How does Anthony Flew (during his atheistic period) deal with conflicting prophetic claims between religions as an argument for their collective loss of credibility?

This question takes us to the heart of the "conflicting prophetic claims" argument developed by Anthony Flew during his long atheistic period (1950-2004). Flew used this argument as part of his philosophical arsenal against religions, before his sudden conversion to belief in God in 2004. Understanding his argument is important because it is frequently raised in contemporary debates, and responses to it reveal deep philosophical complexities.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of religions:

"Flew converted to belief, therefore his old arguments are invalid." This is a logical fallacy. Flew's late conversion does not automatically invalidate his previous arguments. The argument must be evaluated on its own merits, not by the subsequent position of its author. Flew himself did not explicitly retract this particular argument even after his conversion.

"The conflict between religions is superficial; they all call for good." This is a harmful oversimplification. Conflicting prophetic claims are not merely differences in moral details, but fundamental contradictions: Is Jesus an incarnate God (Christianity) or a human prophet (Islam)? Did revelation end with Moses (Judaism) or continue? Ignoring these hard contradictions weakens the response.

From some naturalists:

"The existence of conflicting claims proves they are all false." This is a logical leap. It is logically possible that one of the claims is correct and the rest are wrong. Conflict alone does not entail collective falsehood, but rather requires criteria for discrimination.

"Flew definitively destroyed the credibility of all religions." This is an exaggeration. Flew's argument poses a serious challenge, but it does not close the door. There are sophisticated philosophical responses worthy of consideration. Presenting the argument as a knockout blow ignores the complexity of philosophical debate.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They share a failure to engage with the precise logical structure of Flew's argument. The argument is not merely a passing observation about the existence of conflict, but has a specific inferential structure that requires methodical analysis.

Flew's Argument: The Logical Structure

In his atheistic writings, especially "The Presumption of Atheism" (1976) and "God and Philosophy" (1966), Flew formulated the argument as follows:

1. Multiple competing claims. There exist multiple prophetic claims (Muhammad, Jesus, Moses, Buddha, Zoroaster...) each claiming exclusive or supreme access to divine truth.

2. Fundamental conflict. These claims are not merely complementary differences, but contradictory on fundamental points: the nature of God, human destiny, the path of salvation, the identity of the savior.

3. Apparent epistemic parity. From an external neutral perspective, there is no clear and objective criterion for distinguishing between these claims. All are based on testimonies, alleged miracles, sacred texts, spiritual experiences.

4. The Principle of Parity. If the epistemic foundations are similar and the claims contradictory, the rational position is to treat them equally: either accept them all (impossible due to their contradiction) or reject them all.

5. The conclusion. Since accepting them all is logically impossible, the only rational position is to reject them all, or at least suspend judgment (agnosticism) regarding them.

The Strength of Flew's Argument

Flew did not limit himself to presenting the argument theoretically, but reinforced it with empirical observations:

Geographical bias. Most people follow the religion of their society. If one religion were "clearly correct," why would belief in it correlate more with geography than with evidence?

The failure of interreligious dialogue. Despite centuries of debates, religions have not succeeded in convincing each other. If one possessed decisive evidence, why this continued failure?

The historical evolution of claims. Prophetic claims evolve and become complex over time (from simple monotheism to trinity, from human prophet to incarnate God). This suggests they are human constructions, not stable revelation.

Serious Philosophical Responses to Flew

First Response: Rejecting the Principle of Epistemic Parity

Philosopher Richard Swinburne (in "The Existence of God" and "Revelation") rejects the claim of parity. He proposes rational criteria for discrimination:

- Internal coherence. Some religions are more logically coherent than others.
- Explanatory power. Some religions explain reality (the universe, consciousness, morality) more comprehensively.
- Simplicity. Monotheism is simpler than polytheism, and simplicity is an accepted rational criterion.
- Historical evidence. Some prophetic claims are more historically supported than others.

Second Response: The "Progressive Revelation" Model

John Hick (in "God and the Universe of Faiths") developed a progressive/pluralistic revelation model. Different religions are diverse human responses to one divine reality. The contradictions are superficial, reflecting cultural contexts, not contradictions in the divine essence.

Criticism of this response: It is accused of emptying religions of their specific content. If Jesus is "merely a symbol" of divine reality, this contradicts fundamental Christian belief. The pluralistic solution may be worse than the problem.

Third Response: Distinguishing Between Levels of Claims

Alvin Plantinga (in "Warranted Christian Belief") distinguishes between:
- General metaphysical claims (existence of God, afterlife): shared by many religions.
- Specific historical claims (crucifixion of Christ, ascension of Muhammad): specific to each religion.

Agreement in the former points to a shared "divine sense." Conflict in the latter does not negate the former. One can accept "belief in God" without needing to resolve all historical details.

Fourth Response: Bayesian Analysis of Religions

Some contemporary philosophers (Joshua Rasmussen, Blake McAllister) propose applying Bayesian analysis:
- Prior probabilities for each religion based on its simplicity and coherence.
- Bayesian updating based on evidence (historical, philosophical, empirical).
- Result: A probabilistic ranking of religions, rather than "all or nothing."

Flew's Later Position

Interestingly, Flew, after his conversion to belief in God (2004), did not adopt any specific religion. He continued to see contradictions between Abrahamic religions as a real problem. His belief was in an "Aristotelian" God—an intelligent first mover, not a God of revelation.

In a late interview (2007), he said: "I see Islam as more monotheistic than Christianity, which makes it simpler and closer to reason. But I am not convinced by any specific revelation claims."

Critical Assessment

Flew's argument poses a real challenge worthy of serious consideration. Its strengths:
- It highlights a real epistemic problem: how do we distinguish between conflicting claims?
- It reveals the role of cultural/geographical factors in religious affiliation.
- It challenges naive confidence in the correctness of one religion without critical examination.

But it has limitations:
- It assumes an epistemic parity that may not be accurate.
- It ignores the possibility of rational criteria for discrimination.
- It may confuse "difficulty of discrimination" with "impossibility of discrimination."

Where We Stand Today in This Debate

The debate has evolved in multiple directions:

Comparative religious epistemology. Instead of "all religions or nothing," researchers focus on developing precise criteria for comparison and evaluation.

Philosophical interreligious dialogue. Serious attempts to understand points of agreement and difference, without reduction or elimination.

Critical historical analysis. Careful examination of each religion's historical claims, using neutral academic tools.

Within the framework of god-database, this falls under the fifth (prophetic) and sixth (textual) paths. Rational preferability (rajḥān ʿaqlī) requires cumulative assessment, not categorical judgment based on a single argument.

For Advanced Reading

- Advanced level: Bayesian criteria for evaluating competing religious claims
- Page "Formulation: Religious Diversity Problem"
- Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism (1976)
- Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (2007)
- John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (2004)
- Paul Griffiths & Delmas Lewis, "On Grading Religions, Seeking Truth, and Being Nice to People" (Religious Studies, 1983)