God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments

This monograph presents an innovative philosophical defense of theism by reconfiguring traditional knowledge arguments from the philosophy of mind. Nagasawa develops what he terms the "reverse knowledge argument," which inverts the logic of Frank Jackson's famous Mary thought experiment to challenge physicalism about God rather than consciousness.

The work begins by examining classical knowledge arguments in philosophy of mind, particularly Jackson's scenario of Mary the color scientist who learns something new upon first experiencing color despite possessing all physical facts. Nagasawa demonstrates how such arguments typically aim to show that phenomenal consciousness cannot be reduced to physical properties. He then performs a conceptual reversal, arguing that if knowledge arguments successfully demonstrate the irreducibility of phenomenal properties to physical ones, parallel reasoning suggests divine properties cannot be reduced to any properties accessible through human concepts.

Central to Nagasawa's argument is the claim that just as Mary's complete physical knowledge fails to capture phenomenal properties, complete propositional knowledge about God fails to capture the divine nature. He contends that experiencing God directly would yield knowledge unattainable through theological or philosophical analysis, analogous to how experiencing red provides knowledge beyond scientific description. This move simultaneously defends a modest theistic position while constraining what philosophical theology can achieve.

The monograph engages critically with contemporary physicalism, examining responses from David Lewis, Frank Jackson's own recantation, and the phenomenal concept strategy. Nagasawa argues these physicalist replies fail against his reverse formulation, as they presuppose epistemic frameworks inadequate for divine properties. He develops a sophisticated modal logic to demonstrate that omniscience need not entail knowledge of all phenomenal properties, thereby addressing potential objections about God's own knowledge.

The work's significance lies in its novel methodology, bringing analytical philosophy of mind into constructive dialogue with philosophical theology. Rather than defending specific divine attributes or addressing traditional proofs, Nagasawa establishes principled limits on reductive accounts of divinity. His approach suggests that atheistic arguments based on conceptual analysis necessarily fail to capture essential features of the divine, just as physicalist accounts fail to capture consciousness. The monograph thus opens new territory in philosophy of religion by showing how developments in philosophy of mind yield unexpected resources for theistic philosophy, while maintaining appropriate epistemic humility about theological knowledge.