Does Erik Wielenberg's "robust ethics" argument succeed in establishing objective moral values on primitive moral facts without God, or does it face the problem of cosmic epistemic coincidence?

This question lies at the heart of one of the most ambitious philosophical projects in contemporary ethics: Erik Wielenberg's attempt to establish strong objective ethics without God. The "Robust Ethics" project—which Wielenberg developed in his major work (2014) and subsequent articles—represents the most sophisticated challenge to the theistic moral argument. The question: does it succeed in overcoming "the problem of cosmic epistemic coincidence," or does it remain vulnerable to this fundamental critique?

Inadequate responses to avoid

From some defenders of theism:

"Wielenberg fails because ethics without God is logically impossible." Prior assumption. Wielenberg presents an internally coherent argument for the possibility of objective ethics without God. Responding to him requires refuting his detailed arguments, not merely reasserting the theistic position.

"Primitive ethics is a meaningless vague idea." Ignoring philosophical tradition. The concept of "brute moral facts" has a long history in moral philosophy, from Moore to Ross to Shafer-Landau. Wielenberg develops this tradition in a sophisticated manner.

"The coincidence problem destroys all atheistic ethics." Excessive generalization. The coincidence problem is a serious challenge, but Wielenberg offers specific responses to it. Evaluating these responses requires careful analysis, not wholesale rejection.

From some naturalists:

"Wielenberg proved the possibility of ethics without God." Premature. Wielenberg presents a coherent model, but this doesn't mean he "proved" anything definitively. The philosophical debate about his project remains open and active.

"The coincidence problem is merely a theological trick." Dismissing a serious philosophical critique. The epistemic coincidence problem is raised by neutral philosophers as well (Sharon Street, Richard Joyce), and is not merely a theistic "trick."

Why these responses are inadequate

They share in avoiding engagement with the complexity of Wielenberg's philosophical project. His project is not merely a "defense of atheism," but an attempt to build an integrated ethical theory. Serious critique requires understanding the structure of this theory and its internal challenges.

The structure of Wielenberg's project: Robust Ethics

Wielenberg builds his theory on four pillars:

First: Brute Ethical Facts.

Some moral facts are basic and irreducible. For example: "pain without reason is evil" is not a fact derived from something else, but a primitive fact in the structure of reality. These facts exist necessarily, like mathematical facts.

Second: Making Relations.

Primitive moral facts "make" moral properties in the material world through necessary relations. For example: the existence of a conscious rational being "makes" moral dignity in it. This relation is necessary and not accidental.

Third: Necessity without Foundation.

Moral facts are necessary but do not need an external "founder." Like logical and mathematical facts, they are part of the necessary structure of reality. God is not required to explain their necessity.

Fourth: Reliable Moral Knowledge.

We evolved in a way that makes us capable of knowing some basic moral facts. This is not pure coincidence, but the result of a relationship between moral facts and our evolutionary survival (cooperation is useful for survival and is also morally good).

The central challenge: The epistemic coincidence problem

The coincidence problem—developed by Sharon Street and deepened by others—poses a dilemma:

If moral facts are independent of evolution (as moral realists claim), how is it conceivable that our moral beliefs (evolutionarily shaped) would match objective moral facts? This match would be an amazing cosmic coincidence.

The options:
1. Deny moral realism (moral facts don't exist independently)
2. Accept that our moral beliefs are unreliable
3. Find a non-coincidental explanation for the match

Theists choose (3) through God who designed evolution to lead to correct moral knowledge. Wielenberg needs option (3) without God.

Wielenberg's response: "The Third-Factor Making Relation"

Wielenberg develops a complex response through what he calls the "Third-Factor Making Relation":

The properties that make an action morally good (e.g., promoting cooperation) are the same properties that make it evolutionarily useful. It's not coincidental that we evolved to believe cooperation is good, because the same property (promoting group survival) makes cooperation:
a) evolutionarily useful (so we tend toward it)
b) morally good (through the making relation)

This explains the match without coincidence and without God.

Critique of Wielenberg's response

Critics raise several problems with this response:

First: The scope problem.

Wielenberg's response might succeed with some moral values (cooperation, close altruism), but what about moral values with no clear relationship to evolutionary survival? For example:
- Rights of distant future generations
- Duties toward strangers on other continents
- The value of abstract truth
- The dignity of the mentally disabled

How does the "third-factor making relation" explain our knowledge of these values?

Second: The causal direction problem.

Even if we accept that some properties make an action both good and evolutionarily useful, the question remains: why did we evolve to recognize the property as morally good and not just as useful? Evolution explains the tendency to act, not the moral judgment about it.

Third: The counter-evolutionary facts problem.

Some of our moral facts seem counter to evolutionary interest. For example: "self-sacrifice for strangers is a great virtue." How do we explain our knowledge of these facts if evolution is the only bridge?

Wielenberg's additional attempts

In his recent works (2016-2020), Wielenberg develops additional responses:

"Epistemic expansion": Our evolved cognitive abilities (reason, abstraction) enable us to expand basic moral facts to broader domains. For example: from "don't harm your relatives" to "don't harm anyone."

"Rational coherence": Once we know some basic moral facts, reason leads us to other facts through coherence and inference.

"Limited epistemic luck": Some epistemic luck is acceptable in every epistemological theory. Even theism faces the question "why did God create beings capable of moral knowledge?"

Advanced critique: "Coincidence at a deeper level"

Even with these responses, critics argue that coincidence moves to a deeper level:

Why do "making relations" exist between natural properties and moral properties in the first place? Why is the universe built so that "promoting welfare" makes "moral good"? This seems like a fine-tuned arrangement that needs explanation.

Wielenberg responds that these relations are logically necessary, like mathematical relations. But critics ask: even if they're necessary, why does the physical universe "instantiate" these necessities?

Current positions in the debate (2020-2026)

The "non-theistic moral realism" stream (Wielenberg, Enoch, Cuneo) develops diverse models for objective ethics without God, each facing the coincidence problem differently.

The "theistic critique" stream (William Lane Craig, Mark Linville, David Baggett) develops sophisticated critiques of these attempts, focusing on the persistence of the coincidence problem at different levels.

Where we stand in this debate today

In the period 2020-2026, the debate crystallized around three distinct axes. First: the "deepened evolutionary skepticism" stream (Street, Joyce, Bogardus) continued pressing all moral realism—theistic and non-theistic—showing that the coincidence problem is not solved by the third factor alone, as it returns at a deeper level: why do the making relations themselves align with evolutionary structure? Second: Wielenberg and his allies (Pardy, Enoch) developed models of "strong metaphysical necessity," asserting that making relations are necessary in all possible worlds, so the question of their "coincidence" is meaningless. Third: theistic critique (Linville, Baggett & Walls 2022, Moreland) shifted from detailed response to structural argument: the naturalistic model lacks a "personal ontological foundation" that connects value with consciousness and purpose, and this is a deficiency that cannot be addressed by multiplying abstract necessities. Today's debate is open and escalating, with no side having definitively resolved it.

From the perspective of rational preference (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

Wielenberg's project presents a paradigmatic case for the cumulative rational preference method:
─ The phenomenon requiring explanation is real: the existence of objective moral facts acknowledged by both sides.
─ Two competing explanations: necessary primitive facts without a founder (Wielenberg), or foundation in the nature of a personal rational good God (theism).
─ Wielenberg's model is internally coherent, but pays a double price: multiplying unexplained primitive necessities, and leaving the epistemic-evolutionary coincidence gap without complete closure.
─ The theistic model also pays its price (assuming a necessary personal being), but provides a unified ontological foundation for value, knowledge, and purpose together.
─ The preference tends toward theism when ethics is added to cumulative argumentation: cosmic fine-tuning, the emergence of consciousness, the rational comprehensibility of the world. Each datum alone doesn't decide, but their convergence favors the hypothesis of personal foundation over blind primitive facts.
─ No final certainty, but the balance of rational probability tilts toward theistic foundation for objective ethics.