CORNEA, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement

This article examines the philosophical relationship between evidential arguments from evil and epistemic closure principles, with particular attention to the CORNEA (Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access) constraint. Wykstra develops his analysis through engagement with Rudolf Carnap's confirmation theory and contemporary debates about closure principles in epistemology.

The central contribution involves clarifying how CORNEA functions as a methodological constraint on evidential arguments against theism. Wykstra argues that when skeptical theists invoke CORNEA to block inferences from observed evils to gratuitous evils, they employ a principle analogous to certain closure requirements in confirmation theory. He demonstrates that CORNEA operates not as a general skeptical principle but as a targeted requirement for specific types of evidential inferences about divine purposes.

Wykstra's analysis proceeds by examining Carnap's distinction between instance confirmation and general confirmation, showing how similar distinctions apply to arguments from evil. He contends that critics who reject CORNEA often conflate different types of epistemic closure, leading to what he terms "closure befuddlement." This confusion, he argues, stems from failing to distinguish between closure principles that preserve knowledge and those that preserve reasonable belief or evidential support.

The article makes several important moves in the God debate. First, it provides a more precise formulation of CORNEA that addresses common misunderstandings about its scope and application. Second, it shows how debates about divine hiddenness and gratuitous evil involve complex issues about evidential standards that parallel broader epistemological controversies. Third, Wykstra demonstrates that accepting CORNEA does not commit one to general skepticism about moral knowledge or perceptual beliefs, contrary to some critics' charges.

The work's significance lies in its methodological sophistication. By connecting debates about evil to fundamental issues in confirmation theory and epistemology of perception, Wykstra elevates the discussion beyond simple intuition pumping. His analysis reveals that disagreements about CORNEA often reflect deeper disagreements about the nature of evidence, reasonable expectation, and epistemic access. This reframing suggests that progress in the problem of evil debate requires greater attention to underlying epistemological commitments rather than direct appeals to moral intuitions about suffering.