What are the positions of the anthropomorphists (mushabbihah) and the negators (muʿaṭṭilah) in Islamic theology (kalām) regarding anthropomorphism, and how did the Ashʿarites and Māturīdites mediate between them?

The topic of "anthropomorphism and negation" (tashbīh wa-taʿṭīl) is considered one of the most complex issues in Islamic theology (kalām), as it concerns how to understand the divine attributes mentioned in the Quran and Hadith. This classical debate has important contemporary extensions in philosophy of religion and religious language. A methodical approach requires understanding the different positions and their philosophical foundations.

Inadequate responses to be avoided

From some contemporary theologians:

"The anthropomorphists are disbelievers and the negators are disbelievers." This is hasty takfīr that misses the philosophical complexities. Many anthropomorphists and negators were sincere scholars attempting to solve a genuine philosophical problem. Takfīr prevents methodical understanding of the issue.

"The Ashʿarites solved the problem definitively." An exaggerated claim. The Ashʿarite position has its strength, but it faces philosophical challenges (such as Ibn Taymiyyah's critique of interpretation, and the Muʿtazilite critique of acquisition (kasb)). The philosophical discussion about religious language remains open.

From some contemporary critics:

"All this discussion is pointless sophistry." A superficial rejection. The question of how to speak about God is a fundamental philosophical issue that appears in all religious traditions. The Islamic discussion around it is rich and developed, deserving comparative study.

"The disagreement is merely disguised political conflict." A historical reduction. True, the disagreement has political dimensions (especially in the Miḥnah and the Ḥanbalite-Ashʿarite conflict), but the philosophical questions are real and independent of politics.

Why these responses are inadequate

They share in ignoring the deep philosophical dimension of the issue. The question "How do we speak about God?" is a question that faces every religious tradition, and Islamic solutions deserve serious philosophical analysis.

Philosophical roots of the problem

The Quran and Hadith contain descriptions of God that appear "human": the hand, the face, settling (istiwāʾ), descent, laughter, anger. This poses a dilemma:

- If we take them literally ← anthropomorphizing God (which contradicts transcendence)
- If we negate them entirely ← negating the texts (which contradicts faith in revelation)

This dilemma is not unique to Islam. Christian and Jewish philosophy face the same problem. But the Islamic discussion developed distinctive terminology and solutions.

Position of the anthropomorphists (mushabbihah)

The anthropomorphists are multiple groups, most prominently:

Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam (d. 179 AH): Among the early Shiʿite theologians. He said that God has a subtle luminous body, unlike known bodies. His argument: the existent is either a body or an accident, and God is not an accident, so He is a body of a special kind.

Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 150 AH): An early exegete, attributed with saying that God has limbs like humans but "we don't know their modality." His position is disputed among historians.

Dāwūd al-Jawāribī (3rd century AH): Said that God has form and limbs, and used as evidence the hadith "He created Adam in His image."

The Karrāmiyyah (followers of Muḥammad ibn Karrām, d. 255 AH): Said that God has direction (above) and that He touches the Throne. They were an important intellectual force in Khurasan for centuries.

Basic arguments of the anthropomorphists:
- The texts are clear, and interpreting them is distortion
- Negating attributes leads to negating existence
- God informed us about Himself in language we understand

Position of the negators (muʿaṭṭilah)

The negators are also diverse groups:

Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128 AH): Negated all attributes from God. He said: God is existent only, we don't describe Him with any attribute because every attribute leads to anthropomorphism. Even saying "God is knowing" anthropomorphizes Him with human knowers.

Later Muʿtazilites: Developed a more complex position. They said: attributes are identical to the essence, not additional to it. God is knowing by His essence, not by additional knowledge. This preserves unity (tawḥīd) and negates anthropomorphism.

Islamic philosophers (al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā): Completely negated the anthropomorphic attributes and considered them metaphors for the common people. For them, God is the "Necessary Existent" transcending all human description.

Arguments of the negators:
- Absolute transcendence is a rational necessity
- Human language is incapable of describing God
- Literal attributes lead to corporalism

Ashʿarite mediation

The Ashʿarites (followers of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, d. 324 AH) developed a complex middle position:

Regarding essential attributes (knowledge, power, will):
- They affirmed them as reality, not metaphor
- They said: they are attributes additional to the essence, not identical to it (against the Muʿtazilites)
- But they are not like the attributes of creatures (against the anthropomorphists)

Regarding anthropomorphic attributes (hand, face, settling):
- Early Ashʿarites: affirmed them without anthropomorphism or negation
- Later Ashʿarites: interpreted them (hand = power, settling = dominance)
- Interpretation for them is not negation but directing the expression away from its apparent meaning by evidence

Al-Bāqillānī (d. 403 AH) established the rule: "We affirm what God affirmed for Himself, negate anthropomorphism and corporalism from Him, and either delegate the modality or interpret appropriately."

Al-Juwaynī (d. 478 AH) leaned more toward interpretation, especially in "al-Irshād."

Al-Ghazālī (d. 505 AH) in "Iljām al-ʿAwāmm" established a methodology: common people take the apparent meaning without thinking about anthropomorphism, the elite interpret, and interpretation is regulated by rules of language and reason.

Al-Rāzī (d. 606 AH) developed interpretation into a comprehensive methodology in "Asās al-Taqdīs," with detailed responses to the anthropomorphists.

Māturīdite mediation

The Māturīdites (followers of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, d. 333 AH) have a position close to the Ashʿarites with differences:

- More inclined toward interpretation than early Ashʿarites
- They said: interpretation is obligatory if the apparent meaning leads to anthropomorphism
- Interpretation for them is not negation but affirmation of the appropriate meaning

Al-Nasafī (d. 537 AH) in his creed: "The hand is an attribute without modality, and it may be intended to mean power."

Al-Ījī and al-Taftāzānī developed balanced positions combining affirmation and transcendence.

Ibn Taymiyyah's critique

Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) presented a comprehensive critique of the Ashʿarites and Māturīdites:

- Interpretation is an innovation with no basis in the methodology of the predecessors (salaf)
- Distinguishing between essential and anthropomorphic attributes is arbitrary
- The correct approach: affirming all attributes without anthropomorphism or negation
- "Without modality" doesn't mean interpretation but negating knowledge of the modality

Ibn Taymiyyah's position is philosophically complex: he affirms attributes as reality but negates anthropomorphism, saying this is rationally possible because the realities of God's attributes are fundamentally different from creatures' attributes.

Contemporary developments

The classical discussion has close connection to contemporary philosophy of religious language:

Analogy theory by Thomas Aquinas resembles the Ashʿarite position: language about God is neither literal (univocal) nor purely metaphorical (equivocal) but analogical.

Symbolic theory by Paul Tillich: religious language is necessarily symbolic, pointing to what transcends it. This is close to the position of later Muʿtazilites.

Critical realism in contemporary philosophy of religion: we can speak about God truly but in a limited and analogical manner. This is close to Ashʿarite-Māturīdite mediation.

Philosophical evaluation

Each position has its strength and weakness:

Anthropomorphists: their strength is fidelity to the text, their weakness is falling into corporalism which contradicts rational transcendence.

Negators: their strength is absolute transcendence, their weakness is emptying texts of their meaning and making revelation useless.

Ashʿarites/Māturīdites: their strength is balance, their weakness is complexity and difficulty in controlling the limits of interpretation.

Where are we today?

The classical discussion remains alive in:

- The Salafī-Ashʿarite debate in the contemporary Islamic world
- Philosophy of religion discussions about "God-talk"
- Interreligious dialogue about the nature of religious language

A balanced position acknowledges:
- The philosophical difficulty of the issue
- The legitimacy of disagreement in solutions
- The necessity of transcendence while respecting the text
- That human language is limited but not completely incapable

For advanced reading

— Advanced level: Analogy theory in Aqu