Is Schellenberg's argument from divine hiddenness an independent problem of evil, or a special type of the evidential problem of evil?

This question touches on one of the most important developments in contemporary philosophy of religion. Since J.L. Schellenberg published his book "Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason" in 1993, the argument from divine hiddenness has become the center of independent debate in philosophical literature. However, the question about its relationship to the problem of evil reveals a deep tension in classifying philosophical problems against theism.

Inadequate responses to avoid

From some defenders of theism:

"Divine hiddenness is not evil at all, so the question is misguided." This simplification ignores the structure of the argument. Schellenberg does not claim that hiddenness is "evil" in the direct moral sense, but that the absence of a loving relationship with God creates existential suffering for sincere seekers. This suffering — whether we call it "evil" or not — poses a problem for the hypothesis of a perfectly loving God.

"The two problems are completely separate, with no relationship between them." This is a superficial reading of the literature. Even Schellenberg himself discusses the relationship between the two arguments in his later writings (2015, 2021). The claim of complete separation ignores the shared logical structure and contemporary discussions about classification.

"Hiddenness is divine mercy, not a problem." This is a theological leap that bypasses the philosophical argument. Even if hiddenness has wisdom behind it, this does not eliminate the philosophical question: why would a perfectly loving God remain hidden from sincere seekers who want to believe in Him? The theological answer does not automatically solve the philosophical problem.

From some critics of theism:

"It's merely a new formulation of the ancient problem of evil." This reduction misses what is new in Schellenberg's argument. The argument focuses on the value of personal relationship with God and the conditions of perfect love — concepts not central to traditional formulations of the problem of evil. Equating them impoverishes philosophical discussion.

"Every argument against theism is a type of problem of evil." This is excessive generalization. Although many arguments against theism contain the element of "tension with divine attributes," this does not make them all types of one problem. The argument from conceptual incoherence, for example, differs structurally from the problem of evil.

Why these responses are inadequate

They share a failure to analyze the precise logical structure of each argument. The question about the relationship between the hiddenness argument and the problem of evil requires structural analysis of both arguments, not merely general impressions or prior theological positions.

The logical structure of Schellenberg's argument

The hiddenness argument in its basic formulation:

(1) A perfectly loving God would always be ready for personal relationship with any person capable of it
(2) If God were ready for relationship, there would be no non-resistant non-believers
(3) Non-resistant non-believers exist
(4) Therefore, no perfectly loving God exists

The structure focuses on "perfect love" and "personal relationship" — concepts different from "preventing evil" in the traditional problem of evil.

The logical structure of the evidential problem of evil

In William Rowe's formulation:

(1) There exist seemingly gratuitous evils
(2) An omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God would not permit gratuitous evils
(3) Therefore, it is probable that no such God exists

The structure focuses on "evils" and "moral justifications" — concepts different from "relationship" and "love."

Structural similarities

First similarity: the structure of tension with divine attributes. Both arguments depend on tension between a state in the world (evils/hiddenness) and supposed divine attributes. This structural similarity is what leads some to classify hiddenness as a type of problem of evil.

Second similarity: dependence on empirical observation. Both start from empirical observation (existence of seemingly unjustified evils / existence of non-resistant non-believers) to reach philosophical conclusions.

Third similarity: susceptibility to response by "possible justifications." Just as some respond to the problem of evil with "there may be justifications we don't know," they respond to hiddenness with "there may be reasons for hiddenness we don't know." This parallelism in response strategies reinforces the resemblance.

Fundamental differences

First difference: the nature of the alleged "badness." The problem of evil deals with actual suffering (pain, death, injustice). Hiddenness deals with the absence of a possible good (relationship with God). Philosophically, there is a difference between "existence of evil" and "absence of good."

Second difference: the central divine attribute. The problem of evil primarily targets "perfect goodness." Hiddenness targets "perfect love." Despite the connection, these are conceptually different attributes.

Third difference: type of conclusion. The evidential problem of evil concludes "probably no God exists." Schellenberg concludes a stronger conclusion: "no perfectly loving God exists." The difference in strength of conclusion reflects a difference in logical structure.

Contemporary debate about classification

The "independence" position (Schellenberg, Howard-Snyder). They see the hiddenness argument as independent because it: (1) depends on the concept of perfect love, not just goodness, (2) focuses on the value of relationship, not preventing harm, (3) has its own literature and discussions. Daniel Howard-Snyder in his article "Hiddenness of God" (2016) affirms this independence.

The "special type" position (Stump, Murray). They see hiddenness as a special type of problem of evil because: (1) absence of relationship with God causes existential suffering, (2) the logical structure is similar (tension with divine attributes), (3) response strategies are parallel. Eleonore Stump in "Wandering in Darkness" (2010) treats hiddenness as part of the broader problem of suffering.

The "partial overlap" position (Draper, Muller). They see the two arguments as overlapping but not identical. Paul Draper suggests that hiddenness can be formulated as a problem of evil (suffering of seekers) or as an independent problem (absence of relationship). The formulation determines the classification.

Deeper philosophical analysis

The question of classification reveals a metaphilosophical issue: what are the criteria for distinguishing philosophical problems? Is difference in central concepts (love/good) sufficient? Must the logical structure differ? Is difference in literature and discussions enough?

From another perspective, perhaps the question of "complete independence" or "complete dependence" imposes a false dichotomy. Philosophical arguments overlap and differentiate simultaneously. The hiddenness argument has its specificity (focus on relationship and love) and generality (tension with divine attributes).

Recent developments (2020-2024)

A "critical integration" trend has emerged that sees the hiddenness argument and problem of evil as needing to be studied together because they reveal different patterns of tension in theistic conception. Veronika Weidner's book "The Axiology of Theism" (2023) analyzes how the two problems integrate in a comprehensive critique of theism.

In contrast, Schellenberg himself has developed the argument in new directions (temporal hiddenness, evolutionary hiddenness), which reinforces its independence. His article "Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy" (2021) affirms that the argument has evolved to become an independent research program.

From the perspective of rational preferability (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

The method of rational preferability transcends the classificatory question. Whether the hiddenness argument is independent or a type of problem of evil, it adds probabilistic weight against classical theism. What matters is not the classification but the cumulative force of the arguments.

From this perspective, hiddenness and the problem of evil form part of a broader "family" of challenges to theism. Each argument has its specificity, but they combine in building a cumulative case. This aligns with the cumulative method of the website.

The most philosophically precise position

Schellenberg's argument from divine hiddenness has characteristics of both an independent problem and a type of problem of evil. Rather than imposing binary classification, the more precise approach is to acknowledge both the specificity of the hiddenness argument (its focus on love and relationship) and its structural similarity to the problem of evil (tension with divine attributes).

Where we stand in this debate today

Between 2020 and 2026, the debate about classifying the hiddenness argument has crystallized into three main directions. The first direction, represented by Schellenberg himself in his recent works (2021-2023), continues to reinforce the argument's independence by expanding it to new dimensions — evolutionary hiddenness and cross-religious hiddenness — which structurally distances it from the traditional problem of evil. The second direction, influenced by the works of Weidner (2023) and Draper, adopts a "problem family" approach where hiddenness and evil are differentiated but integrated patterns of tension with classical theism. The third direction, the most recent, transcends the classificatory question entirely and focuses on cumulative effect: does adding the hiddenness argument to the problem of evil increase the probabilistic weight against theism, or do the two arguments rely on the same evidence so that one adds nothing new? This last question — the question of "evidential independence" — is the most active front today. The debate is not settled, but the prevailing trend in the literature leans toward recognizing the specificity of the hiddenness argument while acknowledging its partial overlap with the problem of evil.