The Religious Mind.. An Evolutionary Argument for Theological Non-Realism

This monograph examines the implications of evolutionary psychology for theological realism, arguing that understanding the evolutionary origins of religious cognition undermines claims about the objective reality of religious entities. Walker develops a sophisticated philosophical analysis that bridges evolutionary science and philosophy of religion, challenging traditional assumptions about the relationship between religious experience and divine reality.

Walker's central thesis contends that evolutionary explanations for religious cognition provide compelling reasons to adopt theological non-realism. She systematically examines how natural selection shaped human cognitive faculties to produce religious beliefs and experiences, arguing that these evolutionary origins cast significant doubt on whether such beliefs accurately represent external theological realities. The work engages extensively with recent developments in cognitive science of religion, particularly theories about agency detection, theory of mind, and the evolutionary advantages of religious belief systems.

The monograph critically engages with both design arguments and consciousness-based arguments for divine existence. Regarding design, Walker inverts traditional teleological reasoning by suggesting that the appearance of design in religious cognition itself points toward natural rather than supernatural origins. She argues that the human tendency to perceive purpose and intentionality in nature reflects evolved cognitive biases rather than genuine divine design. On consciousness, Walker examines how evolutionary accounts of religious experience challenge arguments that locate evidence for God in the unique qualities of human consciousness and spiritual awareness.

Walker's philosophical methodology combines careful conceptual analysis with empirical findings from evolutionary psychology and cognitive science. She distinguishes her position from crude reductionism, acknowledging the complexity and significance of religious phenomena while maintaining that their evolutionary origins undermine realist interpretations. The work engages critically with both naturalistic debunkers of religion and theological defenders who attempt to reconcile evolution with religious realism.

The monograph's significance lies in its rigorous philosophical treatment of a question often addressed only polemically. Walker demonstrates how evolutionary considerations generate specific philosophical problems for theological realism without dismissing the cultural and personal importance of religious belief. Her work contributes to growing philosophical literature on the implications of cognitive science for religious epistemology, offering a nuanced argument that evolutionary explanations of religious cognition support non-realist interpretations of theological claims while remaining sensitive to the dialogical complexity of the science-religion interface.