Does Robert Adams's "earthly moral theology" succeed in grounding moral values in the nature of God, or does it fall into a revised Euthyphro dilemma?

This question addresses one of the most sophisticated philosophical attempts to overcome the classical Euthyphro dilemma. Robert Merrihew Adams—the American philosopher specializing in philosophy of religion and ethics—developed in his book "Finite and Infinite Goods" (1999) an advanced theory attempting to ground ethics in the nature of God without falling into the trap of arbitrariness or circularity. The question posed: did he truly succeed in this endeavor?

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of monotheism:

"The Euthyphro dilemma has been solved since the Middle Ages." A simplistic claim. The dilemma renews itself in contemporary forms, and its classical solutions (such as Ashʿarite theory or Aquinas) do not address all contemporary challenges. Adams himself acknowledges that classical solutions are insufficient.

"God is necessarily the source of ethics, no discussion needed." A faith-based rather than philosophical position. Even if we accept that God is the source of ethics, the philosophical question remains: how? And what is the nature of this relationship? Faith does not eliminate the need for philosophical analysis.

"Adams solved the dilemma definitively." An exaggeration. Adams himself is more modest and acknowledges that his theory faces challenges. The philosophical discussion around it remains ongoing and active.

From some critics:

"The Euthyphro dilemma destroys any attempt to ground ethics religiously." A hasty generalization. The dilemma poses a serious challenge, but it does not close the door definitively. Sophisticated attempts like Adams's deserve careful evaluation.

"Adams hides circularity with complex language." An accusation requiring proof. The theory's complexity may be necessary to deal with the complexity of the issue, not an attempt at obfuscation.

"Secular ethics is better than any religious ethics." A prior value judgment. The question is not which is "better" but whether Adams's theory is philosophically coherent or not.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They share in ignoring the precise philosophical details of Adams's theory and the nature of the challenge it faces. Serious discussion requires accurate understanding of the theory and of the dilemma in its contemporary formulation.

The Euthyphro Dilemma: Classical and Contemporary Formulations

In Plato's dialogue "Euthyphro," Socrates poses the question: are actions good because the gods love them, or do the gods love them because they are good?

The first horn means ethics is arbitrary—if the gods loved murder, it would become good. The second horn means ethics is independent of the gods—so what need do we have for them in ethics?

The contemporary formulation is more sophisticated:
- If an action is good only because God commands it, then ethics is arbitrary and lacks rational foundation.
- If God commands an action because it is independently good, then ethics is independent of God.
- In both cases, grounding ethics in God appears problematic.

Adams's Theory: The Basic Structure

Adams develops what he calls the "Modified Divine Command Theory" with three interconnected elements:

First: The Supreme Good is identical with God's nature.
God does not "command" good from outside his nature, but his nature itself is the standard of good. This transcends the first horn of the dilemma—ethics is not arbitrary because it is rooted in a necessary, not contingent, nature.

Second: Moral obligation arises from God's commands.
But not just any god, but the God who is loving by nature. Moral commands are commands of a perfectly loving being, and this ensures their non-arbitrariness. This transcends the charge of arbitrariness without abandoning the role of divine command.

Third: The distinction between "good" and "right/obligatory."
Actions may be good without being morally obligatory. Obligation comes from divine command, but goodness is rooted in divine nature. This distinction allows for greater complexity than simple dualism.

How Does Adams Transcend the Dilemma?

Adams rejects the strict dualism of the dilemma. Instead of "either God commands good because it is good, or it is good because God commands it," Adams proposes: God commands what aligns with his loving nature, and his nature is the standard of good itself.

This resembles saying: God does not "choose" to be loving, but love is a necessary part of his nature. And his commands flow from this nature, so they are neither arbitrary nor independent of him.

Illustrative example: When God commands justice, it is not because justice is "good in itself" independently, nor because he "decided" arbitrarily to make justice good. Rather, because justice reflects his just nature, and his command flows from his desire that creation reflect his perfection.

Philosophical Criticism: The Revised Euthyphro Dilemma

Critics propose that Adams did not solve the dilemma but transferred it to another level:

First Criticism: The Divine Nature Dilemma.
If God's nature is the standard of good, we ask: is God's nature good because it has certain attributes (love, justice, mercy), or are these attributes good because they are God's attributes?

If we say the first, we return to standards independent of God. If we say the second, we return to arbitrariness—if God's nature were cruel, cruelty would become good.

Second Criticism: The Problem of Metaphysical Necessity.
Adams responds that God's nature is necessary, not contingent. But this raises a question: what makes a particular nature "necessary"? If necessity is independent of God, we return to external standards. If God determines his necessity, we fall into circularity.

Third Criticism: The Problem of Moral Knowledge.
Even if we accept that God's nature is the standard of good, how do we know this nature? If we say through revelation, we fall into circularity (we need moral standards to evaluate revelation claims). If we say through reason, then reason has independent capacity to know good.

Adams's Defense and Subsequent Defenses

Adams and his followers (such as William Alston and Robert Adams) respond:

To the first criticism: The question "why is God's nature good?" is meaningless because God is the Supreme Good by definition. This is not arbitrariness but conceptual necessity—like asking "why are bachelors unmarried?"

But critics respond: the difference is that "bachelorhood" is a linguistic definition, while "good" is a normative concept. Linking the normative concept to a particular being requires justification.

To the second criticism: The metaphysical necessity of divine nature is not "imposed" from outside or by God himself, but is simply a brute fact. Some facts are basic and need no deeper explanation.

But this weakens the claim that God "explains" ethics—if his nature is a brute fact, then ethics is also a brute fact, and what is the benefit of linking it to God?

To the third criticism: Moral knowledge is possible through multiple ways: moral intuition (fiṭra), rational contemplation, moral experience, and revelation as a complementary not sole source. No circularity because we have multiple epistemological sources.

Contemporary Developments

Mark Murphy's "Divine Nature Theory" (2011):
Develops Adams's theory by focusing on God not just as the "standard" of good but as the metaphysical "foundation" of moral values' existence. Values are not "attributes" of God's nature but necessary "emanations" from it.

Linda Zagzebski's "Divine Attitude Theory" (2004):
Focuses on divine attitudes rather than commands or nature. An action is right if the God perfect in wisdom and love approves of it.

Erik Wielenberg's "Explanatory Priority" criticism (2005):
Proposes that Adams did not solve the problem of explanatory priority: does God explain ethics, or does ethics (partially) explain God's nature? If we say the first, we need to explain why God's nature has precisely those attributes that make ethics what it is. If we say the second, we undermine the claim that God grounds ethics.

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

The period between 2020 and 2026 witnessed notable developments in the discussion. From defenders of Adams's theory, T. Ryan Byerly (2023) developed an updated formulation linking divine nature theory with virtue theory, attempting to avoid the explanatory priority criticism through a model of "necessary emanation" of values from divine perfection. Similarly, Mark Murphy (2022) continued developing his theory with more precise distinctions between types of ontological grounding and levels of explanation. From critics, Erik Wielenberg (2024) deepened his criticism that any divine foundational theory faces an "impossible trinity": arbitrariness, or circularity, or acknowledgment of independent basic moral facts. Reconciliatory attempts also emerged, most notably Andrew Loke's (2021) suggestion that the relationship between divine nature and values is not explanatory but "constitutive," which might completely reformulate the dilemma. The discussion remains open and active, with no consensus among specialists in either direction.

From the Perspective of Rational Preponderance (The Site's Method)

This discussion is a clear example of how cumulative rational preponderance (rajḥān ʿaqlī) works. There is no "decisive proof" for Adams's theory's success or failure. The cumulative reading takes into account:

─ Adams's theory represents genuine philosophical progress over classical divine command theory: it transcends the charge of simple arbitrariness and provides a metaphysical framework that is internally coherent to a considerable extent.

─ The criticism of "revised Euthyphro dilemma" is serious criticism that cannot be ignored: transferring the dilemma to the level of divine nature does not eliminate it but reformulates it at a deeper level.

─ The response that God's nature is a "brute fact" has weight, but it weakens the desired explanatory power from linking ethics to God, since the counterpart could adopt basic moral facts without divine mediation.

─ The result: Adams's theory makes the connection between God and ethics more reasonable than it was before it, but it does not close the dilemma definitively. The fair researcher acknowledges that both camps possess solid philosophical tools, and that preponderance depends partly on the broader metaphysical commitments each thinker adopts.