What is the conciliatory approach (conciliationism) to religious disagreement according to Helen De Cruz, and how should we modify our confidence in our religious beliefs when facing disagreeing epistemic peers?

Disagreement with epistemic peers — epistemically competent individuals who possess the same evidence — poses a serious challenge to religious beliefs. Helen De Cruz, the Belgian philosopher specializing in philosophy of religion and cognitive science, has developed a nuanced conciliatory approach to address this issue. Her method transcends common oversimplifications and offers a sophisticated methodological framework for dealing with religious diversity.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some believers:

"Disagreeing epistemic peers are simply wrong." This assumes what needs to be proven. If the other person is truly an epistemic peer — possessing the same capabilities and evidence — why are they wrong and you right? Asserting their error requires additional epistemic justification.

"Faith is above reason, so rational disagreement doesn't matter." This evades the problem. Even faith that transcends reason requires initial epistemic justification. Why is your faith correct and another's faith wrong? Surrendering to irrationality is not a solution.

"Conciliationism leads to religious relativism." An unjustified leap. Conciliationism demands modifying degrees of confidence, not abandoning beliefs. There is a difference between "I am less certain" and "everything is relative."

From some critics:

"Religious disagreement invalidates all religious beliefs." A hasty conclusion. Disagreement exists in all domains (science, ethics, politics) without invalidating knowledge within them. Why should religion be an exception?

"Conciliationism demands abandoning all disputed beliefs." A misunderstanding. Conciliationism requires modifying degrees of confidence based on the nature of disagreement, not blindly abandoning every disputed belief.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They share in ignoring the epistemic complexity of peer disagreement. The issue is not "who is right?" but "how do I justify my epistemic confidence when a competent peer disagrees with me?" De Cruz addresses this complexity with precision.

De Cruz's Conciliatory Approach: Foundations

De Cruz begins with an important distinction: not every disagreer is an epistemic peer. An epistemic peer must meet certain conditions:
- Similar epistemic competence (intelligence, training, experience)
- Possession of the same relevant evidence
- Similar epistemic effort in evaluating the matter
- Absence of clear epistemic defects (bias, self-interest, negligence)

In the religious context, this means that a Christian theologian and an Islamic scholar of kalām — both trained, informed, and sincere — may be epistemic peers in certain matters.

The Basic Conciliatory Principle

When two epistemic peers disagree, each should modify their confidence in the direction of the other. This does not mean complete convergence (meeting in the middle), but proportionate adjustment based on:
- The strength of disagreement
- The number of disagreeing peers
- The nature of the disputed matter
- The availability of additional reasons for confidence or doubt

De Cruz's Applications to Religious Disagreement

De Cruz distinguishes between types of religious beliefs:

Core religious beliefs (existence of God, afterlife): Disagreement here is deep and widespread. Conciliationism suggests moderate reduction in degree of certainty, not abandoning the belief. A believer facing an atheist epistemic peer might move from "absolute certainty" to "probable confidence."

Specific religious beliefs (nature of Trinity, details of afterlife): Disagreement here is more complex. Conciliationism may require greater reduction in confidence, especially when decisive evidence is absent.

Religious practices: De Cruz notes that disagreement about practices may not require the same epistemic adjustment, since practices have non-epistemic dimensions (identity, belonging, tradition).

Challenges Facing the Conciliatory Approach

De Cruz acknowledges important challenges:

The problem of peer identification: Who is truly an epistemic peer in religious matters? Is an atheist a peer to a believer? Is a Buddhist a peer to a Muslim? The criteria are difficult to apply.

The problem of special evidence: What if a believer claims personal religious experience that the peer lacks? Does this break epistemic symmetry?

The problem of infinite regress: If you adjust your confidence with every disagreeing peer, you might reach complete suspension of judgment (epoché) in all religious matters.

De Cruz's Developments of the Approach

To address these challenges, De Cruz develops the conciliatory approach:

Flexible conciliationism: Not every disagreement requires the same adjustment. Disagreement with one peer differs from disagreement with a group of peers. Disagreement on a minor issue differs from disagreement on a fundamental matter.

The role of religious experience: Personal experience may justify "extra confidence" but does not completely eliminate the duty to adjust. A believer with religious experience may retain higher confidence, but must acknowledge that their peer may have contrary experiences.

Distinguishing between knowledge and action: One can continue religious practice even while reducing epistemic confidence. "I am less certain but I choose to commit" is a coherent position.

Criticism of the Conciliatory Approach

Other philosophers criticize De Cruz's approach:

Steadfasters: Thomas Kelly argues that if you have strong reasons for your belief, disagreement with a peer should not change your confidence. The peer may be wrong in evaluating the evidence.

Advocates of special interpretation: Peter van Inwagen argues that religious beliefs stem from "insight" that cannot be fully transmitted. The peer's lack of conviction does not mean your insight is wrong.

Advocates of asymmetry: Linda Zagzebski argues that epistemic self-trust has priority over trust in others, even peers. Conciliationism demands unjustified surrender of epistemic self-authority.

De Cruz's Response to Criticisms

De Cruz responds that conciliationism does not demand abandoning beliefs or self-authority, but honest acknowledgment of the limits of human certainty. In a world of deep religious diversity, epistemic humility is a virtue, not a weakness.

Practical Application: Cumulative Rational Probability Method

De Cruz's approach aligns with the "cumulative rational probability" method adopted here:
- We do not claim absolute certainty in religious matters
- We acknowledge the existence of disagreeing epistemic peers
- We evaluate evidence cumulatively from multiple paths
- We maintain confidence proportionate to the strength of cumulative evidence

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

The conciliatory approach has become an influential current in the epistemology of religious disagreement. De Cruz and others continue to develop it, attempting to find balance between:
- Serious acknowledgment of religious diversity
- Preserving the possibility of religious knowledge
- Avoiding absolute relativism
- Respecting the epistemic integrity of disagreers

The ongoing challenge: How do we apply this approach practically without falling into epistemic paralysis or blind dogmatism? De Cruz provides a framework, but application requires practical wisdom in each case.

For Advanced Reading

- Advanced level: Catherine Elgin's discussion of the epistemic value of disagreement
- Advanced level: John Pittman's approach to "dynamic conciliationism"
- Helen De Cruz, "Religious Disagreement: An Empirical Study" (2018)
- Thomas Kelly, "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement" (2005)
- Linda Zagzebski, "Epistemic Authority" (2012)
- "Theme: Religious Epistemology" page on the website