A Realist Theory of Science

Roy Bhaskar's A Realist Theory of Science presents a revolutionary philosophy of science with significant implications for debates about divine reality. The work develops critical realism as a third way between empiricism and idealism, establishing a stratified ontology that distinguishes between the empirical domain of experiences, the actual domain of events, and the real domain of underlying structures and mechanisms. While not explicitly theological, Bhaskar's framework provides conceptual resources that fundamentally challenge both scientific materialism and naive religious realism.

The monograph's central achievement lies in its transcendental argument for the reality of unobservable causal powers. Bhaskar contends that experimental science presupposes the existence of enduring structures and generative mechanisms that operate independently of human knowledge or perception. This move beyond Humean empiricism, which restricts reality to observable conjunctions of events, opens philosophical space for non-empirical realities while maintaining scientific rigor. The work systematically critiques the epistemic fallacy - the reduction of ontological questions about what exists to epistemological questions about what can be known - that dominates both positivist science and much philosophy of religion.

Bhaskar's stratified ontology proves particularly relevant to theological discourse. By distinguishing between open and closed systems, he explains why constant conjunctions rarely occur outside laboratory conditions, thereby undermining simplistic applications of natural laws that often ground atheistic arguments. His concept of emergence - whereby higher-level properties arise from but cannot be reduced to lower-level mechanisms - provides a sophisticated framework for understanding the relationship between material and spiritual dimensions of reality. The work's emphasis on the mind-independence of real structures, combined with acknowledgment of the fallibility and historical conditioning of human knowledge, offers resources for theological realists seeking to affirm divine reality while avoiding fundamentalism.

The philosophical implications extend beyond methodology. Bhaskar's critique of actualism (the view that only actual events are real) and his defense of real but unexercised powers challenge mechanistic worldviews that exclude divine action. His framework suggests that science discovers rather than constructs reality, supporting a modest realism compatible with theistic belief while respecting scientific autonomy. Though Bhaskar himself later developed spiritual views, this early work maintains philosophical neutrality while undermining the philosophical foundations of reductive materialism that often supports atheistic conclusions.