If morality is merely divine command, would killing become good if God commanded it?

This is a profound philosophical question posed by Plato 2,400 years ago in the "Euthyphro" dialogue, and it continues to be vigorously debated today. The question presents us with a dilemma: Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? If we say the former, morality appears to become arbitrary. If we say the latter, there seems to be a standard of goodness independent of God.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some believers: "God would never command killing, so the question is meaningless" — this ignores biblical and Quranic examples where there are divine commands for warfare or killing in specific contexts. "What God commands is good by definition, period" — this doesn't answer the philosophical question but rather ignores it.

From some atheists: "This proves that religious morality is contradictory" — this is hasty, as believing philosophers have developed sophisticated responses. "Morality is objective without God" — this requires justification, as where does moral objectivity come from in a purely material world?

Analyzing the Dilemma Precisely

The Euthyphro dilemma presents two options, both of which seem problematic:

First Option: Pure Divine Command — Something is good solely because God commands it. The problem: this makes morality arbitrary. If God commanded random killing, it would become good. This conflicts with our deep moral intuitions.

Second Option: Independent Morality — God commands good because it is good in itself. The problem: this seems to place a standard of goodness above or outside God, limiting His absolute sovereignty.

Serious Positions in the Debate

First, Modified Divine Command Theory. Some philosophers (like Robert Adams) argue: God commands what He commands based on His necessarily good nature. God doesn't "choose" to be good — goodness is part of His eternal nature. Therefore, He cannot command pure evil.

The advantage: preserves God's role in founding morality without making it arbitrary.

Second, Divine Nature Theory. Morality isn't external "commands" from God, but a reflection of His nature. Love is good because God is love, justice is good because God is just. Morality is rooted in God's essence, not in His arbitrary commands.

This transcends the dilemma: morality is neither independent of God nor arbitrary.

Third, Distinguishing Types of Commands. Some philosophers distinguish between:
- Essential moral commands (don't kill the innocent, don't oppress) — these reflect God's nature
- Contextual or legislative commands (rulings specific to time and place) — these may change

Fourth, The Natural Position. Some philosophers argue that morality is founded in human nature, reason, or utility, independent of divine commands. But this faces its own challenge: where does the normativity of nature or reason come from?

Application to the Example of Killing

In most serious religious ethical theories, the random killing of innocents remains evil even if we hypothetically assumed a divine command for it. Why? Because:

- In divine nature theory: this contradicts God's just and merciful nature
- In modified command theory: the necessarily good God cannot command pure evil
- Even divine commands for warfare in religious texts are constrained by contexts and conditions

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

The Euthyphro dilemma remains one of the most important challenges in philosophy of religion. Contemporary believing philosophers (like William Craig and Richard Swinburne) have developed sophisticated responses that transcend the simple dichotomy. Today's debate revolves around: Can objective morality be founded without transcendent reference? And if reference is necessary, what exactly is its nature?

For Advanced Reading

- Intermediate level: William Craig's contemporary formulation of the moral argument
- Advanced level: Erik Wielenberg's critique of the divine necessity for morality
- "Moral Argument" family page on the website