Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief

This monograph examines David Hume's skeptical challenge to inductive reasoning and its enduring implications for epistemology and the philosophy of science. Colin Howson provides a rigorous analysis of what has come to be known as the problem of induction, exploring both Hume's original formulation and subsequent attempts to resolve or dissolve this fundamental philosophical puzzle.

Howson begins by carefully reconstructing Hume's argument that there can be no rational justification for believing that unobserved cases will resemble observed ones. The work demonstrates how Hume's skepticism strikes at the heart of empirical knowledge, undermining not only scientific methodology but also everyday reasoning about the world. Through detailed textual analysis, Howson shows that Hume's problem is more radical than often supposed, challenging any attempt to ground predictive inference in experience or reason.

The monograph systematically examines major philosophical responses to Hume's challenge, from Kant's transcendental solution to twentieth-century approaches including those of Carnap, Popper, and Reichenbach. Howson argues that none of these attempts successfully answers Hume's skeptical argument on its own terms. Particular attention is given to probabilistic approaches, which Howson subjects to careful scrutiny, revealing their hidden assumptions and circular reasoning.

In the work's most innovative sections, Howson explores the connection between Hume's problem and Bayesian probability theory. He argues that while Bayesianism cannot solve the problem of induction, it provides the most coherent framework for understanding probabilistic reasoning given Humean constraints. This analysis has significant implications for debates about scientific methodology and the rationality of belief formation.

The monograph's contribution to discussions about God lies primarily in its implications for natural theology and arguments from design. By undermining the rational basis for extrapolating from observed order to unobserved causes, Hume's skepticism challenges teleological arguments for God's existence. Howson's analysis reinforces this challenge while exploring how religious belief might persist despite the absence of inductive justification. The work suggests that if Hume's skepticism is correct, neither theistic nor atheistic positions can claim empirical support through inductive inference, leaving the question of God's existence beyond the reach of observational evidence.