How do critics of the sensus divinitatis respond to Plantinga by arguing that the concept needs independent epistemological justification, and do the Plantingian responses succeed?

This objection strikes at the heart of the Plantingian project. Critics argue that the sensus divinitatis itself needs independent justification before it can be used as an epistemological foundation for belief. This debate reveals a deep tension in religious epistemology between foundationalism and reliabilism.

Inadequate responses to avoid

From some defenders of Plantinga:

"The sensus divinitatis needs no justification, just like sense perception." This is a flawed analogy. Sense perception is subject to intersubjective verification, while the sensus divinitatis is not. The qualitative difference calls for different treatment.

"Those who deny the sensus divinitatis lack it due to sin." This is a theological interpretation that transcends philosophical discussion. Even if theologically correct, it doesn't solve the epistemological problem.

"The criticism assumes secular standards for knowledge." This is a counter-accusation that doesn't address the objection. The question about epistemological justification is a neutral philosophical question, not necessarily "secular."

From some critics:

"The sensus divinitatis is merely an invention to justify belief." This is a reductive characterization that ignores the philosophical complexity of Plantinga's theory and the Calvinist tradition it draws upon.

"There's no empirical evidence for the existence of a sensus divinitatis." This assumes that every cognitive faculty must be empirically observable, which is itself a debatable philosophical assumption.

"The sensus divinitatis justifies any religious belief." This is a false generalization. Plantinga sets specific conditions for proper function.

Why these responses are inadequate

They fail to recognize that the objection is deeper than merely "accepting or rejecting" the sensus divinitatis. The epistemological question is: How do we know that we have a sensus divinitatis that functions properly? This is a second-order question that requires careful analysis.

Structure of the epistemological criticism

The basic criticism: Circularity of justification

Richard Fumerton's formulation: To know that our religious beliefs are justified through the sensus divinitatis, we need to know:
1. That we have a sensus divinitatis
2. That it functions properly
3. That it is reliable in producing true beliefs

But how do we know (1-3)? If we use the sensus divinitatis itself, we fall into circularity. If we use other faculties, why not use them directly for religious knowledge?

Michael Bergmann's formulation: The problem is deeper. Even if we accept the existence of the sensus divinitatis, how do we distinguish between:
- The correct sensus divinitatis
- Psychological delusions
- Cultural influences
- Unconscious projections

Without an independent criterion, distinction is impossible.

William Alston's criticism - who is an ally of Plantinga!

Even those sympathetic to the Plantingian project see a problem. Alston in "Perceiving God" (1991) argues that religious perceptual practices (mystical perception) need "social checking" within a religious tradition. The individual sensus divinitatis alone is insufficient.

Plantinga's responses

First response: The Parity Argument

All our cognitive faculties face the same problem. How do we justify sense perception without using sense perception? How do we justify reason without using reason? If we accept other faculties despite circularity, why reject the sensus divinitatis?

Criticism of the criticism: The analogy is incomplete. Sense perception:
- Is subject to intersubjective verification between persons
- Generally produces consistent beliefs
- Has self-correcting mechanisms
- Is linked to biological survival

The sensus divinitatis lacks these characteristics.

Second response: Distinguishing between knowledge and second-order knowledge

We don't need to "know that we know" (KK principle) in order to know. Our religious beliefs can be justified through the sensus divinitatis without our knowing that they're justified. Justification operates at the first level, not requiring second-order knowledge.

Criticism of the criticism: Even if we accept this, the practical question remains: How do we distinguish justified beliefs from unjustified ones? Without second-order criteria, we lose any critical capacity.

Third response: Externalist Reliabilism

Epistemological justification doesn't require internal access to justificatory reasons. It's sufficient that the faculty be objectively reliable in producing true beliefs. If the sensus divinitatis (if it exists) is reliable, then the resulting beliefs are justified, even if we can't prove its reliability.

Criticism of the criticism: This makes justification unevaluable from the epistemic agent's perspective. How do I know if my sensus divinitatis is reliable or not? External reliabilism might be metaphysically correct but epistemologically useless.

Recent developments in the debate

Ernest Sosa's criticism - "Virtue Epistemology"

Sosa in "A Virtue Epistemology" (2007) argues that knowledge requires not just truth and justification, but "apt performance." The sensus divinitatis, even if it exists, needs:
- Standards for competent performance
- Ability to distinguish between good and bad performance
- Mechanisms for improvement and correction

Without these, it's not a genuine "intellectual virtue."

Paul Boghossian's criticism - "Conceptual content"

In "Content and Justification" (2008), he argues that the concept of "sensus divinitatis" itself is vague. What is its conceptual content? What exactly does it "perceive"? Conceptual vagueness makes justificatory claims dubious.

Rescue attempts from within the Plantingian camp

Michael Sudduth: Proposes integrating the sensus divinitatis with "modified natural theology." The sensus divinitatis provides initial knowledge, but it's supported and refined by philosophical arguments. This avoids complete dependence on a single faculty.

Andrew Moon: Develops "religious seemings theory." Instead of the sensus divinitatis, he discusses "it seems to me that God exists" as a phenomenal state with prima facie justificatory force, defeasible by contrary evidence.

Kevin McCain: Proposes "explanatory coherence." The sensus divinitatis is justified if it's part of the best comprehensive explanation of our total experience, not as an isolated faculty.

The deeper philosophical point

The objection reveals a fundamental tension in religious knowledge:

On one hand, religion claims knowledge that transcends ordinary human capacities. This calls for special faculties or revelation.

On the other hand, any cognitive claim is subject to rational evaluation standards. This calls for justification that's open to examination.

The sensus divinitatis attempts to combine: a special but natural faculty, transcending pure reason but subject to epistemological standards. Is this combination coherent? The debate continues.

From the perspective of rational preponderance (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

The position of the website can be formulated as follows:

The sensus divinitatis (or its equivalent "fiṭra" in Islamic tradition) may be a genuine component in religious knowledge, but it:
- Isn't sufficient alone for complete epistemological justification
- Needs support from other cognitive sources
- Is fallible and subject to psychological and cultural influences
- Requires standards for distinguishing correct from false

Therefore, the cumulative approach (cosmological arguments + religious experience + revelation + rational coherence) is stronger than relying on a single faculty, however reliable it might be.

This doesn't negate the role of the sensus divinitatis/fiṭra, but places it in a broader and more balanced epistemological context. Rational preponderance builds on multiple sources, not on a single faculty that may or may not be reliable.

Where we stand in this debate today

The debate over the sensus divinitatis remains active in analytic philosophy of religion. Plantinga hasn't succeeded in convincing the philosophical community that the sensus divinitatis solves the problem of epistemological justification for belief. However, [text appears to be cut off]