Do contemporary formulations of the "Argument from Fiṭra" in Islamic philosophy (Muḥammad al-Būṭī, ʿAlī al-Salūs) succeed in overcoming Western academic criticisms, or do they remain confined to an internal framework?

The "Argument from Fiṭra" in its contemporary formulations by Muḥammad Saʿīd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī (The Greatest Cosmic Certainties, 1982) and ʿAlī al-Salūs (Faith in God and the Struggle with Atheism, 2010) represents an attempt to renew the traditional fiṭra argument with modern epistemological tools. The question posed is: Do these formulations succeed in entering into genuine dialogue with Western academic philosophy, or do they remain confined to the circle of internal conviction? The assessment requires analyzing the logical structure of these formulations, comparing them with contemporary academic standards, and examining the possibility of translating them into a cross-culturally philosophical language.

Inadequate responses to be avoided

From some defenders of the fiṭra argument:

"Fiṭra is a Quranic reality that does not need Western approval." An isolationist stance that misses the point. If the fiṭra argument claims universality of truth (that every human is naturally endowed), it must be capable of formulation in cross-cultural language. Self-enclosure contradicts the claim of universality.

"Al-Būṭī proved fiṭra conclusively." An exaggeration. Even al-Būṭī himself speaks of "certainties" in the sense of intuitive conviction, not strict logical demonstration. Confusing personal conviction with philosophical proof weakens the argument.

"The West is atheist and will never accept the fiṭra argument no matter how strong it is." A false generalization. Western academic philosophy includes strong theistic currents (Plantinga, Swinburne, Craig) that discuss arguments similar to the fiṭra argument under other names (sensus divinitatis, properly basic belief).

From some critics:

"The fiṭra argument is merely circular justification for prior faith." A reduction. Contemporary formulations attempt to build an epistemological argument, not mere justification. Evaluating them requires examining the structure, not wholesale rejection.

"Islamic formulations lag behind contemporary philosophy." A hasty judgment. Some formulations (especially by thinkers familiar with contemporary philosophy) use advanced methodological tools. The problem lies in communication and translation, not necessarily in essence.

Why these responses are inadequate

They share either rejection of dialogue from the outset, or prejudgment without analysis. Productive assessment requires: (1) precise understanding of contemporary formulations, (2) knowledge of academic philosophical standards, (3) analysis of possibilities for translation and dialogue.

Al-Būṭī's formulation: Fiṭra certainties

Muḥammad Saʿīd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī in "The Greatest Cosmic Certainties" builds the fiṭra argument on three layers:

First layer: Fiṭra as "primordial certainty"

Al-Būṭī distinguishes between two types of knowledge: inferential knowledge (requiring proof) and fiṭra knowledge (self-evident). Faith in the existence of a higher power belongs to the second type. This resembles Plantinga's concept of "properly basic beliefs," but with different formulation.

Second layer: Fiṭra as "existential need"

Humans are born with a "metaphysical void" that only faith can fill. This is not merely a psychological need, but an authentic existential dimension. Al-Būṭī cites experiences of nations and civilizations, and contemporary psychological studies.

Third layer: Fiṭra as "latent knowledge"

Humans carry primordial knowledge of God, which may be veiled by upbringing or culture, but appears in moments of existential honesty (danger, death, deep contemplation).

Strengths of al-Būṭī's formulation

1. Epistemological grounding: Attempts to build an integrated epistemological theory, not mere citations.
2. Utilization of human sciences: Employs psychology and anthropology.
3. Argumentative language: Addresses the contemporary mind with its tools.

Weaknesses of al-Būṭī's formulation

1. Confusion between description and normativity: Does it describe a human phenomenon, or establish a metaphysical reality?
2. Generalization from Islamic experience: Many examples are taken from the Islamic context.
3. Failure to respond to contemporary objections: Does not deeply discuss criticism from cognitive sciences.

Al-Salūs's formulation: Fiṭra and contemporary science

ʿAlī al-Salūs develops a more interactive approach with contemporary sciences:

First: Fiṭra in light of evolutionary psychology

Al-Salūs attempts to employ research from the "cognitive science of religion" (Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer) that indicates humans are "programmed" for religiosity. But he goes beyond reductive explanation: this programming is evidence of fiṭra, not its refutation.

Second: Fiṭra and the moral dimension

Al-Salūs connects religious fiṭra with innate moral sense. Moral conscience is evidence of a spiritual dimension in humans that transcends matter.

Third: Fiṭra confronting atheism

Al-Salūs analyzes the phenomenon of "disturbed atheism" — how many atheists express deep existential anxiety. This anxiety is an indicator of suppressed fiṭra.

Strengths of al-Salūs's formulation

1. Engagement with sciences: Benefits from latest research in psychology of religion.
2. Confronting contemporary atheism: Does not ignore the challenge, but faces it.
3. Diversity in sources: Cites both Western and Muslim philosophers.

Weaknesses of al-Salūs's formulation

1. Selective interpretation of sciences: Takes what supports his position, ignores what opposes it.
2. Confusion between levels: Between scientific description and philosophical conclusion.
3. Weak logical construction: The transition from description to metaphysical judgment is not solid.

Comparison with Western academic standards

To assess the possibility of these formulations entering academic dialogue, we compare them with three criteria:

1. Conceptual Clarity

Academic philosophy requires precise conceptual definition. The concept of "fiṭra" needs more precise definition:
- Is it a psychological disposition?
- Or a cognitive structure?
- Or an ontological reality?

Contemporary formulations tend to mix these levels without clear distinction.

2. Testability

Philosophical claims in Western academia must be open to rational discussion. The fiṭra argument faces a challenge: How do we test the claim that every human is naturally endowed? How are exceptions (committed atheists) explained?

3. Responding to Objections

Academic philosophy requires serious treatment of known objections:
- The evolutionary objection: The tendency toward religiosity is a product of evolution, not evidence of its truth.
- The cultural objection: Religious diversity contradicts the idea of one fiṭra.
- The epistemological objection: Intuitive fiṭra is not a reliable source of knowledge.

Contemporary formulations address some of these objections, but not with the depth academically required.

Possibilities for translation and dialogue

Possible opportunities:

1. Convergence with "Reformed Epistemology": Plantinga's school accepts basic beliefs, which is close to the concept of fiṭra.

2. Dialogue with "Cognitive Science of Religion": Employing contemporary research opens doors for dialogue.

3. The existential dimension: Existential philosophy (from Kierkegaard to Marcel) appreciates the experiential dimension of faith.

Existing challenges:

1. Philosophical language: Islamic terminology needs precise translation, which is not easy.

2. Reference framework: Islamic formulations assume a Quranic framework, while academic philosophy requires neutrality.

3. Demonstrative method: The transition from description to metaphysical judgment needs clearer logical steps.

Suggestions for development

To transcend the internal framework, formulations of the fiṭra argument need to:

1. Distinguish between levels: Separate phenomenological description from metaphysical claim.

2. Solid logical construction: Formulate the argument in explicit logical form, open to evaluation.

3. Deep treatment of objections: Especially the evolutionary objection and religious diversity.

4. Dialogue with contemporary philosophy: Benefit from Reformed Epistemology and philosophy of mind.

5. Empirical research: Support claims with psychological and anthropological research.

Where we stand in this discussion today

The period 2020-2026 witnessed notable developments on three axes. First, in cognitive sciences, research by Olivera and Jong (2021-2023) strengthened evidence that the tendency to perceive intentional agency in nature (hypersensitive agency detection) is a cross-cultural cognitive trait, which is being reemployed by both sides: naturalists see it as a product of blind evolution, while believers see it as an indicator of real fiṭra. Second, in analytical philosophy, Plantinga's students (especially Moon, 2022) developed internal criticism of the concept of "properly basic belief" showing that sensus divinitatis needs more precise activation conditions — and this criticism applies equally to the Islamic fiṭra argument. Third, new dialogical attempts appeared in journals like Philosophy East and West and Intellectual Discourse trying to translate the Quranic concept of fiṭra into analytical philosophical language, but they are still in their early stages and have not yet achieved the methodological integration required in the mainstream academic current. Conclusion: The door to dialogue is more open than ever before, but contemporary Islamic formulations have not exploited it sufficiently.

From the perspective of rational preponderance (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

The fiṭra argument is a paradigmatic case of cumulative rational preponderance at work:
─ The basic phenomenon is real: the cross-cultural human tendency toward religiosity is a fact supported by strong anthropological and cognitive evidence.
─ But its interpretation is open: the natural explanation (evolutionary product) and the teleological explanation (deposited fiṭra) are both logically consistent with the data.
─ It is not valid to rely on the fiṭra argument alone to prove God's existence, but it acquires real probabilistic weight when combined with other arguments: cosmological, moral, and existential.
─ The strongest aspect of contemporary formulations (al-Būṭī and al-Salūs) is highlighting the existential dimension that reductive explanation fails to accommodate. Their weakest aspect is the failure to make strict distinction between description and metaphysical conclusion.

The balanced position therefore: the fiṭra argument provides probabilistic evidence favoring the theistic interpretation of existence, not a decisive proof, and its value increases within a cumulative reading, not within methodological isolation.