Does the emphasis on faith and submission in Abrahamic traditions answer the problem of hiddenness, or does it deepen it?

The problem of divine hiddenness poses a central question: why doesn't a loving, omnipotent God manifest clearly to every sincere seeker? Abrahamic traditions respond by emphasizing faith and submission as conditions for relationship with God. This answer raises deep philosophical debate: does it resolve the problem or exacerbate it? Careful examination reveals genuine tension between the logic of hiddenness and the logic of faith.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of the traditions:

"Faith in the unseen is higher than proof, and hiddenness is divine mercy." Misleading oversimplification. Even within Abrahamic traditions, the relationship between faith and proof is complex. The Quran calls for reflection on signs, and the New Testament speaks of "many proofs" (Acts 1:3). Hiddenness may have wisdom, but describing it as absolute "mercy" ignores the suffering of sincere seekers.

"Those who don't believe are arrogant or insincere in their search." An unfair and unprovable accusation. Schellenberg himself—author of the hiddenness argument—was a Christian believer before becoming agnostic precisely because of this problem. Assuming bad faith in every non-believer closes the door to serious philosophical discussion.

From some critics:

"The emphasis on faith proves the weakness of evidence." A logical leap. Abrahamic traditions offer rational proofs (Islamic kalām, Christian natural theology), but they see complete divine knowledge as requiring more than logical demonstration. This is an epistemological position that can be debated, not an admission of weakness.

"The faith required in monotheism is by definition irrational." Conceptual confusion. Abrahamic traditions distinguish between "blind faith" (fideism) and "enlightened faith." Required faith isn't against reason, but transcends it to include personal trust and existential commitment.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They ignore the philosophical complexity of the relationship between faith and hiddenness. The question isn't "is faith good or bad?" but "does emphasizing it coherently resolve the problem of hiddenness?"

How Emphasizing Faith Might Resolve the Problem

First Argument: Faith as Condition for Authentic Relationship

Richard Swinburne in "The Existence of God" (2004) argues that relative hiddenness is necessary for free relationship with God. If God's existence were as clear as the sun, there would be no room for free choice in belief. The relationship would be "epistemically coercive." Faith—as an act of free trust—requires space for uncertainty.

This resembles human relationships: trusting a friend requires space for risk. If I knew all the friend's intentions with certainty, trust would lose its meaning.

Second Argument: Faith as Moral-Spiritual Development

John Hick in "Faith and Knowledge" (1966) developed "soul-making theodicy." Hiddenness is part of divine educational process: seeking God amid ambiguity develops moral and spiritual character. Faith isn't merely cognitive acceptance, but a process of existential transformation.

Kierkegaard anticipated a similar idea: the "leap of faith" isn't irrational, but transcends pure reason toward existential commitment that transforms the self.

Third Argument: Knowledge of God Requires Moral Preparation

Islamic tradition (al-Ghazālī in "Revival of the Religious Sciences") and Christian tradition (Augustine in "Confessions") agree: knowledge of God isn't purely intellectual matter. "Purity of heart" is a condition for "seeing God." Hiddenness may result from moral-spiritual veils, and faith is the process of removing these veils.

This doesn't mean accusing non-believers of moral corruption, but indicates that divine knowledge may require preparation that transcends intellectual capacity.

How Emphasizing Faith Might Deepen the Problem

First Problem: Logical Circularity

Schellenberg poses: if faith is a condition for knowing God, and faith requires initial knowledge of God (one cannot believe in what one doesn't know at all), we're in a circle. How can the sincere seeker begin the journey?

Some respond with "divine grace" that initiates the process, but this returns the question: why isn't this grace granted to every sincere seeker?

Second Problem: Divine Injustice

If faith is a condition for salvation or eternal happiness, and hiddenness makes faith difficult or impossible for some, this raises a moral problem. How can humans be judged for not believing in the context of divine hiddenness?

Studies in psychology of religion show that capacity for religious experiences varies biologically and psychologically. If faith depends partly on natural capacities, emphasizing it deepens the justice problem.

Third Problem: Religious Plurality

Hiddenness leaves room for multiple religious interpretations. If faith in a specific tradition (Christian, Islamic, Jewish) is required, how does the sincere seeker choose amid this plurality? Hiddenness + emphasis on particular faith = epistemic dilemma.

Contemporary Reconciliation Attempts

Paul Moser: "Transformative Knowledge of God"

In "The Elusive God" (2008), Moser develops a sophisticated theory: God hides from "objective" neutral knowledge, but manifests to those who seek him sincerely in transformative context. Faith isn't a blind leap, but response to divine invitation—hidden but real.

Alister McGrath: "Extended Rationality"

In "A Scientific Theology" (2001-2003), McGrath argues that faith extends rationality, doesn't negate it. Hiddenness calls for a different kind of knowledge—not less rational, but more comprehensive, integrating reason, intuition, experience, and commitment.

John Cottingham: "Spiritual Practice as Knowledge"

In "The Spiritual Dimension" (2005), Cottingham argues that spiritual practices (prayer, meditation, charity) aren't only results of faith, but paths to it. Hiddenness is gradually overcome through practice, not abstract reasoning.

Critical Assessment: Where Do We Stand?

Emphasizing faith in Abrahamic traditions offers a partial answer to the problem of hiddenness, but doesn't completely resolve it:

Strengths:
- Explains why divine knowledge isn't self-evident like mathematical knowledge
- Preserves human freedom in relationship with God
- Links knowledge to moral-spiritual transformation

Weaknesses:
- Leaves questions about divine justice toward sincere seekers
- Faces difficulty explaining diversity of religious experiences
- May appear as circular justification for pre-existing faith

Most Probable Position: Emphasizing faith provides an important dimension in understanding hiddenness, but needs completion with other elements (rational proofs, communal experience, openness to religious plurality) to be adequate answer. Hiddenness remains a real problem, and faith is part of the solution, not the complete solution.

For Advanced Reading

- Advanced level: Schellenberg's complete theory and responses from analytic philosophers
- Advanced level: Hiddenness in Islamic mysticism - Ibn ʿArabī and the concept of "veil"
- J. L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Cornell, 1993)
- Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God (Cambridge UP, 2008)
- Michael J. Murray, "Coercion and the Hiddenness of God" (American Philosophical Quarterly, 1993)
- Al-Ghazālī, al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā
- "Problem: Divine Hiddenness" page on the website