Does Alston's argument in "Perceiving God" succeed in treating religious experience as a perceptual mode parallel to sensory perception, or does it face decisive epistemological objections from religious diversity?

This question addresses one of the most important contemporary philosophical attempts to establish the epistemology of religious experience. William Alston in "Perceiving God" (Cornell UP, 1991) presents an ambitious project: treating spiritual/mystical perception as an independent epistemological practice parallel to sensory perception, making religious experience a legitimate epistemic source. But does this project succeed in facing the challenge of religious diversity?

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of religious experience: "Mystical experience is decisive proof of God's existence" is an overreach. Alston himself doesn't claim this—he only defends prima facie reliability. "Those who haven't experienced it have no right to criticize" is a weak epistemic position—it eliminates the possibility of philosophical discussion altogether.

From some critics: "Religious experiences are psychological delusions" is non-philosophical reductionism. "The difference in experiences invalidates them all" is a logical leap—difference doesn't necessarily mean complete invalidity.

Structure of Alston's Argument—Mystical Perceptual Practice

Central Concept: Doxastic Practice.
Alston distinguishes between different types of doxastic practices: sensory perception (SP), memory, rational inference, and Christian mystical perception (CMP). Each practice has:
- Specific perceptual mechanisms
- Internal evaluative criteria
- A system of concepts and background beliefs

The Basic Argument in Four Steps:

1. The reliability of sensory perception cannot be proven non-circularly. Any attempt to prove the reliability of the senses ultimately depends on the senses themselves.

2. We accept sensory perception based on practical rationality. We have no practical choice but to trust our senses.

3. Christian mystical perception (CMP) is a socially established perceptual practice. It has a long history, internal criteria for discrimination, and a coherent conceptual system.

4. By the parity argument: If we accept SP despite its inability to be proven, we must accept CMP for its practitioners.

Development: Prima Facie Reliability and Defeaters

Alston doesn't claim absolute reliability, but prima facie reliability that is defeasible. Potential defeaters:
- Internal contradictions in experience
- Conflict with established knowledge
- Failure of predictions based on experience

But he argues that CMP withstands these defeaters reasonably well.

The Challenge of Religious Diversity—The Strongest Objection

Formulation of the Objection: Different religious traditions produce conflicting experiences. The Christian "perceives" the Trinity, the Hindu "perceives" Brahman, the Buddhist "perceives" emptiness. This conflict undermines the reliability of all of them.

Alston's Complex Response:

First, the distinction between phenomenal content and interpretation. The experience itself may be shared, but interpretation differs according to the conceptual framework. Example: two people see the same thing but one sees it as a "plane" and the other as an "eagle"—the perception is correct but the classification differs.

Second, analogy to diversity in sensory perception. Even in SP we find cultural differences in perception (such as color perception). This doesn't invalidate all sensory perception.

Third, commitment to a specific tradition. Just as a scientist commits to a specific scientific theory despite the existence of competing theories, a believer can commit to a specific religious tradition while acknowledging the existence of other traditions.

Decisive Epistemological Objections?

John Hick's Objection: Diversity is deeper than Alston acknowledges. It's not just different interpretations, but radically contradictory experiences (personal/impersonal, one/many).

Keith Yandell's Objection: Essential non-parity—sensory perception has verification mechanisms shared across cultures, while CMP lacks this.

Richard Gale's Objection: The problem of "mutual checking"—in science, scientists can examine each other's results; in religious experience this is practically impossible.

Contemporary Critical Assessment

Strengths:
- Moving beyond naive discussion about the "truth" of religious experiences
- Providing a sophisticated epistemic framework for religious experience
- Recognizing the social nature of knowledge

Weaknesses:
- Underestimating the severity of conflict between traditions
- Difficulty in epistemologically justifying "commitment" to one tradition
- Absence of independent criteria for arbitrating between traditions

Later Developments (2000-2024)

The "Epistemic Pluralism" Current: Accepts Alston's framework but rejects restricting reliability to one tradition. Kevin Schilbrack, Jerome Gellman develop models that accommodate multiple experiences without canceling their epistemic value.

The "Neurotheological" Current: Neurological studies of religious experiences (Newberg, d'Aquili) reveal common neural patterns across traditions—partially supporting Alston's idea of shared content.

The "Bayesian Approach" Current: Lori Paul, Michael Thune reformulate the discussion in Bayesian terms: How do religious experiences affect prior probabilities?

From the Perspective of Rational Preferability (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

Alston's project partially aligns with the rational preferability approach:
- It doesn't claim absolute certainty but relative reliability
- It acknowledges potential defeaters
- It presents religious experience as a factor within cumulative argumentation

But religious diversity remains a real challenge. Rational preferability accommodates this by acknowledging that religious experience is an important factor but not decisive, and that its preferential strength is affected by the degree of consensus or disagreement between traditions.

Where Are We Today?

The debate hasn't been settled. Most philosophers acknowledge that Alston provided a sophisticated epistemic framework, but the challenge of diversity remains. The current trend is toward more synthetic models that accommodate both the epistemic value of religious experience and the reality of radical diversity.

For Reading

- William Alston, Perceiving God (Cornell UP, 1991)
- Keith Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cambridge UP, 1993)
- Jerome Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief (Cornell UP, 1997)
- Kevin Schilbrack, "Religious Diversity and the Closed Mind" (2014)
- Kai-Man Kwan, The Rainbow of Experiences (2011)
- Page "Formulation: Argument from Religious Experience"