear moral?" (yes), but "Can naturalistic evolution explain the truth of our moral beliefs?" (here lies the debate).

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They share a failure to understand the dual nature of the Linville-Evans argument: it is both defensive (defending the possibility of moral knowledge within a theistic framework) and offensive (proposing that theism provides a better explanation). Understanding this dual structure is necessary to appreciate the strength of the argument.

Structure of Street's Original Argument

Before presenting the Linville-Evans response, a precise understanding of Street's argument (2006) is necessary:

1. Evolution shaped our basic evaluative tendencies.
2. Evolutionary forces are not concerned with moral truth but with survival and reproduction.
3. Therefore, our moral judgments are products of forces unrelated to tracking moral truth.
4. This creates a "Darwinian Dilemma" for the moral realist.

Street says: Either we accept that our moral judgments are unreliable (skepticism), or we abandon moral realism in favor of constructivism.

Linville's Response: An Argument from Moral Knowledge

Mark Linville in "The Moral Argument" (2009, 2012) develops a multi-level response:

First Level: The Distinction Between Causal Explanation and Epistemic Justification

Linville distinguishes between two questions:
- How did we arrive at our moral beliefs? (causal/historical question)
- Are our moral beliefs justified/true? (epistemic/normative question)

Evolution may answer the first without negating the second. Illustrative example: Our knowledge of mathematics has an evolutionary history (brains evolved to solve practical problems), but this does not negate the truth of "2+2=4".

Second Level: The Divine Correspondence Argument

If God exists and created humans "in his image" (imago Dei) to be moral agents, it would be expected that he would guide the evolutionary process to produce beings capable of perceiving moral truths. This explains the correspondence between our moral inclinations and moral truths.

In contrast, naturalism faces the "matching problem": Why do our evolutionary tendencies match independent moral truths? This is a statistically improbable correspondence in a naturalistic world.

Third Level: An Argument from the Nature of Moral Obligation

Linville emphasizes that genuine moral obligation requires:
- Objectivity (not merely personal or cultural opinion)
- Categoricity (not conditional on desires)
- Authority that transcends individuals and societies

Naturalistic evolution can explain behavioral tendencies, but cannot establish obligation with these characteristics. Theism provides a metaphysical foundation for obligation: divine commands or the divine nature.

Evans' Response: The Extended Epistemic Argument

Stephen Evans in "God and Moral Obligation" (2013) and "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God" (2018) develops Linville's argument in new directions:

First Dimension: Virtue Epistemology

Evans employs virtue epistemology: reliable knowledge requires cognitive faculties oriented toward truth and operating in a suitable environment.

In the theistic framework: God designed/guided our moral faculties to be reliable.
In the naturalistic framework: our faculties are products of blind processes that do not aim for truth.

Conclusion: Theism provides the conditions for epistemic reliability; naturalism does not.

Second Dimension: Distinguishing Levels of Explanation

Evans distinguishes three levels:
1. Biological level: How did moral capacities evolve?
2. Psychological level: How do these capacities function?
3. Normative level: Are these capacities connected to truth?

Evolution answers (1) and (2) but does not settle (3). Theism connects all three levels: God used (1) to produce (2) in a way that ensures (3).

Third Dimension: The Explanatory Adequacy Argument

Evans proposes that evolutionary theism explains phenomena that naturalism cannot:

- Why do we experience morality as objective facts, not merely subjective inclinations?
- Why do we feel moral obligation even when it conflicts with our evolutionary interests?
- Why do we possess the capacity for radical moral criticism of "natural" evolutionary practices?

The Joint Cumulative Argument

Linville and Evans together build a cumulative argument:

1. Negative Defense: Divinely guided evolution does not undermine moral knowledge but supports it.

2. Positive Attack: Naturalism faces a "reliability gap" — it cannot explain why our moral faculties would be reliable in tracking truth.

3. Explanatory Superiority: Theism solves the matching problem, explains phenomenological moral experience, and establishes epistemic reliability.

The Strongest Counter-Responses and Replies

Objection from Katarina Duttle and David Enoch: The naturalist can propose a "consequent reliability argument" — perhaps moral capacities are reliable as a byproduct of reliable general cognitive capacities.

Linville-Evans Reply: This pushes the question back a step — why are general cognitive capacities reliable specifically in the moral domain? Evolution explains their reliability in practical domains (survival), but not in abstract normative domains.

Objection from Erik Wielenberg: "Lucky evolution" — perhaps we were fortunate and our inclinations happened to match moral truths.

Evans' Reply: This substitutes explanation with chance. Theism provides an explanation; naturalism resorts to cosmic luck. From the perspective of inference to the best explanation, theism is superior.

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

The debate over evolutionary debunking arguments has seen notable developments between 2020 and 2026. Most prominently, naturalistic moral realists — such as Enoch and Clarke-Doane — have deepened their attempts to bridge the "reliability gap" through structural arguments linking moral facts to necessary natural facts, but these attempts remain subject to intense debate. Meanwhile, theistic responses have evolved: works by scholars like FitzPatrick and Moon have expanded the discussion to include whether theism itself faces an "epistemic Euthyphro problem" — namely: Does God make moral beliefs true or guide us toward independent truths? Integrative attempts combining empirical evolutionary psychology with normative philosophy have also emerged, making the boundaries between camps less rigid than before. The reasonable position today: there is no philosophical consensus, but the Linville-Evans argument remains one of the strongest available responses, gaining its real strength when integrated within a broader cumulative argument rather than when treated as a standalone argument.

From the Perspective of Rational Preferability (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

The Linville-Evans argument constitutes an important preferential indicator but not a decisive proof:

– It shows that evolutionary theism explanatorily surpasses naturalism in solving the "matching problem" between our moral inclinations and objective moral truths.
– But it presupposes moral realism, an assumption that itself needs independent support.
– Its strength multiplies when joined with other indicators: the cosmological argument (why does an ordered world exist at all?), the fine-tuning argument (why does the universe allow for moral agents?), and the argument from consciousness (how does normative subjectivity emerge from deaf matter?).
– The strongest objection — the possibility of explaining moral reliability as a byproduct of general cognitive capacities — remains a serious objection not to be dismissed lightly, but it pushes the question without resolving it.

The conclusion: The argument for divinely guided evolution adds genuine preferential weight within a cumulative rational preferability framework, making the theistic hypothesis more coherent in explaining a fundamental dimension of human experience — the moral dimension — without claiming categorical certainty.