Rationality and Perception
How do neo-Darwinians (Dawkins, Dennett) assume that evolution produces reliable cognition, and what is the epistemic problem that Plantinga raises?
This question places us at the heart of one of the most important contemporary debates between naturalism and theism: can biological evolution explain the reliability of our cognitive faculties? Neo-Darwinians say yes, and Plantinga raises a radical challenge to this claim. Understanding the arguments from both sides is necessary to evaluate the strength of the "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" (EAAN).
Inadequate Responses to Avoid
From some believers:
"Evolution is a false theory, so there's no need for discussion." This ignores the philosophical context. Plantinga himself accepts biological evolution as a scientific fact. His argument is not against evolution, but against combining evolution with philosophical naturalism. Rejecting evolution does not solve the philosophical problem being raised.
"The human mind is a divine miracle that evolution cannot explain." This is an unjustified leap. Even if the mind is a divine gift, this doesn't mean evolution played no role in shaping it. Philosophical arguments need precise formulation, not mere declarations of miracle.
From some naturalists:
"Evolution explains everything, including mind and knowledge." This is a hasty claim. Evolution explains behaviors that aid survival, but the transition from "behavior useful for survival" to "true knowledge" is not self-evident. This is precisely the point of contention.
"Plantinga is just a disguised creationist." This misrepresents the position. Plantinga is a respected analytic philosopher, and his argument uses contemporary philosophical tools, not religious fundamentalism. Responding to him requires philosophical analysis, not accusations.
Why These Responses Are Inadequate
They share a failure to understand the nature of the epistemic problem being raised. The question is not "Is evolution real?" or "Does God exist?", but "Does the combination of evolution and naturalism produce a self-defeating epistemic problem?" This is a technical question in epistemology that requires careful analysis.
The Neo-Darwinian Position: Dawkins and Dennett
Richard Dawkins in "The Selfish Gene" and "The God Delusion," and Daniel Dennett in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" and "Breaking the Spell," present a coherent vision of how evolution produces reliable cognition:
Natural Selection Mechanism and Truth:
─ Organisms that perceive their environment more accurately survive and reproduce more.
─ Correctly perceiving "there is a lion" is better for survival than illusion.
─ Over millions of years, brains that produce accurate representations of reality are selected.
─ Result: our brains are evolutionarily "tuned" to perceive truth (at least in domains important for survival).
Gradation in Cognitive Complexity:
─ From simple sensory perception (sight, hearing) to abstract thinking.
─ Each stage built on the previous one gradually.
─ Higher cognitive capacities (mathematics, philosophy) are "byproducts" of basic capacities useful for survival.
Dawkins' Concept of "Memes":
─ Ideas evolve culturally like genes biologically.
─ True and useful ideas spread and persist.
─ This explains the development of scientific and philosophical knowledge.
Basic Trust in Reason:
Dennett affirms that the naturalist can trust their reason because:
─ Evolution is a "blind watchmaker" but effective at producing functional mechanisms.
─ Cognitive errors exist but are correctable through scientific method.
─ The success of science is empirical evidence for the reliability of our basic cognition.
Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN)
Alvin Plantinga developed a complex argument in his book "Warrant and Proper Function" (1993) and refined it in later articles. The argument proceeds as follows:
Basic Premises:
1. Evolution (in the naturalistic framework) selects behaviors useful for survival, not true beliefs per se.
2. Useful behavior can result from false beliefs (e.g., fleeing from a lion because you believe it wants to play with you dangerously).
3. Therefore, the probability that our beliefs are true—in the naturalistic evolutionary framework—is low or indeterminate.
The Devastating Conclusion:
If naturalism is correct, we cannot trust our cognitive faculties. But this includes our trust in naturalism itself! Therefore naturalism is self-defeating.
Technical Details:
Plantinga calculates probabilities:
─ P(R|N&E): the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable assuming naturalism and evolution.
─ He argues this probability is low or indeterminate.
─ Therefore, the believer in (N&E) has a "defeater" for all their beliefs, including (N&E) itself.
Illustrative Examples:
─ Paul fleeing from the tiger: he could have completely false beliefs (the tiger wants to play, fleeing is a way to play) but his behavior (fleeing) keeps him alive.
─ Abstract capacities: why would evolution produce the ability to understand quantum mechanics or set theory? These have no relation to survival on the savanna.
Neo-Darwinian Responses to Plantinga
Dennett's Response: "Truth is Generally Useful"
─ In most cases, true beliefs produce better survival behaviors.
─ Counter-examples (like Paul and the tiger) are artificial and rare.
─ Evolution produces "general mechanisms" for learning, and these tend toward truth.
Patricia Churchland's Response: "Epistemic Pragmatism"
─ We don't need "absolute truth," but representations "good enough" for reality.
─ Evolution produces this level of cognitive accuracy.
─ The success of science and technology is evidence of the adequacy of our cognition.
Fodor and Piattelli's Response: "Cognitive Modules"
─ The mind consists of specialized modules.
─ Basic modules (sensory perception) are evolutionarily reliable.
─ Higher capacities were built on this reliable foundation.
Mutual Criticism
Naturalists' Criticism of Plantinga:
─ He exaggerates the separation between cognitive content and behavior.
─ He ignores empirical evidence for the success of our knowledge (science).
─ His argument works against any theory of knowledge, not just naturalism.
Plantinga's Response:
─ Practical success doesn't guarantee theoretical truth.
─ Trust in science presupposes the reliability of reason, and this is circular in the naturalistic framework.
─ Theism solves the problem: God created our minds to perceive truth.
Where We Stand in This Debate Today
The debate remains alive in contemporary philosophy:
─ Philosophers like Ernest Sosa and Timothy Williamson are developing sophisticated naturalistic responses.
─ Other philosophers like Michael Rea and Robert Koons are developing updated versions of Plantinga's argument.
─ Cognitive scientists are empirically studying the relationship between evolution and cognitive reliability.
Balanced Assessment:
Plantinga's argument poses a serious challenge to naturalism, but it is not decisive. Naturalists have reasonable responses, but they require additional assumptions. The prudent position—within the framework of rational preferability (rajḥān ʿaqlī)—is that this problem weakens confidence in pure naturalism, but does not completely destroy it.
For Advanced Reading
─ Advanced level: Contemporary responses to EAAN in analytic philosophy
─ Advanced level: The role of evolutionary epistemology in philosophy of science
─ Alvin Plantinga, "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism" (2011)
─ Daniel Dennett & Alvin Plantinga, Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? (2010)
─ "Argument from Reason" page on the website