Consequentialism and Collective Action

This monograph examines the intersection of consequentialist ethics and collective action problems, with particular attention to how these philosophical frameworks bear on religious and theological questions. Crummett investigates whether consequentialism can adequately address situations where individual actions seem inconsequential but collective outcomes carry significant moral weight, a challenge that extends to religious contexts including prayer, worship, and communal religious practices.

The work engages with a fundamental tension in consequentialist theory: if moral rightness depends solely on outcomes, how should agents approach situations where their individual contribution appears negligible? Crummett analyzes cases ranging from voting and consumer choices to religious observances and charitable giving. He argues that standard consequentialist approaches struggle to explain why individuals should participate in collective endeavors when their personal impact remains imperceptible. This difficulty becomes particularly acute in religious contexts, where practices like communal prayer or religious education might seem individually inefficacious yet collectively transformative.

Central to Crummett's analysis is the examination of various consequentialist strategies for resolving these puzzles. He considers expected utility theory, threshold views, and participatory approaches, demonstrating how each faces distinct challenges when applied to collective religious practices. The monograph engages critically with philosophers including Derek Parfit, Shelly Kagan, and Julia Nefsky, while also drawing on theological sources that address communal aspects of religious life.

The work's significance extends beyond technical philosophy to practical questions about religious commitment and community. Crummett explores whether consequentialist reasoning can justify participation in religious communities, support for religious institutions, or engagement in practices whose benefits emerge only through collective participation. He examines how different religious traditions conceptualize collective spiritual goods and whether consequentialist frameworks can accommodate these understandings.

By bridging moral philosophy and philosophy of religion, Crummett's monograph contributes to debates about the rational justification of religious practice. His analysis suggests that consequentialism's difficulties with collective action problems may limit its applicability to religious life, where communal dimensions often prove essential. The work provides resources for understanding why individuals might rationally participate in religious communities even when their personal contribution seems minimal, while also highlighting the theoretical challenges such participation poses for outcome-based ethical theories.