Revelation and Reason

How did Ibn Rushd (Averroes) in "Fasl al-Maqāl" distinguish between reason and revelation, and how did he regulate the relationship between them in cases of conflict?

IntermediateM5-T9-Q36 min read

Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) in "Fasl al-Maqāl fīmā bayna al-Ḥikma wa al-Sharīʿa min al-Ittiṣāl" (The Decisive Treatise on the Connection between Wisdom and Religious Law) stands among the most profound Muslim philosophers in treating the relationship between reason and revelation. His intellectual project transcends mere superficial reconciliation to establish a coherent methodology for dealing with apparent conflict between them.

Inadequate Responses to Be Avoided

From some traditional theologians (mutakallimūn):

"Ibn Rushd absolutely prioritizes reason over revelation." This is a misleading oversimplification. Ibn Rushd sees demonstrative reason (al-ʿaql al-burhānī) and authentic revelation as incapable of truly contradicting each other, since their source is one (God). Prioritization for him is methodological and interpretive, not axiological.

"Ibn Rushd is a Greek philosopher in Islamic garb." An unjust accusation. Ibn Rushd was a Mālikī jurist (judge of Cordoba) and grandson of the great jurist Ibn Rushd the Elder. His knowledge of Islamic law is deep and authentic, not external veneer.

From some contemporary secularists:

"Ibn Rushd is secular, separating religion from philosophy." This is a modernist projection. Ibn Rushd sees philosophy and religious law as "twin sisters nursed from the same source." His project is unifying, not schismatic.

"Ibn Rushd practices philosophical dissimulation (taqiyya)." A misunderstanding of his methodology. His distinction between levels of discourse (demonstrative/dialectical/rhetorical) is not dissimulation, but an educational method that considers the capacities of different audiences.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They fail to grasp the depth of the Rushdian project: establishing an integrated epistemological theory that preserves the domains of both reason and revelation without real conflict, with a clear methodology for dealing with apparent contradiction.

Ibn Rushd's Methodological Structure

First Principle: Truth Does Not Contradict Truth

"Truth does not contradict truth, but rather supports and bears witness to it." This golden rule underlies Ibn Rushd's entire methodology. If revelation is truly from God and demonstrative reason leads to truth, they cannot truly contradict each other.

Apparent contradiction arises from:
- Error in rational demonstration
- Misunderstanding of religious text
- Taking text at face value where interpretation is required

Second Principle: Levels of Discourse and Comprehension

Ibn Rushd distinguishes three levels:

1. People of demonstration (philosophers): They grasp truths through certain proofs
2. People of dialectic (theologians): They use probable dialectical arguments
3. People of rhetoric (the masses): They are content with representations and images

Religious law addressed everyone according to their capacity. Texts whose apparent meaning contradicts demonstration are directed to the masses in representational language they understand.

Third Principle: Regulated Interpretation (Taʾwīl)

In cases of apparent contradiction, texts must be interpreted with controls:

- Interpretation must be consistent with Arabic linguistic rules
- It must not exceed recognized Arabic metaphorical usage
- It must preserve the general purposes of religious law
- It must not be proclaimed to the masses (preserving their simple faith)

Methodological Applications

On the Eternity of the World:

Aristotelian philosophical demonstration suggests the world's eternity. Religious texts affirm creation. The Rushdian solution:

- The world is eternal in species (motion and time have no beginning)
- But it is temporally originated in individuals and forms
- God is a perpetual agent whose action never ceases
- Religious texts speak of the formation of this observable world, not about the principle of existence absolutely

On God's Knowledge of Particulars:

The philosophical problem: How does God know changeable things without His knowledge changing?

The Rushdian solution:
- God's knowledge is not like our knowledge (analogizing the unseen to the seen is invalid)
- God knows things through knowledge that is identical to His essence, not additional knowledge
- His knowledge of particulars is not in the way we know them

On Bodily Resurrection:

Texts are explicit about bodily resurrection. Some philosophers denied it.

Ibn Rushd's position:
- Bodily resurrection is a truth established by religious law
- Its precise manner is beyond detailed rational comprehension
- Reason establishes its possibility and non-impossibility
- We accept the details from revelation through submission

Methodological Rules for Dealing with Contradiction

First Rule: If the demonstration is certain and the text is probable in meaning, the text is interpreted.

Second Rule: If the text is certain in meaning and the demonstration is probable, the demonstration is revised.

Third Rule: It is impermissible to declare as infidel one who interprets a text through linguistically acceptable interpretation.

Fourth Rule: Demonstrative interpretations are not publicized to the masses.

Methodological Critique of Ibn Rushd

Ashʿarite Critique:
Al-Ghazālī in "Tahāfut al-Falāsifa" accused philosophers of infidelity in three issues (world's eternity, denying God's knowledge of particulars, denying bodily resurrection).

Ibn Rushd's response in "Tahāfut al-Tahāfut":
- Al-Ghazālī did not understand what philosophers intended
- The disagreement is often verbal
- Declaring infidelity is permissible only for denying what is known of religion by necessity

Theologians' Critique:
They see Ibn Rushd's methodology as opening the door of interpretation wide.

The Response:
- Interpretation is controlled by strict rules
- Not everyone is qualified for interpretation
- Preserving the masses' beliefs is obligatory

Historical Influence

In the Islamic World:
- Limited influence due to Ashʿarite hegemony
- Partial revival in the modern era (Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn)

In Latin Europe:
- Deep influence through Latin translations
- Latin Averroism (Siger of Brabant)
- Thomas Aquinas was influenced by his methodology despite criticizing him

Contemporary Relevance

Ibn Rushd's methodology offers a model for:

1. Cognitive Integration: No real conflict between science and religion when both are understood deeply
2. Respect for Specialization: Each field has its people and tools
3. Educational Gradation: Considering different levels of understanding among people
4. Civilizational Dialogue: The possibility of rational dialogue between intellectual traditions

The Deeper Philosophical Point

Ibn Rushd does not solve the problem of reason and revelation through superficial reconciliation, but by deepening our understanding of the nature of each. Demonstrative reason and divine revelation are both paths to one truth, and apparent contradiction reveals deficiency in our understanding, not contradiction in reality.

Where We Stand in This Discussion Today

In the age of modern science, Ibn Rushd's methodology is more important than ever. Contemporary challenges (theory of evolution, neuroscience, modern physics) need an advanced Rushdian methodology that preserves constants while opening to new knowledge.

For Advanced Reading

- Advanced level: Ibn Rushd's theory of religious knowledge compared to contemporary virtue epistemology
- Ibn Rushd, "Faṣl al-Maqāl" (edited by Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī)
- Ibn Rushd, "Al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-Adilla"
- Ibn Rushd, "Tahāfut al-Tahāfut"
- Oliver Leaman, Averroes and His Philosophy (Oxford UP, 1988)
- Richard Taylor & Luis López-Farjeat (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy (2016)
- Majid Fakhry, Averroes: His Life, Works and Influence (Oneworld, 2001)
- "Tension: Reason and Revelation" page on the website

#averroes-reason-revelation