Does Paul Moser's response based on "volitional knowledge" successfully refute Schellenberg's argument, and what are the strongest counter-responses to it?

This question lies at the heart of contemporary debate about divine hiddenness in analytic philosophy of religion. Paul Moser—a philosopher of religion at Loyola University Chicago—has developed a distinctive response to Schellenberg's argument based on the concept of "volitional/filial knowledge," claiming that Schellenberg misunderstands the nature of religious knowledge that God desires from humans.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of theism:

"Moser has definitively proven that God hides for wisdom." An exaggerated claim. Moser offers an alternative interpretive framework, but he doesn't claim "definitive proof." His argument is philosophically probabilistic, and he himself acknowledges that it requires faith commitment.

"Schellenberg is just an atheist who wants impossible evidence." A distortion of Schellenberg's position. Schellenberg is a serious scholar who was a believer and then lost his faith specifically due to the hiddenness issue. His argument isn't a demand for impossible evidence, but a question about the consistency between God's supposed attributes and the reality of hiddenness.

"Volitional knowledge is clear to those who want to believe." Problematic circularity. If knowledge requires willing belief first, how can a non-believer be expected to attain it? This makes the argument non-dialogical with those outside the faith circle.

From some critics:

"Moser makes God narcissistic, wanting only submission." A caricature of Moser's position. Moser speaks of a transformative moral relationship, not mere submission. God in his conception wants deep moral transformation that requires volitional commitment.

"Volitional knowledge is just justification for lack of evidence." An unfair reduction. Moser offers an alternative epistemological framework rooted in philosophical tradition (from Kierkegaard to Polanyi on personal knowledge), not merely an "excuse" for absent evidence.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They fail to understand the complex philosophical nature of Moser's argument, which challenges the basic epistemological assumptions of Schellenberg's argument, and is not merely a defensive response.

Structure of Moser's Volitional Knowledge Argument

Moser builds his argument on three levels:

Level One: Critique of Schellenberg's Epistemological Assumption
Schellenberg assumes an "inferential" model of religious knowledge: a loving God must provide sufficient evidence for reason to infer His existence. Moser rejects this assumption, claiming it misunderstands the nature of knowledge desired by a God of love.

Level Two: Nature of Volitional Knowledge
Volitional knowledge for Moser is not theoretical knowledge (knowing that) but transformative relational knowledge (knowing as). The difference is fundamental:
- Theoretical knowledge: "I know that God exists" (a proposition one can accept without changing one's life)
- Volitional knowledge: "I know God as Father/Lord" (a relationship requiring moral transformation)

This knowledge requires from humans:
1. Readiness for moral transformation
2. Abandoning selfishness and pride
3. Openness to God's transformative will
4. Commitment to a life of divine love (agape)

Level Three: Wisdom of Divine Hiddenness
Hiddenness is not absence but a divine pedagogical strategy. God hides in a way that:
- Prevents coerced belief
- Preserves genuine moral freedom
- Makes faith a personal transformative commitment
- Reveals true heart intentions

Textual and Philosophical Evidence for Moser

Moser draws on:

From Christian tradition: Gospel stories where Jesus conceals his identity from those wanting signs for power or curiosity, and reveals it to those seeking transformation (such as the Emmaus story in Luke 24).

From philosophy: Kierkegaard's distinction between objective and subjective knowledge, Martin Buber's concept of "I-Thou" versus "I-It" relationships, and Levinas's critique of possessive knowledge.

From moral psychology: Studies showing that coerced knowledge doesn't lead to genuine moral transformation, while voluntary commitment produces deep change.

Strongest Counter-Responses to Moser

1. The "Sincere Seekers" Response (Schellenberg and Rea)

This is the strongest response: What about sincere seekers who genuinely want transformative knowledge and are prepared for moral transformation, but don't find God? Cases such as:
- Former believers who lost their faith despite sincere seeking
- Seekers from non-religious backgrounds open to faith
- Mystics from different traditions searching for truth

Rea and Peterson have documented numerous cases of people who meet Moser's criteria but don't reach faith.

2. The "Epistemic Arbitrariness" Response

If divine knowledge requires prior commitment, how can it be distinguished from self-deception? How do we distinguish between:
- Someone who committed and received genuine knowledge
- Someone who committed and convinced themselves of illusory knowledge

Moser's criteria for distinction (moral transformation, fruits of the spirit) can be psychologically mimicked without God's real existence.

3. The "Divine Injustice" Response

Even accepting Moser's framework, God appears unjust:
- Why do some receive clearer "invitations" to volitional knowledge?
- Why do cultural and psychological backgrounds strongly influence receptivity to volitional knowledge?
- Isn't it unfair to judge people for not responding to what wasn't clearly offered to them?

4. The "Excessive Pragmatism" Response

Howard-Snyder's critique: Moser transforms the question from "Does God exist?" to "Is commitment to God's existence transformatively beneficial?" This is a pragmatic shift that avoids the basic ontological question.

5. The "Contradiction with Perfect Divine Love" Response

Even accepting the importance of freedom, perfect love seems to require more clarity:
- A loving parent doesn't leave their child in absolute existential confusion
- Healthy relationships require basic clarity about the other party's existence
- Excessive ambiguity harms relationship more than it helps

Moser's Defenses and Possible Defenses

Moser and his supporters respond:

To "sincere seekers": Perhaps there are hidden obstacles (intellectual pride, attachment to autonomy, fear of consequences). Apparent sincerity doesn't guarantee deep openness.

To "epistemic arbitrariness": Volitional knowledge is tested by its long-term moral fruits. Genuine transformation differs qualitatively from self-suggestion.

To "injustice": God judges according to response to given light, not by a uniform standard. Diversity in invitations reflects diversity in capacities and circumstances.

To "pragmatism": Volitional knowledge doesn't avoid the ontological question but redefines it. Divine existence isn't an abstract "fact" but a relational reality.

To "contradiction with love": Excessive clarity can be coercion. True love respects the beloved's freedom even if it leads to temporary pain.

Balanced Philosophical Assessment

Moser's response offers an important contribution to the debate:

Strengths:
- Challenges Schellenberg's narrow epistemological assumptions
- Provides a coherent vision of God's relationship with humans
- Links religious knowledge to moral transformation
- Has support in religious and philosophical tradition

Weaknesses:
- Difficult empirical verification of its claims
- Sometimes appears to shield faith from criticism
- Doesn't satisfactorily explain cases of sincere seekers
- Risks making religious knowledge purely subjective

Contemporary Debate Position (2020-2026)

The debate has evolved in several directions:

Empirical: Psychological studies on the relationship between spiritual openness and religious experiences (Taves & Asprem 2024 studies).

Analytical: Precise development of distinctions between types of religious knowledge.

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

The period 2020-2026 witnessed notable developments in this debate. Schellenberg continued deepening his argument in updated editions of his work, emphasizing that "volitional knowledge" responses don't explain cases of sincere seekers who meet the criteria for moral openness. In contrast, Moser's supporters—including Trendon Gilhooley and Travis Dumsday—have developed more precise models linking volitional knowledge to intellectual virtues, attempting to address verification problems. Ann Taves and Egil Asprem's (2024) studies in empirical psychology of religion added an empirical dimension, showing that volitional openness does correlate with intensified religious experiences, but they haven't settled whether this reflects metaphysical reality or psychological mechanism. A third approach has also emerged—among philosophers like Meghan Blasczyn and Amanda Antonacio—attempting to transcend the Moser-Schellenberg dichotomy through relational epistemological models that require neither complete hiddenness nor complete clarity. The debate hasn't been settled, but it has gained notable depth.

From the Perspective of Rational Preferability (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

The Moser-Schellenberg debate represents a paradigmatic case of cumulative rational preferability:
─ Basic data: Millions of humans sincerely search for God; some find and some don't. This is a reality requiring explanation.
─ Two competing explanations: hiddenness indicates absence (Schellenberg), or hiddenness is a divine pedagogical strategy (Moser). Both are internally coherent, and both pay a philosophical price.
─ Price of Schellenberg's position: ignoring the actual transformative dimension of religious experiences and assuming a narrow epistemological model.
─ Price of Moser's position: difficulty of verification, and inadequate explanation of sincere seeker cases.
─ Preferability depends on cumulative argument: if hiddenness is combined with data from cosmology, consciousness, ethics, and fine-tuning, Moser's explanation becomes more reasonable within a comprehensive theistic system. But isolated from these indicators, Schellenberg's argument retains genuine compelling force.

No decisive resolution, but divine hiddenness—within cumulative balancing—doesn't invalidate theistic preferability, but remains a serious challenge that reduces its degree without eliminating it.