Why do some Muslims consider that belief in God is "natural" while atheism is "acquired"?

This question touches on one of the most deeply rooted convictions in Islamic tradition: that belief in God is embedded in human nature, while atheism is a deviation from it. This conviction is based on the concept of "fiṭra" — the original nature upon which humans were created. However, this claim faces contemporary challenges from psychology, sociology, and philosophy. Is belief really "natural" and atheism "acquired"? Or is it the opposite? Or is the matter more complex than this binary?

Inadequate responses to avoid

From some believers:

"The Quran says {The fiṭra of Allah upon which He has created mankind}, period." Circular reasoning. The questioner is asking about the validity of the claim itself, so one cannot rely solely on religious text. A non-Muslim will not be convinced by a Quranic verse, and the Muslim posing the question wants deeper understanding than mere citation.

"Look at children, they all believe in God before society corrupts them." Misleading oversimplification. Children believe in many things: Santa Claus, fairies, monsters under the bed. Is everything children believe "innate"? Moreover, child psychology studies show that children tend toward teleological thinking more than belief in a specific deity.

"Atheism is a modern Western fad." Historical error. Atheism exists in all civilizations: the Cārvāka in ancient India, some Greek philosophers, atheists of the classical Islamic period like Ibn al-Rāwandī and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. Atheism is not a modern "invention."

From some atheists:

"Religion is mere social indoctrination, children are atheist by nature." Strong claim without sufficient evidence. Contemporary studies (Justin Barrett, Paul Bloom) show that children naturally tend toward thought patterns that facilitate religious belief: attributing intentionality to things, believing in continuity after death, dualistic thinking between body and mind. This doesn't prove "divine fiṭra," but it refutes that children are "naturally atheist."

"Belief in God is an evolutionary result of survival mechanisms." Reductionism. Even if religion has an evolutionary basis (which is debatable), this doesn't settle its truth or falsehood. Our mathematical capacity has an evolutionary basis, but this doesn't make mathematics an "illusion." Evolutionary origin doesn't determine epistemic truth.

Why these responses are inadequate

They share the flaw of oversimplifying a complex phenomenon. The question about the "naturalness" of belief or atheism requires careful analysis of the meaning of "natural," thoughtful study of evidence from different sciences, and avoiding jumping to conclusions that serve a predetermined position.

Serious positions in the debate

First, the developed "religious fiṭra" position. This position — adopted by contemporary Muslim philosophers like Hamza Tzortzis and Sami Ameri — doesn't merely cite texts, but relies on evidence from cognitive psychology:

1. Natural tendency toward teleological thinking: Children ask "why?" more than "how?" and assume intention behind things.
2. Innate dualism: Children naturally distinguish between mind and body, facilitating conception of immaterial beings.
3. Moral intuition: The existence of basic moral sense in children is more easily explained by a transcendent moral source.
4. Tendency toward worship: The phenomenon of religiosity is universal across cultures, suggesting an innate basis.

This position doesn't claim that children are born Muslim or Christian, but that human cognitive structure is "prepared" for belief in a transcendent power.

Second, the "cognitive by-product" position. Psychologists like Justin Barrett and Pascal Boyer see the tendency toward religion as a natural result of cognitive mechanisms that evolved for other purposes:

- Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD): A survival mechanism that makes us assume an agent behind events.
- Theory of mind: Our ability to attribute thoughts and intentions to others extends to include invisible beings.
- Memory and narrative: Brains love stories, and religions provide powerful narratives.

This position is theologically neutral: it neither denies nor proves God's existence, but explains the human tendency toward religion.

Third, the "social construction" position. Sociologists of religion see both religiosity and atheism as social constructions. Societies shape their members' beliefs, and children learn belief or disbelief from their environment. This position completely rejects the idea of "fiṭra," whether for belief or atheism.

Fourth, the reconciliatory position. Some thinkers see that humans have diverse cognitive tendencies: some facilitate belief (teleological thinking), and some facilitate doubt (analytical thinking). What's "natural" is diversity, not unidirectional tendency.

Where we stand in this debate today

Contemporary research in the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) tends to favor the view that humans have natural cognitive tendencies that facilitate religiosity. However, the interpretation of these tendencies remains disputed: are they evidence of "divine fiṭra" or merely an evolutionary by-product?

The cumulative approach places these data in a broader context. If humans are cognitively "programmed" in a way that facilitates belief in God, this is evidence (not conclusive proof) in favor of the theistic position. But this evidence must be placed alongside other evidence (fine-tuning of the universe, consciousness, religious experience, etc.) to reach a reasonable conclusion.

For advanced reading

─ Intermediate level: The concept of fiṭra in Ibn Taymiyya and its contemporary applications
─ Advanced level: Cognitive science of religion debate (Barrett vs. Geertz)
─ "Natural Belief in God" family page on the website
─ Justin Barrett, "Born Believers" (2012)