Thomistic Arguments and the Five Ways

Does Edward Feser's contemporary reformulation of the Five Ways succeed in overcoming the objections of analytic philosophy (Mackie, Kenny)?

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Edward Feser—Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College—is among the most prominent contemporary defenders of Thomistic philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon academic arena. From "The Last Superstition" (2008) to "Five Proofs of the Existence of God" (2017), Feser presents a radical reformulation of the Five Ways that claims to overcome classical analytic objections. The debate surrounding it is intense in specialized journals.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some supporters of Thomism:

"Feser revived Thomas Aquinas and definitively proved the Five Ways." Excessive. Even Feser himself is more precise: he argues that the Five Ways—if properly understood—survive the usual objections, but he does not claim definitive proof in the mathematical sense.

"Analytic objections are based on misunderstanding Aquinas." Simplistic. True, much criticism misses the Aristotelian-Thomistic context, but some objections (especially Anthony Kenny's) demonstrate deep understanding of Thomistic texts.

"Feser's Neo-Thomism solves all metaphysical problems." Excessive claim. Feser presents a strong metaphysical framework, but debate over its foundations (form/matter, act/potency) continues.

From some opponents:

"Feser is merely a religious apologist wearing Thomistic garb." Unhelpful dismissal. Feser presents technical philosophical arguments published in peer-reviewed journals, and responding to them requires engaging with philosophical details.

"Mackie and Kenny refuted the Five Ways forever." Hasty. Classical analytic criticism was strong, but Feser (with other philosophers like David Oderberg and Alexander Pruss) develops new responses worthy of consideration.

"Aristotelian metaphysics is outdated, superseded by science." Category confusion. Feser distinguishes between Aristotelian physics (superseded by science) and Aristotelian metaphysics (operating at a different level).

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They fail to recognize that Feser presents an integrated philosophical project: reviving the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical framework, then reformulating the Five Ways within this framework. Serious criticism needs to engage with both levels.

Feser's Reformulation of the Five Ways

Feser reconstructs the Five Ways on explicit Aristotelian-Thomistic foundations:

The First Way (from motion): Not merely "everything moved has a mover," but relies on the distinction between actuality and potentiality. What is potential cannot actualize itself. The series of movers here-and-now (not in the past) requires a first mover in pure act.

The Second Way (from efficient causation): Not about temporal causation (what caused the Big Bang?), but about simultaneous existential causation. Contingent things need a cause that keeps them in existence now. The series of simultaneous causes requires a first uncaused cause.

The Third Way (from possibility and necessity): Feser's formulation transcends Humean criticism. Not "everything possible was once non-existent," but: contingent things (whose essence doesn't include existence) require a necessary being (whose essence is existence).

The Fourth Way (from degrees of perfection): Feser reinterprets this: not about "hotter things," but about participation in transcendental perfections (being, goodness, truth). What participates in perfection derives it from the source of perfection.

The Fifth Way (from governance): Not "intelligent design" in the modern sense, but about immanent teleology in nature. Every nature tends toward specific ends. This directedness requires an intelligence to guide it.

Basic Objections by Mackie and Kenny

John Mackie in "The Miracle of Theism" (1982):
- Causation is not metaphysically necessary (Hume).
- Infinite regress is logically possible.
- The leap from "first cause" to "personal God" is unjustified.

Anthony Kenny in "The Five Ways" (1969):
- The First Way assumes false Aristotelian physics.
- The Third Way confuses logical and metaphysical necessity.
- The Fifth Way doesn't distinguish between order and conscious purposiveness.

Feser's Responses to Mackie

First: Causation for Feser is not a "relation between events" (Hume), but a metaphysical principle: what changes from potency to act requires what is in act. This is not inductive generalization but conceptual necessity.

Second: Infinite regress in simultaneous series is impossible. Not because "infinity is impossible," but because a series of members deriving their causal power from others cannot explain the existence of any causal power. Like a series of mirrors reflecting light—without an original light source, no reflection.

Third: The Five Ways prove the existence of "pure act," "being-by-itself," etc. Inferring divine attributes (knowledge, will) comes in a later step through analyzing what it means to be "pure act."

Feser's Responses to Kenny

First: The First Way doesn't depend on Aristotelian physics but on metaphysics. The distinction between act and potency applies even in modern physics (electrons have potential to be in different orbitals).

Second: Feser clarifies the distinction: logical necessity (non-contradiction), metaphysical necessity (being-by-itself). The Third Way concerns the latter.

Third: Teleology for Feser is not "external design" but intrinsic directedness. Even electrons "tend" toward specific orbitals. This requires explanation.

Strengths of Feser's Project

First: Precision in distinctions. Clarifies the difference between temporal and simultaneous series, between physical and metaphysical motion, between types of necessity.

Second: Engagement with contemporary criticism. Doesn't ignore Hume or Kant but provides detailed responses.

Third: Connection to modern science. Shows that Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is compatible with modern physics.

Contemporary Objections to Feser

From naturalists: Graham Oppy argues that Feser presupposes the correctness of the Aristotelian framework. Why accept act/potency as basic categories?

From analytic philosophers: Some (like Joseph Campbell) reject the Principle of Sufficient Reason even in its Thomistic formulation.

From theologians: Some see Feser as making God "constrained" by metaphysical necessities.

Responses from Feser and Supporters

They develop arguments for the Aristotelian framework from analysis of change and causation. They distinguish between rejecting PSR in its Leibnizian form and rejecting it entirely. They clarify that God for them is not "constrained" but is the source of all necessity.

The Deeper Philosophical Point

The issue is not merely the correctness of the Five Ways, but a conflict between two metaphysical visions: Aristotelian-Thomistic (realist, teleological, hierarchical) versus modern (mechanistic, reductionist, flat). Feser bets that the former is more coherent and explanatorily powerful.

From the Perspective of Rational Consideration

Feser's project strengthens the theistic position considerably:
- Shows that classical analytic criticism is not decisive.
- Provides precise formulations that avoid common errors.
- Connects classical metaphysics with contemporary philosophy.

However:
- Reliance on the Aristotelian framework remains a point of debate.
- Some steps (from pure act to personal God) need further justification.
- Dialogue with contemporary objections continues.

Result: Feser largely succeeds in showing that the Five Ways—in their precise formulation—are stronger than many critics thought. But this success is not "complete transcendence" of objections, but considerable strengthening of the theistic position in contemporary debate.

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

In the period 2020-2026, the debate over Feser's project witnessed notable developments across several fronts. On one hand, Feser himself continued defending his framework in articles and public debates (including his 2024 debate with Alex O'Connor), expanding the circle of audiences engaging with Thomistic arguments beyond narrow academic circles. On the other hand, academic debate deepened: philosophers like Joseph Schmid presented precise technical objections to Feser's argument from act and potency, questioning the necessity of concluding to a single simple pure act, while Oderberg and Gotschalk developed independent defenses of the Aristotelian framework that strengthen Feser's position from different angles. Similarly, a trend of "Analytical Thomism" emerged among philosophers like James Orr and others, seeking to combine analytic precision with Thomistic structure. As for naturalists, some moved from wholesale rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics to more serious discussion of its categories, especially potentiality, which found resonance in contemporary philosophy of science (dispositionalism in Mumford and Molnar). The result is that the Five Ways in Feser's formulation can no longer be ignored in analytic philosophy of religion, but they have not achieved consensus, and debate over their metaphysical foundations grows deeper and more complex.

For Reading

- Edward Feser, The Last Superstition (St. Augustine's Press, 2

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