The Existence of God and the Existence of Homer: Rethinking Theism and Revelatory Claims

This article challenges the conventional epistemological boundaries that separate religious belief from historical inquiry, arguing that evidence for divine revelation deserves the same serious consideration accorded to evidence for historical figures like Homer. Menssen contends that contemporary philosophy of religion artificially restricts itself by refusing to examine specific revelatory claims, thereby handicapping theistic arguments from the outset.

The work critiques what Menssen identifies as an unjustified double standard in academic philosophy. While scholars readily debate the existence of Homer based on textual and historical evidence, philosophers typically dismiss revelatory claims as beyond rational assessment. This asymmetry, she argues, stems not from principled epistemological concerns but from unexamined assumptions about the proper scope of philosophical inquiry. The article systematically dismantles the notion that revelatory claims are inherently more problematic than other historical claims, demonstrating that both rely on similar forms of evidence including testimony, textual analysis, and coherence with broader historical patterns.

Central to Menssen's argument is the claim that natural theology alone cannot establish a robust theism capable of addressing existential human concerns. Without considering specific revelatory traditions, philosophical theism remains abstract and religiously inadequate. She argues that philosophers who exclude revelatory evidence while purporting to assess theism comprehensively are like historians who would evaluate Homer's existence while refusing to examine the Iliad and Odyssey. This methodological critique extends to both theistic and atheistic philosophers who debate God's existence in purely abstract terms.

The article's significance lies in its challenge to entrenched disciplinary boundaries. Menssen advocates for a more integrated approach that combines philosophical rigor with serious engagement of religious traditions' specific claims. This position threatens the comfortable separation between philosophy of religion and theology that has characterized much Anglo-American philosophy since the Enlightenment. By arguing that revelatory claims merit the same evidential scrutiny as historical claims, she opens new avenues for theistic argumentation while challenging atheistic dismissals that rely on ruling out revelatory evidence a priori.

The work contributes to broader debates about religious epistemology, the relationship between faith and reason, and the proper methodology for philosophy of religion. Its provocative thesis demands that philosophers either provide principled reasons for excluding revelatory evidence or expand their evidential base when assessing theistic claims.