Does Jordan Howard Sobel's argument for "default atheism" succeed in formulating an epistemologically fortified position similar to the Plantingian position, or does it face analogical problems?

Jordan Howard Sobel (1929-2010) in his massive work "Logic and Theism" (2004) developed a position he called "Default Atheism" — an attempt to build an atheistic parallel to Plantinga's Reformed epistemology. The central claim: atheism is an epistemological "default" position that requires no justification, while theism needs positive proofs. This position raises deep questions about epistemic symmetry between atheism and theism.

Inadequate responses to avoid

From some atheists: "Sobel proved that atheism needs no justification" is an oversimplified reading. Sobel himself distinguishes between "lack of belief" and "belief in absence," with the latter requiring justification. "Default atheism settles the debate" ignores strong responses from philosophers like Paul Moser and Alvin Plantinga.

From some theists: "Sobel is just a biased atheist" is an unfair characterization. Sobel is a rigorous analytic philosopher; his book is among the most technically sophisticated treatments of theistic arguments. "The position is a clear logical fallacy" is reductive — the argument is complex and requires careful analysis.

Structure of Sobel's argument

Epistemological foundation: principle of ontological economy.

Sobel begins from a modified version of Ockham's razor: the default epistemological position is not to assume additional entities without explanatory necessity. The natural world is given in direct experience. Assuming a transcendent entity (God) requires special justification.

This is not "atheism" in the positive sense (denying God's existence), but a default position of "lack of belief." Just as lack of belief in pink dragons is a default position, so is lack of belief in God.

Precise conceptual distinction.

Sobel distinguishes three positions:
- Strong atheism: belief that God does not exist.
- Weak atheism: lack of belief in God's existence.
- Agnosticism: suspension of judgment between existence and non-existence.

"Default atheism" is the second position: a lack of belief taken as an epistemological starting point that needs no proofs. Moving to theism requires positive evidence, while remaining in non-belief does not.

Analogy with Plantinga.

As Plantinga claims faith is "properly basic belief" through the divine sense, Sobel claims lack of faith is "properly basic position" through epistemic economy. Both attempt to establish positions that need no external proofs.

The difference: Plantinga assumes a special cognitive faculty (sensus divinitatis), Sobel relies on a general epistemic principle (ontological economy).

Problems with the analogy

First problem: asymmetry in burden of proof.

Criticism from Paul Moser: Sobel assumes "non-existence" is the default position, but this is a non-neutral metaphysical assumption. In a possible world where God exists and created humans with a divine sense, belief would be default and non-belief would need justification.

Sobel responds: we live in this world, not in possible worlds. In our world, direct experience gives us nature, not what lies beyond it. Epistemic economy requires beginning from what is directly given.

Second problem: potential self-contradiction.

Criticism from William Lane Craig: If the principle of ontological economy itself needs justification, the position refutes itself. If it needs no justification, why not accept Plantinga's principle (divine sense) the same way?

Sobel responds: the economy principle is not an existential claim but a methodological rule. Methodological rules are justified pragmatically (by their success), not by direct proofs.

Third problem: selective application.

Criticism from Alvin Plantinga: Sobel applies economy to God but not to other entities like natural laws, abstract numbers, objective moral values. This is selective application of the principle.

Sobel responds: the distinction is based on explanatory necessity. Natural laws are necessary to explain regularity in nature. God — according to Sobel — is not explanatorily necessary.

Fourth problem: broader epistemological consequences.

Criticism from Richard Swinburne: If Sobel's position is accepted, it applies to other beliefs: existence of other minds, reliability of memory, realism about the external world. All require "additional entities" not directly given.

Sobel attempts distinction: these beliefs are necessary for cognitive practice itself, while belief in God is not. But this distinction faces technical difficulties.

Comparative assessment

Strengths in Sobel's position:
- Clear distinction between "lack of belief" and "belief in absence."
- Consistency with scientific practice (not assuming entities without necessity).
- No need to assume special cognitive faculties.

Weaknesses:
- Assuming ontological economy is metaphysically neutral.
- Difficulty justifying selective application of the principle.
- Tension with other basic beliefs we accept without direct proof.

Comparison with Plantinga:

Both positions attempt to establish "epistemic immunity" for a position without proofs. Plantinga is more explicit in acknowledging his position assumes a particular metaphysical framework. Sobel claims neutrality but is accused of concealing naturalistic assumptions.

The paradox: each position seems reasonable within its own framework, but there is no neutral position from which to judge between them.

Contemporary developments (2010-2026)

After Sobel's death (2010), the debate developed in new directions:

The "moderate epistemic atheism" current (Graham Oppy, J.L. Schellenberg) adopts a modified version: atheism is not absolutely "default," but is the most probable position based on available evidence.

The "epistemic symmetry" current (Paul Draper, Wes Morriston) rejects the idea of epistemic privilege for either position and calls for balanced evidence assessment.

The "post-analytical" current (Continental approaches) criticizes the entire analytical framework, including attempts by both Sobel and Plantinga to establish "fortified positions."

From the perspective of rational preponderance (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

The rational preponderance approach transcends this debate by rejecting the idea of "fortified position" altogether:

- Neither belief nor atheism is absolutely "default."
- Every position needs assessment of cumulative evidence.
- Ontological economy is a useful but not absolute principle.
- The divine sense is a possibility assessed within total evidence.

The Six Paths provide a framework for balanced assessment instead of seeking illusory "epistemic immunity."

Critical conclusion

Sobel's attempt to build "default atheism" parallel to Plantinga's Reformed epistemology faces analogous problems:
- Both claim "basic" positions but assume metaphysical frameworks.
- Both face the problem of selective application of their principles.
- Both find it difficult to justify their epistemic privilege neutrally.

The philosophical lesson: attempts to establish epistemologically "fortified positions" — whether theistic or atheistic — face structural limits. More philosophically honest is acknowledging that every position carries burdens of proof, and that balanced assessment of cumulative evidence is the wisest path.

This does not mean all positions are equal, but that claiming "exemption from burden of proof" — whether for belief or atheism — is philosophically problematic. Rational preponderance offers an alternative: accumulating evidence across multiple paths, while acknowledging the result is preponderance, not certainty.

Where we stand in this debate today

The debate over "default positions" in religious epistemology has seen notable shifts between 2020 and 2026. On one hand, Graham Oppy developed in his recent works a more modest position that abandons the claim of "default atheism" and adopts instead a cumulative assessment of evidence seeing naturalism as explanatorily simpler — a significant shift from Sobel's original position. On the other hand, philosophers like Max Baker-Hytch and John Greco have reformulated the Plantingian position using virtue epistemology tools, transcending the "default or proof" dichotomy. A third current represented by Paul Draper and Tristan Haze rejects the idea of "default position" fundamentally, calling for assessment of prior probabilities based on complex explanatory considerations rather than a simple economic principle. Notably, the general trend in contemporary literature moves away from the project of "epistemic fortification" — whether theistic or atheistic — toward Bayesian and cumulative models that acknowledge every position carries varying burdens of proof. This shift brings academic debate closer to the logic of cumulative rational preponderance than ever before.

For reading

- Jordan Howard Sobel, Logic and Theism (Cambridge UP, 2004), especially Chapter 2
- Paul Moser, The Elusive God (Cambridge UP, 2008)
- Graham Oppy, Arguing About Gods (Cambridge UP, 2006)
- J.L. Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt (Cornell UP, 2007)
- "Formulation: Default Positions" page on the website
- "Theme" page