What is "the objectivity of divine reference in natural law" according to Aquinas, and how does it differ from contemporary natural law theories?

Thomas Aquinas's (1225-1274) theory of natural law represents one of the deepest philosophical attempts to connect the natural order with divine wisdom. The concept of "divine reference" at the heart of his theory distinguishes it from contemporary formulations, whether secular or religious. Understanding this distinction is essential for grasping the depth of philosophical debate about the foundations of natural law.

Inadequate responses to avoid

From some believers:

"Aquinas proves that every natural law directly requires God." This is a misleading oversimplification. Aquinas distinguishes between multiple levels of law (eternal, natural, human, divine), and the relationship between them is not simply direct. Natural law for him has relative autonomy in knowledge even if it is metaphysically grounded in eternal law.

"Aquinas's theory is the only Christian theory of natural law." This is a historical error. Even in the medieval period, there were different theories (Duns Scotus, William of Ockham). In the modern era, Christian natural law theories have multiplied even more.

From some naturalists:

"Aquinas is merely a theologian dressing Aristotelian philosophy in religious garb." This is an unfair reduction. Aquinas developed Aristotelian philosophy in new directions, and his philosophical arguments stand on their own even if within a theological framework. Contemporary non-believing philosophers (Anthony Kenny, Philippa Foot) take his philosophical arguments seriously.

"Contemporary natural law theories have completely surpassed Aquinas." This is a strong claim that requires scrutiny. Some contemporary theories (John Finnis, Alasdair MacIntyre) develop Aquinas more than surpass him. Even theories that differ radically from him benefit from his conceptual distinctions.

The structure of Aquinas's theory: The four layers of law

For Aquinas, law is not a single concept but four interconnected levels:

1. Eternal Law (Lex Aeterna): The divine wisdom that governs all creation. This is not "law" in the legislative sense, but the rational order in the divine mind by which God governs the universe.

2. Natural Law (Lex Naturalis): The participation of rational creatures in eternal law. Humans, through reason, perceive basic principles for moral action ("do good and avoid evil") and derive moral rules from them.

3. Human Law (Lex Humana): Positive laws enacted by humans to organize society, which must harmonize with natural law to be just.

4. Divine Law (Lex Divina): Direct revelation (in Scripture) that complements natural law and directs humans toward their supernatural end.

The objectivity of divine reference: The precise meaning

"Divine reference" for Aquinas does not mean that natural law needs explicit knowledge of God to be known or binding. Rather, it means:

Ontologically: Natural law has its foundation in metaphysical reality (eternal law). It is not merely human agreement or social construction, but has roots in the nature of things as God created them.

Epistemologically: Human reason can know natural law without special revelation. The pagan and atheist can perceive that murder is wrong through natural reason alone.

Teleologically: Natural law directs humans toward their natural end (happiness in this life), but it is open to a supernatural end (the beatific vision) that requires divine law.

This "objectivity" means that natural law is real and binding regardless of our knowledge of its divine origin, but its complete understanding requires recognizing its place in the broader cosmic order.

How does this differ from contemporary theories?

1. From contemporary secular natural law theories:

Philosophers like John Finnis (in "Natural Law and Natural Rights" 1980) attempt to formulate natural law without explicit divine reference. For them, "basic goods" (life, knowledge, friendship, play, aesthetic experience, practical reasonableness, religion) are self-evident and do not need metaphysical foundation.

The difference: Aquinas sees that these goods ultimately need grounding in eternal law. Without this foundation, they remain "suspended in air." Finnis responds that self-evidence is sufficient, but critics (like Russell Hittinger) see this as weakening the theory's force.

2. From Protestant natural law theories:

Reformers like Calvin accepted natural law but with greater reservation about the capacity of fallen reason. For them, sin corrupted human reason to the degree that natural law always needs correction by revelation.

The difference: Aquinas is more optimistic about natural reason. Sin weakened it but did not destroy it. Reason is still capable of perceiving basic moral truths, though with greater difficulty.

3. From evolutionary naturalistic theories:

Philosophers like Larry Arnhart ("Darwinian Natural Right" 1998) attempt to ground natural law in evolutionary biology. Natural human inclinations are products of evolution, and what serves human flourishing is "natural" and "moral."

The difference: Aquinas sees nature as teleological (having intended purposes), while Darwinian evolution is non-teleological. Attempting to extract moral standards from a blind process faces the "naturalistic fallacy." Aquinas avoids this because nature for him is designed for purposes.

4. From divine command theories:

Some theologians (especially in the Islamic Ash'ari tradition and some Protestants) see morality as coming directly from divine command, not from nature.

The difference: Aquinas sees that God commands what is good according to the nature of things, not that things are good because God commanded them. This avoids the Euthyphro dilemma in a different way.

Strengths of Aquinas's theory

Metaphysical coherence: Connecting moral law with cosmic order provides a unified explanation of reality. Why is the universe ordered? Why does reason understand nature? Why is morality objective? All are explained by reference to eternal law.

Moral realism: Avoids relativism and subjectivity. Morality is not a matter of opinion or culture, but has foundation in the nature of things.

Respect for human autonomy: Despite divine foundation, human reason has a real role in discovering morality. It is not merely blind obedience.

Contemporary challenges to Aquinas's theory

The problem of pluralism: In a multicultural world, can we speak of one "human nature"? Critics see what Aquinas considers "natural" as possibly cultural.

The scientific challenge: Is the concept of "teleological nature" still defensible after Darwin? Even if we accept evolution, can we speak of "purposes" in nature?

The problem of knowledge: Even if natural law exists, how clear is it? Deep moral disagreements cast doubt on reason's ability to perceive it clearly.

Contemporary developments

Analytical Thomism: Philosophers like John Haldane reformulate Aquinas in the language of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Existentialist Thomism: Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson developed Aquinas in a direction focusing more on the person and freedom.

Dialogue with cognitive sciences: Attempts to understand how reason perceives natural law from the perspective of cognitive psychology and neuroscience.

Where we stand in this debate today

Aquinas's theory remains influential but not dominant. Even contemporary Thomists differ in interpreting and applying it. Current debate revolves around:

- Can natural law be defended without the complete Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics?
- How do we reconcile the constancy of natural law with evolving knowledge about human nature?
- What is the role of revelation in clarifying or completing natural law?

The most balanced position recognizes both the enduring insights and the genuine challenges facing Aquinas's synthesis in our contemporary context.