Justice for Hedgehogs

Ronald Dworkin's Justice for Hedgehogs presents a comprehensive moral philosophy that grounds human values in an integrated unity, developing implications that bear significantly on debates about God and religious belief. The work advances a secular framework for objective moral truth while engaging substantively with theistic alternatives to his position.

Dworkin argues that all values form an interconnected web, rejecting Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism in favor of what he terms the "unity of value." This unity stems from the fundamental principle of human dignity, which Dworkin analyzes as comprising two dimensions: intrinsic value (each life matters objectively) and personal responsibility (each person bears special responsibility for their own life). From these foundations, he derives principles of morality, ethics, justice, and political legitimacy without recourse to divine authority or metaphysical grounding beyond human practice itself.

The work engages the God debate through its treatment of religious conviction and moral objectivity. Dworkin distinguishes between religious faith narrowly conceived (belief in a personal God) and what he calls the "religious attitude" - a broader stance recognizing objective value and cosmic purpose. He argues that atheists can possess this religious attitude, experiencing awe at natural beauty and conviction about moral truth without accepting theistic metaphysics. This position challenges both traditional theistic claims that God provides the necessary foundation for moral objectivity and crude atheistic positions that dismiss all religious sensibility as delusion.

Methodologically, Dworkin employs interpretive philosophy, treating moral and political concepts as requiring constructive interpretation rather than empirical or conceptual analysis alone. He develops his arguments through engagement with major philosophical traditions, particularly responding to moral skepticism, relativism, and divine command theory. The work represents a significant contribution to secular moral realism, demonstrating how objective values might exist independently of God while acknowledging the profound human experiences that motivate religious belief.

The monograph's importance to God debates lies in its sophisticated defense of moral objectivity without theistic foundations and its nuanced treatment of religious experience. By arguing that the "religious attitude" transcends belief in God, Dworkin opens space for dialogue between believers and non-believers who share commitment to value's reality and importance. His framework challenges both sides to reconsider the relationship between moral truth, human dignity, and ultimate reality.