In Defense of the Soul

This monograph presents a sustained philosophical defense of substance dualism, arguing that human persons possess an immaterial soul distinct from the physical body. Rae develops his case through careful engagement with contemporary philosophy of mind, particularly addressing physicalist and materialist accounts that dominate current academic discourse. The work positions itself within the analytic tradition while drawing upon classical Christian philosophical resources, especially Thomistic insights about the nature of the soul.

The argument proceeds through several interconnected stages. First, Rae examines the phenomenology of consciousness, contending that first-person subjective experience cannot be adequately explained through purely physical processes. He analyzes qualia, intentionality, and the unity of consciousness as features that resist reduction to neurological states. Second, the work addresses the problem of personal identity through time, arguing that psychological continuity theories and biological approaches fail to account for the persistence of the self. Rae proposes that only an immaterial soul can ground diachronic identity while explaining both continuity and change in personal development.

Central to Rae's methodology is his critique of prevailing naturalistic assumptions in philosophy of mind. He challenges the explanatory adequacy of functionalism, eliminative materialism, and property dualism, demonstrating how each position encounters significant conceptual difficulties. The work engages extensively with contemporary philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, Paul Churchland, and David Chalmers, while also incorporating neuroscientific findings that Rae interprets as compatible with dualist commitments.

The theological implications receive careful treatment without compromising philosophical rigor. Rae explores how substance dualism coheres with doctrines of creation, moral responsibility, and the afterlife, though these considerations supplement rather than drive the philosophical arguments. He addresses the interaction problem that has plagued dualism since Descartes, proposing a model of psychophysical laws that govern soul-body causation.

This work contributes significantly to debates about divine action and human nature. By defending the reality of immaterial souls, Rae preserves conceptual space for libertarian free will and genuine agency, both crucial for traditional theistic ethics and soteriology. His arguments challenge the sufficiency of physicalism to explain human persons, thereby indirectly supporting a theistic worldview that includes non-physical realities. The monograph serves as a sophisticated rejoinder to materialist philosophy of mind while demonstrating the continued viability of classical Christian anthropology within contemporary analytic philosophy.