How does Robert Adams defend the Modified Divine Command Theory, and does it avoid the Euthyphro dilemma?

Robert Adams — philosopher of religion at the Universities of Michigan, Yale, and Oxford — is among the most prominent developers of Divine Command Theory in the twentieth century. His "Modified" Divine Command Theory attempts to overcome classical objections to traditional Divine Command Theory, especially the famous Euthyphro dilemma. But has it actually succeeded? Contemporary philosophical debate reveals important complexities.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of religious ethics:

"Adams definitively solved the Euthyphro dilemma." Excessive oversimplification. Adams provided important modifications that avoid some aspects of the dilemma, but philosophical debate continues over whether these modifications are sufficient or merely transfer the problem to another level.

"Divine command is clear: what God commands is good because He commands it." This is precisely what Adams' theory attempts to overcome! Simple traditional theory faces fatal objections (arbitrariness, possibility that God could command evil). Adams provides a more complex structure.

"No need for complex theory, natural intuition (fiṭra) suffices." Ignoring the philosophical challenge. The question is not "Do we know good and evil?" but "What is the metaphysical foundation of this knowledge?" The theory attempts to explain the basis of ethics, not merely describe it.

From some secularists:

"The Euthyphro dilemma destroys any connection between ethics and religion." Hasty generalization. The dilemma poses a serious challenge, but several philosophers (Adams, Alston, Evans) have developed sophisticated responses. Rejecting these responses requires analysis, not merely invoking the dilemma.

"Adams is just playing with words, the problem remains." An accusation requiring proof. The modifications Adams offers are not merely verbal but substantive: a change in the structure of the relationship between God and ethics. Evaluating them requires understanding the details.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They share a failure to deal with the philosophical complexity of Adams' theory. The theory is not merely "God commands so we obey," but an attempt to construct a coherent ethical theory that connects objective ethics with divine nature in a way that avoids known objections.

The Euthyphro Dilemma: Recalling the Challenge

In Plato's dialogue "Euthyphro," Socrates poses the crucial question: "Is the good good because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is good?"

The first horn (the good is good because God commands it) leads to:
- Arbitrariness: if God commanded random killing, it would become good
- Collapse of meaning for "God is good": becomes an empty statement (God is good = God conforms to His commands)
- Problem of moral motivation: why obey except from fear of punishment?

The second horn (God commands the good because it is independently good) leads to:
- Independence of ethics from God
- Existence of an ethical standard above or outside God
- Undermining God's role in founding ethics

Adams' Modified Theory: Basic Structure

Adams presents in his book "Finite and Infinite Goods" (1999) and earlier papers a modified theory with three main elements:

First: Ethics grounded in God's nature, not merely His commands

Instead of "good = what God commands," Adams proposes: "good = what conforms to God's nature of perfect love." Divine commands express this nature but do not create it. This avoids arbitrariness: God cannot command evil because that would contradict His nature.

Second: Distinction between goodness and obligation

Adams distinguishes between:
- Goodness: grounded in God's nature itself
- Moral obligation: grounded in God's commands

For example: kindness to the poor is good because it reflects God's loving nature. But it becomes a moral duty when God commands it. This distinction allows space for "supererogatory" actions.

Third: Social nature of obligation

Moral obligations for Adams are not merely abstract commands but arise in relational context. Just as social obligations arise from human relationships, absolute moral obligations arise from our relationship with God. This explains moral motivation: we obey not only from fear, but from the standpoint of relationship.

How Does the Theory Avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma?

Adams argues that his theory avoids both horns of the dilemma:

Against the first horn (arbitrariness): Ethics is not arbitrary because it is grounded in God's necessary nature, not in contingent commands. God cannot command evil because that would contradict His nature of perfect love.

Against the second horn (independence): Ethics is not independent of God because God's nature itself is the standard. There is no standard "above" God, but the standard is God's very self.

Adams' solution: God neither submits to an external standard nor creates ethics arbitrarily, but His necessary nature is the supreme ethical standard.

Contemporary Philosophical Objections

The "Problem Transference" Objection

Philosopher Erik Wielenberg argues: Adams has not solved the dilemma but transferred it. The question now becomes: "Is God's nature loving because love is good, or is love good because God's nature is such?" The same dilemma at a deeper level.

Possible response: God's nature is metaphysically necessary, not contingent. The question "Why is God's nature loving?" is like asking "Why does 2+2=4?" — some truths are necessary and need no external justification.

The "Circularity" Objection

Michael Huemer poses: If God's nature is the standard of goodness, how do we know God is good? Saying "God is good because He conforms to His nature" is circular. We need an independent standard to evaluate God's goodness.

Possible response: Basic moral knowledge (moral intuition) allows us to perceive goodness. When we perceive that love, justice, and mercy are good, and understand that God perfectly embodies these attributes, we perceive His goodness without circularity.

The "Practical Justification" Objection

Louise Antony asks: Even if we accept Adams' theory metaphysically, what is its practical impact? Atheists and believers agree on most moral judgments. Does the theory add anything practical?

Possible response: The theory explains the foundation of ethics, not merely its content. Just as atomic theory explains chemistry without changing observed reactions, Adams' theory explains why ethics is objective and binding.

Contemporary Developments

The "New Analytic Theology" movement (Craig, Evans, Wainwright) develops Adams' theory with additions:
- Integration of virtue theory: virtues reflect God's attributes
- Integration with natural ethics: natural law reflects divine nature
- Eschatological dimensions: ethics fulfilled in the ultimate vision of God

The "Theistic Moral Realism" movement (the later Robert Adams, Mark Murphy) attempts to integrate:
- Moral intuition as window into divine nature
- Ethics as participation in divine life
- Gradation in moral perception

The "Constructive Criticism" movement (Linda Zagzebski, John Hare) accepts Adams' framework with modifications:
- Zagzebski: integration of Divine Motivation Theory
- Hare: emphasis on the gap between human capacity and moral demand

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

Adams' Modified Divine Command Theory represents important progress in connecting ethics with theism. Does it completely solve the Euthyphro dilemma? Opinions are divided:

Supporters see it as offering a coherent solution that preserves the objectivity of ethics and its connection to God without falling into arbitrariness or independence.

Critics see it as transferring or concealing the problem without fundamentally solving it, and that basic questions about God's relationship to ethics remain open.

The middle position — which aligns with the method of rational preference (rajḥān ʿaqlī) — sees Adams' theory as providing a useful framework for understanding the relationship between God and ethics, even if it has not settled all questions.