How did Muslim philosophers (al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī) address the problem of the relationship between divine attributes and the divine essence, and do their formulations avoid contemporary problems of divine simplicity?

This is one of the most subtle theological-philosophical issues in the Islamic tradition, representing a point of intersection between kalām, philosophy, and mysticism. The discussion concerning the relationship between attributes and the divine essence occupied Muslim philosophers for centuries and produced sophisticated formulations that are still discussed in contemporary philosophy of religion.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of the tradition:

"Muslim philosophers solved the problem definitively." This is excessive oversimplification. Al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and al-Ghazālī offered different formulations, sometimes even contradictory ones. There is no single agreed-upon "solution," but rather diverse approaches, each with its strengths and weaknesses.

"Divine simplicity in Islamic philosophy has no relation to contemporary discussion." This is a historical error. The concept of divine simplicity (basīṭ lā yatarakkabu) in Ibn Sīnā has direct connection to divine simplicity in contemporary philosophy. The difference lies in formulation, not in essence.

"Al-Ghazālī refuted the philosophers, so the discussion ended." This is a misleading reduction. Al-Ghazālī criticized a specific theory (the identity of attributes with essence in Ibn Sīnā), but he offered his own theory that faces other problems. The discussion continued after al-Ghazālī (Ibn Rushd, al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī).

From some critics:

"Muslim philosophers merely borrowed from Plotinus." This is historical reductionism. While Plotinian influence is clear (especially in al-Fārābī), Muslim philosophers developed the theory in an original manner responding to specific Quranic-theological problems.

"The discussion is merely verbal manipulation without real content." This is an unphilosophical rejection. The discussion addresses a fundamental metaphysical issue: how can God be simple and uncomposed while being characterized by multiple attributes? This is not verbal play but a real problem.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They fail to understand the complexity of the issue and its historical development. The matter is neither "solved" nor "valueless," but rather a deep philosophical issue that developed over centuries and remains alive in contemporary discussion.

Structure of the Basic Problem

The problem: If God is completely simple (no composition in Him), how do we understand the multiplicity of His attributes (knowledge, power, life, hearing, sight, will, speech)?

Logical options:
1. Attributes are identical with essence (no real multiplicity) ← But this seems contrary to Quranic language and common understanding
2. Attributes are additional to essence ← But this negates simplicity and leads to composition
3. Attributes are neither identical nor different ← But this appears logically contradictory

Al-Fārābī's Formulation (d. 339 AH/950 CE)

Al-Fārābī adopted the theory of "absolute identity": all divine attributes refer to one meaning, which is the essence. In "The Perfect State":

"The First is exalted, knowing by His essence, and His knowledge of His essence is His essence, and powerful by His essence, and His power is His essence, and wise by His essence, and His wisdom is His essence... All these meanings in Him are one meaning and one essence."

Philosophical analysis: Al-Fārābī solves the problem by eliminating real multiplicity. Attributes are merely different rational considerations of one reality. This preserves simplicity but at a cost: difficulty understanding the real meaning of different attributes.

Objection to al-Fārābī: If knowledge = power = essence, what does it mean to say "God is knowing" versus "God is powerful"? The difference appears merely verbal, and this empties attributes of their content.

Ibn Sīnā's Formulation (d. 428 AH/1037 CE)

Ibn Sīnā developed a more complex theory in "Al-Shifā'" and "Al-Najāh":

"The Necessary Existent in itself is necessary existent from all its aspects... If so, then it is pure intellect and pure intellectual and pure intelligible, and all in it is one thing."

Sinian innovation: the theory of "rational considerations" (i'tibārāt 'aqliyya). Attributes are not merely synonymous terms, but different considerations arising from the relationship of the divine essence to contingent beings:
- Knowledge: consideration of essence from the aspect of things being revealed to it
- Power: consideration of essence from the aspect of things emanating from it
- Will: consideration of essence from the aspect of things being ordered in the best way

This preserves a distinctive meaning for each attribute without introducing multiplicity into the essence.

Objection to Ibn Sīnā: Considerations presuppose a mind that considers. Who "considers" these considerations regarding God? If it is our mind, are the attributes intrinsic to God or not? If it is God, this presupposes multiplicity in God Himself.

Al-Ghazālī's Criticism (d. 505 AH/1111 CE)

In "The Incoherence of the Philosophers," al-Ghazālī attacked the identity theory forcefully:

"Their saying that His knowledge is identical with His essence leads to knowledge being power, and this contradicts rational necessity. For we know by necessity the difference between something being known and being within power."

Al-Ghazālī proposed the theory of attributes "neither identical nor different":
- Attributes are not identical with essence (against the philosophers)
- But they are not different in the sense of separation (against the Mu'tazila)
- Rather they are "subsisting in the essence" as description subsists in the described

Analysis: Al-Ghazālī attempts a middle position, but the formulation "neither identical nor different" appears logically contradictory. How can something be neither identical nor different?

Al-Ghazālī's defense: The contradiction is apparent. The meaning is:
- "Not identical" = not identical in every respect
- "Not different" = not separate or independent
Like the relationship of whiteness to a white body: whiteness is not identical with the body, but it is not something separate from it.

Later Developments

Ibn Rushd (d. 595 AH/1198 CE) in "The Incoherence of the Incoherence":
Defended a modified position: divine attributes are different realities in one essence, but without composition. The distinction is in concept, not in existence.

Al-Rāzī (d. 606 AH/1209 CE) in "Al-Muḥaṣṣal":
Developed the Ash'arite position: attributes are existential meanings additional to essence, but eternal and beginningless. This preserves the reality of attributes but raises the problem of multiple eternal entities.

Al-Ṭūsī (d. 672 AH/1274 CE) in "Tajrīd al-I'tiqād":
Formulated the theory of "aspects" (ḥaythiyyāt): attributes are essential aspects that do not necessitate multiplicity. Each attribute is a special aspect in the one essence.

Relationship to Contemporary Problems

Contemporary discussion about divine simplicity faces the same dilemmas:

Plantinga's Problem: If God = His attributes, then God = abstract justice. But abstract justice does not create the world. Therefore God does not create the world!

This resembles al-Ghazālī's problem: if knowledge = power = essence, we lose the distinctive meaning of each attribute.

Mann's Problem: How do we understand relational attributes (like being creator) within the framework of simplicity? Creation presupposes relationship to the created, and relationship presupposes multiplicity.

This recalls the discussion among theologians about active attributes (creating, providing) versus essential attributes.

Craig and Moreland's Attempts: Proposing that God is simple in His essence but complex in His attributes/relations.

This is close to the position of some later thinkers who distinguished between "essence as such" (simple) and "essence with consideration of attributes" (conceptual multiplicity).

Critical Assessment: Do Islamic Formulations Avoid Contemporary Problems?

Strengths:

1. Conceptual Development: Muslim philosophers developed precise concepts (considerations, aspects, states) that go beyond simple dichotomy (either identical or different).

2. Awareness of the Problem: From the beginning, there was awareness of the difficulty of reconciling simplicity and multiplicity, not merely naive adoption of one side.

3. Methodological Diversity: Multiple approaches (philosophical, theological, mystical) enriched the discussion and opened multiple horizons.

Weaknesses:

1. Conceptual Ambiguity: Concepts like "neither identical nor different" or "aspects" remain philosophically vague. Are they real solutions or merely formulations that postpone the problem?

2. Tension with Religious Language: The more philosophical rigor increased (as with Ibn Sīnā), the greater the distance from clear Quranic language about attributes.

3. Problem of Divine Knowledge of Particulars: Ibn Sīnā's theory led to saying that God knows particulars "in a universal way," which seems problematic.

Where We Stand in This Discussion Today

The period 2020-2026 witnessed notable renewal in discussion about divine simplicity in analytic philosophy of religion. James Dolezal's work (especially "All That Is in God," revised edition) renewed defense of strict classical simplicity, while Ryan Mullins and R.T. Mullins developed detailed criticism seeing that absolute simplicity conflicts with divine freedom of action. Meanwhile, philosophers like Alexander Pruss and Edward Feser attempt to revive the Thomistic-Sinian formulation through the concept of "pure being" (ipsum esse subsistens), a concept very close to Ibn Sīnā's "Necessary Existent in itself." What is genuinely new is the increasing Western academic interest in Islamic sources themselves: studies by Peter Adamson and Jon McGinnis on Ibn Sīnā, and Frank Griffel's studies on al-Ghazālī, have introduced these formulations into the heart of analytic discussion not merely as historical heritage, but as living philosophical options. However, the fundamental problem remains unresolved: neither absolute identity nor absolute addition nor the "neither identical nor different" formula has succeeded in convincing everyone. Each formulation solves one aspect of the dilemma and regenerates another.

From the Perspective of Rational Probability (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

This discussion reveals a precise cumulative structure when evaluating the concept of God:
─ Divine simplicity is not an isolated doctrine, but a logical consequence of independent premises: necessary existence, negation of causation from the divine essence, and perfection of the First Being. Each premise carries its own probability.
─ Ibn Sīnā's formulation (rational considerations) remains the strongest available approach because it preserves ontological simplicity while maintaining real distinctive content for attributes, which is better than al-Fārābī's absolute identity (which empties attributes) and the Ash'arite addition (which threatens simplicity).
─ The problem of conceptual ambiguity is real, but it does not invalidate the theory; ambiguity is expected when dealing with an entity that completely transcends human experience.
─ Probability tends toward some form of modified (not absolute) simplicity that preserves unity of essence with conceptual multiplicity having a real basis. This is not demonstrative certainty, but it is the position with the least philosophical cost within cumulative balance with data from fine-tuning, consciousness, and moral foundation.