GOD Database

SUMMARY

The problem of evil presents one of philosophy's most enduring challenges to theistic belief, questioning how an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God could permit suffering and evil. The challenge takes both logical and evidential forms, and is treated within the project framework as a transversal objection — one that cuts across all six masālik rather than belonging to any single pathway. Honest engagement requires acknowledging the weight of the challenge before offering responses, and accepting that no response fully removes the existential weight of suffering.

The Logical Problem of Evil

The logical problem, most forcefully articulated by J.L. Mackie in "Evil and Omnipotence" (1955), argues that the existence of any evil whatsoever is logically incompatible with an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God. Mackie's formulation suggests that these divine attributes, when taken together with the observable reality of evil, generate an inconsistent set.

The argument proceeds from a triad: (1) God is omnipotent, (2) God is perfectly good, and (3) evil exists. According to this reasoning, an omnipotent God would have the power to prevent all evil, a perfectly good God would desire to prevent all evil, and an omniscient God would know how to prevent all evil. The persistence of evil therefore appears to demonstrate either God's non-existence or the falsity of traditional divine attributes.

Most contemporary philosophers — including most philosophical critics of theism — now consider the logical problem to have been substantially answered by Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense (1974). Plantinga showed that if libertarian free will is genuinely possible and morally valuable, then it is logically possible that even an omnipotent God could not create a world containing free creatures who never freely choose evil. The defense does not require that this is actually the case; it requires only logical possibility, which suffices to defeat the logical problem.

This shift in the consensus is significant: the contemporary debate has largely moved to the evidential problem, where the issue is no longer logical compatibility but probabilistic weight.

The Evidential Problem of Evil

The evidential problem, developed by William Rowe and Paul Draper, concedes that evil's existence might be compatible with theism but argues that the quantity, intensity, and distribution of evil provide strong evidence against God's existence. Rowe's influential 1979 paper focuses on what he calls "apparently pointless suffering" — evils that seem to serve no greater good or necessary purpose. His famous example is a fawn caught in a forest fire, suffering alone for days before dying — suffering that appears to serve no compensating human or divine purpose.

Paul Draper's more sophisticated probabilistic argument contends that the pattern of pain and pleasure in the world is more likely under what he calls the "hypothesis of indifference" (the universe is indifferent to the wellbeing of sentient creatures) than under theism. This shifts the debate from logical impossibility to comparative likelihood: not whether God and evil can coexist, but whether their coexistence is more probable than naturalistic alternatives.

The evidential problem is widely regarded as the more pressing version. Engaging it requires more than logical possibility — it requires showing that the appearance of pointless evil does not, on reflection, weigh significantly against theism.

Theodicies: Free Will, Soul-Making, and Skeptical Theism

Theodicies attempt to identify morally sufficient reasons for divine permission of evil. Several principal traditions:

The Free Will Defense / Theodicy. Plantinga's defense in God, Freedom, and Evil (1974) argued for the bare logical possibility of moral evil arising from free will. A theodicy — distinct from a defense — would claim that free will actually explains evil. The defense is stronger than the theodicy because it claims less. Plantinga himself is careful about this distinction.

Soul-Making Theodicy. John Hick's Evil and the God of Love (1966) draws on Irenaean rather than Augustinian traditions, proposing that evil and suffering serve the necessary purpose of moral and spiritual development. A world without challenges would be inadequate for the formation of mature, virtuous character. Critics including Marilyn McCord Adams argue that soul-making fails to address horrendous evils — evils so devastating that they appear to destroy rather than build character.

Skeptical Theism. Advocated by Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and others, this approach challenges the evidential problem by questioning human cognitive ability to discern God's reasons for permitting evil. Wykstra's "CORNEA" principle (Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access) holds that evidence of absence requires reasonable expectation that evidence of presence would be accessible. Applied to evil: the appearance of pointless suffering counts as evidence against God only if we would reasonably expect to discern God's reasons. Critics argue that this move risks undermining moral reasoning in general by casting doubt on our capacity to recognize good reasons in any context.

Eleonore Stump's Narrative Theodicy. In Wandering in Darkness (2010), Stump develops a different approach grounded in biblical narratives (Job, Samson, Abraham, Mary of Bethany), arguing that suffering can be the occasion for a deepened relationship with God that constitutes a good of a kind impossible without the suffering. The approach engages the existential and personal weight of suffering rather than treating it primarily as a logical puzzle.

Marilyn McCord Adams on Horrendous Evils. In Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (1999), Adams argues that "horrendous evils" — evils that prima facie destroy the possibility of a person's life being a great good — cannot be addressed by standard theodicies. Her theological response invokes the dimension of the afterlife and divine participation in human suffering (in the Christian frame, the Incarnation).

Islamic Engagement with the Problem

Islamic intellectual tradition has engaged the problem of evil extensively, though typically with different conceptual emphases than Western analytic theodicy.

Classical Muʿtazilite theology (al-Naẓẓām, ʿAbd al-Jabbār) developed sophisticated treatments grounded in divine justice (ʿadl), often arguing that God's purposes in permitting evil must accord with what is rationally good for creatures. The Ashʿarite school countered with a different emphasis on divine sovereignty and the inscrutability of divine wisdom (ḥikma).

Al-Ghazali's treatment in al-Iqtisad fi al-Iʿtiqad and elsewhere emphasized divine wisdom and the limits of human moral judgment regarding the cosmic order. Ibn al-Qayyim's Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa-l-Qadar wa-l-Ḥikma wa-l-Taʿlīl is one of the most extensive premodern treatments, arguing for the role of divine wisdom in permitting evil. Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī in al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-Sharīʿa developed a related approach grounded in human moral development.

Three concepts are central to Islamic engagement: ibtilāʾ (testing — the idea that earthly life is a probationary period), ḥikma (divine wisdom — that God's reasons exceed human comprehension), and al-ākhira (the afterlife — that the books of justice are balanced beyond this life). The afterlife dimension is particularly important: without it, much suffering becomes morally unintelligible; with it, suffering is denied the status of the final word without thereby being explained away.

The Position of the Project Framework

The framework of this project takes a specific position on the problem of evil that warrants explicit statement:

The problem is acknowledged in its full weight, not minimized. The framework explicitly rejects apologetic minimization (e.g., "all evil is for a greater good" as a glib formula).
The logical problem is regarded as substantially addressed by Plantinga's defense; the evidential problem remains live.
No theodicy or defense removes the existential weight of suffering. The intellectual response is distinct from the personal-existential response.
The eschatological dimension is held to be important: a framework without an afterlife may render much suffering morally unintelligible, but the afterlife does not erase suffering — it prevents it from being the final word.
The cumulative case (across the six masālik) for faith does not require that the problem of evil be fully resolved. It requires that the problem not decisively outweigh the cumulative weight of considerations in favor of faith.

This is a position of epistemic modesty: the framework offers neither the apologetic claim that evil is fully explained, nor the atheistic claim that evil decisively refutes theism. The problem of evil remains a genuine cost of the theistic position, weighed against the cumulative considerations of the other masālik.

KEY DISTINCTIONS

• Logical vs. Evidential Problem: The logical problem claims evil makes God's existence impossible; the evidential problem argues evil makes God's existence less probable • Theodicy vs. Defense: A theodicy claims to identify God's actual reasons for permitting evil; a defense merely shows that God's existence remains possible despite evil • Moral vs. Natural Evil: Moral evils result from free agents' choices; natural evils arise from disease, disaster, and natural processes • First-order vs. Second-order Goods: First-order goods are intrinsically valuable; second-order goods (courage, compassion) presuppose the possibility of evil • Intellectual vs. Existential Response: An intellectual response addresses the logical and probabilistic structure of the problem; an existential response addresses the lived experience of suffering. The framework treats these as related but distinct • Horrendous vs. Ordinary Evils: Adams's distinction between evils so devastating they appear to destroy the meaning of a life vs. evils that can be incorporated into a meaningful life

MAJOR CRITICS OF THEISM (proponents of the problem)

• J.L. Mackie — Formulated the logical problem of evil in its classic form • William Rowe — Developed the evidential problem focused on apparently pointless suffering • Paul Draper — Probabilistic argument that the pattern of pain favors the hypothesis of indifference over theism • David Hume — Presented influential early formulations in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion • Graham Oppy — Contemporary systematic critic; engages theodicy and defense literature in detail

MAJOR RESPONDENTS (defenders against the problem)

• Alvin Plantinga — God, Freedom, and Evil (1974); the Free Will Defense against the logical problem • John Hick — Evil and the God of Love (1966); the soul-making theodicy • Eleonore Stump — Wandering in Darkness (2010); narrative theodicy through biblical literature • Marilyn McCord Adams — Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (1999); engages the worst cases • Stephen Wykstra — Skeptical theism and the CORNEA principle • Michael Bergmann — Refined skeptical theism in response to objections • Richard Swinburne — Sophisticated theodicy emphasizing the value of moral responsibility and natural law • Peter van Inwagen — The Problem of Evil (2006); skeptical engagement combined with defense

CLASSICAL ISLAMIC ENGAGEMENT

• ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī — Muʿtazilite treatment grounded in divine justice (ʿadl) • Al-Ghazali — Wisdom-based response in al-Iqtisad fi al-Iʿtiqad • Ibn Sina — Treatment of evil as privation, drawing on Neoplatonic resources • Ibn al-Qayyim — Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl — one of the most extensive premodern treatments • Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī — al-Dharīʿa ilā Makārim al-Sharīʿa — moral-developmental approach

The Problem of Evil