Does skeptical theism (Wykstra, Alston, Bergmann) succeed in refuting William Rowe's evidential argument, or do Paul Draper's objections remain standing?

Skeptical theism represents one of the most powerful contemporary responses to the evidential argument from evil, especially in William Rowe's formulation. It was developed by Stephen Wykstra, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann between the 1980s and the first decade of the millennium. However, Paul Draper has raised profound objections that deserve careful analysis. The question is not merely a technical debate, but touches the heart of religious knowledge: what are the limits of our knowledge of God's wisdom?

Inadequate Responses to Be Avoided

From some defenders of theism:

"God knows best about wisdom, we have no right to question." This evades philosophical discussion. The question is not about the "right" to question, but about the strength of the logical argument. Even the believer needs to understand why evil does not refute God's existence.

"Skeptical theism has definitively proven the failure of the argument from evil." This is an exaggeration. Even Wykstra and Bergmann present their position as a "defense," not as "conclusive proof." The philosophical debate continues, and declaring "victory" is premature.

"Evil is a test, and testing justifies everything." This is a misleading simplification. Not all evil can be explained as a test (the suffering of infants? natural disasters?). Skeptical theism is more sophisticated than this simple justification.

From some critics:

"Skeptical theism is merely epistemological evasion." This is reductive. The position has a precise philosophical structure, published in the finest academic journals. Rejecting it as "evasion" misses the depth of the argument.

"If we don't know God's reasons, how can we trust his promises?" This is Draper's well-known objection, but presenting it as a "definitive refutation" ignores the developed responses from Bergmann and others.

"Wykstra leads to comprehensive religious skepticism." This is a logical leap. Skeptical theism carefully delimits the scope of doubt: in knowing all of God's reasons, not in knowing God himself or his basic attributes.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They fail to realize that the debate is epistemically precise: what can we know about the relationship between specific evils and comprehensive divine good? The answer requires epistemological analysis, not merely general positions.

Rowe's Original Evidential Argument

William Rowe in "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" (1979) formulated the most influential evidential argument:

1. There exist evils for which we see no morally sufficient justification (pointless evils).
2. If an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God existed, there would be no unjustified evils.
3. Therefore, probably no all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God exists.

Rowe provides examples: a deer burns in a forest fire and dies in great pain without anyone seeing it. A little girl is raped and killed. These are evils that "seem" to have no moral purpose.

The argument is probabilistic, not definitive. Rowe does not claim certainty that no justification exists, but that our failure to see justification after serious inquiry makes its non-existence probable.

The Structure of Skeptical Theism

Skeptical theism attacks the inference from "we see no justification" to "probably no justification exists." The basic argument:

Wykstra's Thesis (1984): Our knowledge of the range of possible goods is very limited compared to God's knowledge. This is like an ant in a corner of a hall trying to assess the contents of the entire hall. Our failure to see justification does not indicate its non-existence.

Alston's Thesis (1991): Even if we knew all possible goods, our knowledge of the complex causal connections between events is limited. Today's evil might prevent greater evil after a thousand years in ways we cannot imagine.

Bergmann's Thesis (2001): Skeptical theism relies on general epistemological principles, not religion-specific ones:
- ST1: We have no reason to think the goods we know represent a representative sample of possible goods.
- ST2: We have no reason to think the evils we know represent a representative sample of possible evils.
- ST3: We have no reason to think our knowledge of connections between goods and evils represents actual connections.

These principles break the inference from "seems unjustified" to "actually unjustified."

Paul Draper's Objections

Paul Draper provided the strongest criticisms of skeptical theism in a series of articles (1989-2013):

The Symmetry Objection: If skeptical theism is correct, we should also doubt our ability to know that God will fulfill his promises. Perhaps there is some greater good that justifies breaking promises? This undermines religious trust.

The Additional Evidence Objection: The argument from evil does not depend only on "not seeing justification," but on patterns of evil in the world. The distribution of evil (apparently random, affecting innocent and guilty alike) resembles what we would expect from a godless world more than from a world managed by a wise God.

The Prior Probability Objection: Even if we accept that we cannot assess the probability of justification for specific evil, the prior probability of "world without God" versus "world with God who allows mysterious evils" favors the former.

Skeptical Theism's Responses to Draper

On the Symmetry Objection: Bergmann (2009) distinguishes between types of religious knowledge. Our knowledge of God's basic attributes (his justice, mercy) comes from revelation or philosophical proof, and is stronger than our detailed knowledge of all the reasons for his actions. We can trust that God is just without knowing all applications of his justice.

On the Additional Evidence Objection: Howard-Snyder and Bergmann (2007) respond that "apparent randomness" might be exactly what we would expect from a complex divine plan that exceeds our understanding. Apparent complexity as apparent randomness is known in complex systems.

On the Prior Probability Objection: This shifts the debate to the prior probabilities of theism and atheism, which is a separate discussion. Skeptical theism only claims that the evidential argument from evil does not significantly change the probabilities, not that it proves God's existence.

Contemporary Developments in the Debate

The "Moderate Skeptical Theism" current (Dayton 2017, McBrayer 2019) accepts limits to skepticism. Yes, our knowledge is limited, but not non-existent. We can offer "partial theodicies" for some evils while acknowledging our inability to explain everything.

The "Formal Analysis" current (Tooley 2013, Sober 2015) applies probability theory with mathematical precision to the debate. The question becomes: what is the exact value of P(unjustified evil | God exists)? The debate becomes technical but more precise.

The "Integrative Approaches" current (Stump 2018) combines skeptical theism with specific theodicies (free will, soul-making). Skepticism covers what theodicies do not explain, and theodicies reduce the need for comprehensive skepticism.

The Deeper Philosophical Points

The debate reveals a fundamental tension in philosophy of religion: between religious trust (we know that God is good and wise) and epistemic humility (we do not understand all his ways). Skeptical theism leans toward humility; its critics fear this leads to erosion of trust.

The deeper question: what is the nature of religious knowledge? Is it propositional knowledge (we know facts about God) or relational knowledge (we know God without complete understanding of his actions)? The distinction is important for the debate.

From the Perspective of Rational Preferability (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

Skeptical theism provides a strong defense against the evidential argument from evil, but it is not complete "refutation":

Strengths:
- It reveals a hidden assumption in Rowe's argument: that our knowledge is sufficient to assess divine reasons.
- It aligns with the epistemic humility required in major metaphysical issues.
- It provides general epistemological principles, not merely special defense.

Weaknesses:
- It might lead to erosion of religious trust if applied without limits.
- It does not explain why a loving God would allow this much mystery about evil.
- It sometimes appears as a

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

The period 2020-2026 witnessed notable transformations in this debate. On one hand, Bergmann continued refining his three principles (ST1-ST3) in response to new objections from Trakakouskas (2021) and Leon (2022) regarding what was called "the scope problem": to what extent does epistemological skepticism extend before it undermines any moral reasoning? On the other hand, Draper (2022) developed a more precise Bayesian probabilistic formulation that integrates the argument from evil with arguments from "divine hiddenness," emphasizing that the accumulation between the two problems raises the burden on skeptical theism. In contrast, a current of "Integrative Skeptical Theism" emerged with McBrayer and Dayton (2023) that mixes epistemological skepticism with partial theodicies and with narrative existential considerations inspired by Eleonore Stump. Artificial intelligence and computational modeling also entered the field of philosophy of religion (Shulman & Bostrom 2024), with probabilistic simulation being used to test whether the actual distribution of evils is more compatible with the theistic or naturalistic hypothesis, without clear resolution so far. The general trend indicates that the debate has not been settled in favor of either side, but has become more technically precise and less inclined toward decisive declarations.