Infinity and Time
Does the eternal universe theory (eternalism, B-theory of time) conflict with the kalām argument, or can an alternative formulation of the argument accommodate it?
The eternal universe theory (Eternalism) or "B-theory of time" is among the most important contemporary philosophical and physical theories about the nature of time. It proposes that all moments of time—past, present, and future—exist equally in the "spacetime block." This challenges the kalām argument, which depends on a temporal "beginning" of the universe.
Inadequate responses to avoid
From some defenders of kalām: "Relativity is just a theory, the Quran says the universe has a beginning." This confuses levels—the discussion is philosophical about interpreting relativity, not rejecting science. "Eternalism means no need for a creator." Inaccurate—temporal eternity does not entail ontological independence.
From some eternalists: "Relativity proved eternalism, the kalām argument is finished." Overreach—relativity supports eternalism but does not settle it philosophically. "The spacetime block eliminates causation." Fallacy—causation can be redefined within an eternal framework.
Structure of eternal universe theory
Physical foundation: Special (1905) and general (1915) relativity eliminated Newtonian absolute time. Simultaneity is relative—what is "now" differs across reference frames. This suggests that the distinction between past/present/future is not absolutely objective.
Philosophical conception: In eternalism, the universe is a "four-dimensional block"—three spatial and one temporal. All events exist "at once" from a timeless perspective. The "passage of time" is a subjective illusion; the reality is that all moments exist equally.
This differs radically from the "A-theory of time" (A-theory/Presentism), which proposes that only the present truly exists, the past has passed and the future has not yet come.
The challenge to the kalām argument
The classical kalām argument (al-Ghazālī, William Lane Craig):
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause
2. The universe began to exist
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause
The second premise depends on a "linear" understanding of time—there was a "first moment" of the universe. Eternalism denies this: the universe did not "begin" but rather "is" in the spacetime block. There is no "first moment" in the dynamic sense.
Reconciliation attempts and responses
Craig's strategy: William Lane Craig, the most prominent contemporary defender of kalām, philosophically rejects eternalism. His arguments:
1. Eternalism contradicts direct experience of time's passage
2. It leads to fatalism (future actions exist in advance)
3. Relativity does not force eternalism—it can be interpreted through "Lorentzian interpretation" which preserves a hidden absolute time
Critique: Craig sacrifices the elegance of relativity to save the kalām argument. Most physicists reject Lorentzian interpretation as it adds unnecessary complexity.
Ontological dependence strategy: Even if the universe is temporally eternal, it remains existentially contingent. It needs explanation for why the spacetime block exists at all. This shifts the discussion from temporal causation to ontological dependence.
Response: This moves beyond the original kalām argument, which specifically depends on temporal beginning. The discussion becomes about the argument from contingency and necessity, not kalām.
Reformulation strategy: Some philosophers (Alexander Pruss, Robert Koons) reformulate kalām:
"The neo-kalām argument":
1. Every contingent event needs explanation
2. The existence of the spacetime block is a contingent event
3. Therefore, the spacetime block needs explanation
This avoids talk of temporal "beginning." But it faces objections:
- Is "the existence of the spacetime block" an event in the technical sense?
- Does the principle of sufficient reason apply to the cosmic whole?
Deeper philosophical critique of eternalism
From phenomenology: Our lived experience of time is dynamic—we feel time's passage, change, becoming. Eternalism makes this pure illusion. Is it conceivable that our deepest experiences are complete illusion?
Eternalist response: Many physical truths contradict intuition (wave-particle duality, quantum entanglement). Intuition is not final evidence.
From ethics and freedom: If our future actions already exist in the spacetime block, where is freedom? How can we be responsible for actions that "exist eternally"?
Response: Eternalism does not necessarily negate freedom. The action "exists" in spacetime, but remains "resulting from" the agent's choice in its moment. The issue is complex and requires independent discussion.
Contemporary alternatives and developments
Growing Block theory: A middle solution—past and present exist, future does not yet exist. This preserves some dynamism while partially respecting relativity.
Problem: Difficulty determining "cosmic present" in relativity. Which reference frame determines the "edge" of the growing block?
Emergent Time: Some quantum gravity theories propose that time "emerges" from a deeper timeless level. This might open a door for a modified kalām argument about the "emergence" of time itself.
Quantum interpretations: Some quantum interpretations (especially Relational Quantum Mechanics) reintroduce a kind of fundamental dynamism. Time might have a deeper nature than classical spacetime block.
Position from the perspective of rational preponderance (rajḥān ʿaqlī)
Eternalism is a serious challenge to the classical kalām argument, but it:
1. Does not settle against God's existence: Even if the universe is temporally eternal, the question of its existential foundation remains. Why does a spacetime block with these properties exist?
2. Faces philosophical problems: Conflict with lived experience, the freedom issue, difficulty explaining causation—all make eternalism an unsettled philosophical position.
3. Opens space for new formulations: Instead of abandoning cosmological arguments, they can be developed to accommodate eternalism. The shift from temporal causation to ontological dependence is fruitful.
4. Does not eliminate other arguments: Even if the classical kalām argument falls, arguments from contingency and necessity, fine-tuning, consciousness, and objective morality remain.
Evaluative conclusion
The eternal universe theory represents a serious philosophical and scientific challenge to the traditional kalām argument. It cannot be ignored or superficially rejected. At the same time, it does not settle the matter against faith:
- The kalām argument can be reformulated in ways that accommodate eternalism
- Eternalism itself faces deep philosophical challenges
- The question of God is broader than the question of the universe's temporal beginning
The most prudent position: acknowledge the strength of the eternalist challenge, while noting that it does not settle the issue. The cumulative arguments for God's existence remain standing, even if the kalām argument needs modification or replacement.
This discussion shows the importance of dialogue between philosophy and science in foundational matters. Neither physics alone nor philosophy alone settles—we need critical integration between them.
Where we stand in this discussion today
The period 2020-2026 witnessed notable developments on several fronts. In philosophy of time, "hybrid" positions strengthened that attempt to reconcile the dynamism of lived experience with relativity's structure, especially with works by Christian Wüthrich and Nick Huggett on spacetime emergence from quantum gravity (2021-2024), where theories like causal set theory and loop quantum gravity suggest that classical spacetime block may not be reality's fundamental level—this reopens the door to beginning from a deeper level. Craig continued defending neo-Lorentzian interpretation, but physical opposition remains dominant. Conversely, Koons (2021) and Pruss (2023) developed new kalām formulations not depending on A-theory of time, but on sufficient reason principle and ontological dependence, reviving cosmological arguments in a framework compatible with eternalism. Eternalists strengthened their position with works on ontological solidarity of the spacetime block, with growing recognition that eternalism does not solve the problem "why something rather than nothing exists." Today's discussion is more mature and less polarized than a decade ago.
From the angle of rational preponderance (rajḥān ʿaqlī)
This discussion reveals how the cumulative method works when facing structural challenge to one argument:
─ Eternalism is a real challenge to the classical kalām argument in its formulation based on temporal beginning. Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging this.
─ But the challenge affects one formulation, not the principle of cosmic explanation itself. New formulations based on ontological dependence and contingency accommodate eternalism while preserving argumentative strength.
─ Eternalism itself is not a settled fact but an interpretive position with philosophical costs: the freedom problem, illusoriness of temporal experience, and absence of explanation for spacetime block's existence.
─ Rational preponderance does not fall with one argument's fall. Even if the traditional kalām formulation weakens, evidence from fine-tuning, consciousness, objective morality, and existential contingency continues accumulating toward theistic explanation.
─ The most reasonable position: the universe's existence—whether eternal or temporal—needs an existential foundation that transcends it, and theism provides the simplest explanation for this, without this being certain knowledge.
For reading
- William Lane Craig & Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford, 1993)
- Rob Koons & Alex Pruss, "The Kalām Argument" in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (2009)
- Craig Callender, ed., Time, Reality and Experience (Cambridge UP, 2002)
- Yuval Dolev, Time and Realism (MIT Press, 2007)
- Dean Zimmerman, "The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and 'Taking Tense Seriously'" (Dialectica, 2005)
- "Challenge: Eternalism and the Kalām Argument" page on the website
- "Formulation: Neo-Kalām Arguments" page on the website