The Problem of Animal Pain: A Theodicy for All Creatures Great and Small

This monograph presents a comprehensive theodicy addressing the longstanding problem of animal suffering within theistic philosophy. Dougherty develops an innovative framework that extends traditional human-centered theodicies to encompass all sentient creatures, arguing that animal pain poses no insurmountable challenge to belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God.

The work engages critically with both classical and contemporary approaches to the problem of evil, particularly those that minimize or dismiss animal suffering as philosophically irrelevant. Against philosophers who argue that animals lack the cognitive sophistication necessary for morally significant suffering, Dougherty marshals empirical evidence from animal cognition research and ethology to demonstrate that many non-human animals experience genuine pain states deserving moral consideration. This empirical grounding distinguishes the work from purely speculative theodicies.

Central to Dougherty's argument is a neo-Cartesian framework that attributes souls to animals while maintaining crucial distinctions between human and non-human consciousness. He proposes that animal suffering serves instrumental goods within God's broader creative purposes, including the development of natural virtues, ecological balance, and opportunities for human moral development through compassionate response to animal need. Significantly, Dougherty extends eschatological hope to animals, arguing for their inclusion in divine redemption—a position that challenges anthropocentric readings of traditional Christian theology.

The monograph responds directly to atheistic arguments, particularly those advanced by Rowe and Draper, who cite apparently gratuitous animal suffering as evidence against theism. Dougherty contends that such arguments fail to account for the limitations of human epistemic access to divine purposes and the possibility of goods beyond our current comprehension. He develops a "nooseeum" defense specifically tailored to animal suffering, arguing that our inability to discern purposes for all instances of animal pain does not entail their purposelessness.

Methodologically, the work combines analytic philosophy with systematic theology, drawing on patristic and medieval sources while engaging contemporary debates in philosophy of mind and environmental ethics. This interdisciplinary approach yields fresh perspectives on ancient questions, offering resources for theists grappling with evolutionary biology's implications for divine providence. The monograph's significance lies in its serious treatment of animal suffering as a philosophical problem requiring robust theological response, rather than dismissal or minimization. By expanding theodicy's scope beyond humanity, Dougherty addresses a lacuna in natural theology while contributing to broader discussions about animal ethics and environmental responsibility within theistic worldviews.