Religion After Science

This monograph presents a systematic philosophical investigation into the implications of humanity's temporal position in evolutionary and cultural history for religious belief. Schellenberg argues that recognizing our species' relative youth—merely 200,000 years into what may be a multi-million year trajectory—fundamentally transforms how we should approach religious questions. Rather than defending traditional theistic or atheistic positions, the work develops a framework centered on "ultimism": the proposition that there exists a reality that is metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate, without specifying its nature.

The analysis proceeds through careful examination of what Schellenberg terms "temporal vertigo"—the disorienting recognition of humanity's early developmental stage. He contends that just as we would not expect scientific maturity from our ancestors 150,000 years ago, we should not assume our current religious concepts adequately capture ultimate reality. This temporal perspective undermines confidence in both religious belief and disbelief, suggesting instead an attitude of patient inquiry suited to our epistemic limitations.

Central to Schellenberg's argument is the distinction between determinate religious claims (such as personal theism) and the more minimal commitment of ultimism. While traditional philosophy of religion focuses on evaluating specific religious doctrines, this work shifts attention to whether any religious orientation is appropriate given our developmental status. The author argues that skepticism about detailed religious claims is compatible with openness to religious possibility itself.

The work engages critically with both religious philosophers who assume humanity's religious maturity and secular thinkers who consider religious questions settled. Against religious traditionalists, Schellenberg marshals evolutionary considerations showing the contingency and likely primitiveness of current religious concepts. Against secular certainty, he argues that dismissing religious possibility altogether reflects temporal parochialism—an unjustified confidence that our current stage of inquiry has exhausted the options.

Methodologically, the work exemplifies analytic philosophy's emphasis on careful conceptual distinctions and sustained argument. Schellenberg develops a novel vocabulary for discussing religious possibility without predetermined theological commitments. His pluralist orientation appears in the work's openness to various forms ultimate reality might take, while maintaining that rational assessment remains possible. The monograph's significance lies in reframing the God debate around temporal humility rather than competing certainties, offering a philosophically rigorous alternative to both traditional belief and disbelief.