New Atheism
How does Sam Harris respond to Hume's objection regarding the impossibility of deriving "ought" from "is," and does he succeed in establishing a "moral science"?
The "is-ought problem" posed by David Hume represents one of the deepest philosophical challenges to naturalistic ethics. Sam Harris in "The Moral Landscape" (2010) presented an ambitious attempt to overcome this objection and establish a "moral science" on empirical foundations. Understanding his attempt and its critique reveals the strength of Hume's objection and the difficulty of overcoming it.
Inadequate Responses to Avoid
From some believers:
"Harris is an atheist, so everything he says about morality is false." This is an unproductive a priori rejection. Harris presents a philosophical argument that deserves systematic evaluation. Rejecting an argument merely because of its author's atheism weakens the religious position and makes it appear dogmatic.
"Morality comes from God alone, no need for science." This is a reductive oversimplification. Even if morality comes from God, the question "how do we know morality?" remains legitimate. Does moral knowledge come from revelation alone? From reason? From natural disposition (fiṭra)? From experience? Harris's attempt deserves systematic critique, not doctrinal rejection.
From some atheists:
"Harris has definitively solved Hume's problem." This is clear overstatement. Most professional philosophers, even atheist ones, believe that Harris did not solve the problem but rather circumvented it. Claiming he "solved it" demonstrates a lack of understanding of the depth of Hume's objection.
"Science can solve all moral problems." This is scientistic naivety. Science is a powerful tool, but it is limited by its nature. Science describes "what is," and the transition to "what ought to be" requires an additional philosophical step that science alone cannot provide.
Why These Responses Are Inadequate
They share a failure to understand the nature of Hume's objection and the nature of Harris's attempt. Serious critique requires first understanding the argument, then evaluating it by precise philosophical standards.
Hume's Objection: Precise Analysis
David Hume in "Treatise of Human Nature" (1740) observed that philosophers transition from descriptive statements ("is") to normative statements ("ought") without justification:
─ "Humans are social beings" (description)
─ "Therefore humans ought to help others" (norm)
Hume asks: where did the "ought" come from? Description does not contain within itself a norm. Describing reality, however accurately, does not alone produce a moral imperative.
The problem is deeper than mere formal logic. Hume poses a question about the nature of moral knowledge: is morality objective existing in the world (discoverable by science), or subjective arising from human feelings and evaluations?
Harris's Attempt: "The Moral Landscape"
Sam Harris presents his argument in steps:
First Step: Defining "good" scientifically.
Harris proposes that "good" = "well-being of conscious creatures." This is a definition that can be measured scientifically: health, happiness, fulfilling potentials, absence of pain, etc.
Second Step: "The Moral Landscape".
Conceive of morality as a "landscape" with peaks (states of high well-being) and valleys (states of suffering). Science can map this landscape: which actions lead to peaks? Which lead to valleys?
Third Step: Science determines "ought".
If we agree that the goal is "maximizing well-being," then science tells us what we "ought" to do: we ought to do what leads to peaks, we ought to avoid what leads to valleys.
Philosophical Critique of Harris's Attempt
Harris's attempt faces several fundamental objections:
First Objection: Circumvention, not solution.
Harris did not solve the is-ought problem but circumvented it. He presupposes that "we ought to maximize well-being." But this is precisely what needs justification! Why "ought" we maximize well-being? Hume would ask: where did this initial "ought" come from?
Second Objection: Defining "well-being" is problematic.
What exactly is "well-being"? Is it happiness? Fulfilling potentials? Absence of pain? Psychological balance? Existential meaning? Different definitions produce different "moral landscapes." Science does not determine which definition is "correct."
Third Objection: Multiple peaks.
Even if we agreed on a definition, the "landscape" might contain multiple contradictory peaks. A society that maximizes individual freedom might achieve one "peak," and a society that maximizes collective solidarity might achieve another "peak." Which one "ought" we choose? Science does not answer.
Fourth Objection: Composition fallacy.
Even if maximizing individual well-being is good for the individual, it does not logically follow that maximizing everyone's well-being is good for everyone. This is a composition fallacy: what applies to the part does not necessarily apply to the whole.
Fifth Objection: Moral nihilism.
Why should we care about well-being at all? A moral nihilist might say: "There is no objective reason to prefer well-being over suffering." Harris assumes that well-being is "self-evidently good," but this is a philosophical assumption, not a scientific discovery.
Harris's Responses to Objections
Harris offers responses, but they remain problematic:
To the first objection: He claims that "maximizing well-being" is self-evident like "health is better than illness." But self-evidence is not a philosophical argument. Many things seemed "self-evident" then proved wrong.
To the second objection: He accepts that defining well-being is complex, but sees this as not negating the possibility of science. Health is also a complex concept, but medicine is a science. The problem is that morality is not like medicine: in medicine, the goal (health) is generally agreed upon. In morality, the goals themselves are disputed.
To the third objection: He accepts multiple peaks but sees this as not negating objectivity. Multiple peaks do not mean "everything is permissible." The problem is that multiple peaks undermines his basic claim: science determines what we "ought" to do. If multiple peaks are possible, science does not determine which one we "ought" to choose.
Deeper Philosophical Assessment
Harris's attempt represents a model of the common philosophical error among scientistic thinkers: confusing different levels of questioning.
First Level: Scientific description. Science accurately describes: this action leads to this result. No dispute here.
Second Level: Moral evaluation. Is this result "good" or "evil"? Here dispute begins. Science does not determine what is "good."
Third Level: Moral obligation. Even if we agreed that something is "good," where does the "duty" to achieve it come from? Why "ought" I do good?
Harris jumps from the first level to the third without satisfactorily passing through the second.
Philosophical Alternative
Other philosophers have offered more precise attempts:
Moral Realism: Proposes that moral facts exist objectively, independent of science. Derek Parfit in "On What Matters" defends this powerfully.
Contractualism: T.M. Scanlon proposes that morality stems from principles no one can reasonably reject. This bypasses is-ought in a different way.
Virtue Ethics: Avoids is-ought by focusing on character rather than actions. Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre are among its contemporary pioneers.
The Religious Position
From the perspective of philosophy of religion, Harris's attempt confirms the difficulty of establishing morality without transcendent reference:
─ If the universe is merely matter and energy, where does "value" and "duty" come from?
─ If humans are merely evolved animals, why does their well-being have objective value?
─ If there is no purpose to existence, why "ought" we strive for anything?
These are deep philosophical questions that empirical science does not answer.