Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

This collection brings together Earl Conee's influential work developing and defending evidentialism, the thesis that epistemic justification supervenes on evidence. While primarily focused on epistemological theory, the volume carries significant implications for religious epistemology and the rationality of theistic belief.

Conee, often writing with Richard Feldman, articulates evidentialism as the view that one's doxastic attitude toward any proposition ought to fit one's evidence. The essays systematically defend this position against various objections while exploring its applications. Central to the collection is the claim that what one ought to believe depends entirely on the evidence one possesses, where evidence consists in one's mental states—experiences, apparent memories, and intuitions.

The work engages critically with externalist epistemologies, particularly reliabilism and proper functionalism. Conee argues that these approaches fail to capture the intuitive connection between justification and evidence. His critique extends to Alvin Plantinga's reformed epistemology, which holds that belief in God can be properly basic and warranted without evidential support. Against this view, Conee maintains that rational belief requires evidential grounding, challenging accounts that would exempt religious belief from ordinary epistemic standards.

Several essays address the problem of reasonable disagreement among epistemic peers. Conee's evidentialist framework suggests that when equally competent inquirers disagree about God's existence, this typically indicates differing evidence rather than legitimate interpretive variation. This position implies that religious disagreement often stems from evidential disparities that careful investigation should resolve.

The collection's treatment of a priori justification and intuition bears on natural theology. Conee defends a moderate empiricism that allows intuitive justification for some propositions while maintaining that substantive claims about reality require empirical support. This stance constrains the scope of purely conceptual arguments for theism.

Conee's meticulous analyses exemplify the analytic tradition's emphasis on precision and argument. His evidentialist framework provides tools for assessing religious claims by the same standards applied to other beliefs. While not directly addressing God's existence, the epistemological principles defended throughout these essays establish demanding criteria for rational religious belief. The work challenges both fideistic approaches that minimize reason's role and reformed epistemologies that claim special epistemic status for religious beliefs. By insisting on the universal application of evidential standards, Conee's collection represents a significant contribution to debates about the rationality of religious belief.