In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism

This article defends moral realism without appealing to either naturalistic reduction or theistic grounding, positioning itself against two dominant approaches in contemporary metaethics. Wielenberg argues that objective moral truths exist as irreducible, non-natural facts that require neither God nor naturalistic explanation for their reality and authority.

The work directly challenges theistic moral arguments, particularly those claiming that objective morality requires divine grounding. Against philosophers like Robert Adams and William Lane Craig, Wielenberg contends that moral facts can be both objective and authoritative without supernatural foundation. He examines various formulations of the moral argument for God's existence, demonstrating how each fails to establish necessary dependence between moral reality and divine existence. The article particularly scrutinizes the claim that without God, moral facts would lack their binding character or normative force.

Wielenberg employs analytic philosophical methods to develop his positive case for non-natural moral realism. Drawing on the tradition of G.E. Moore and contemporary defenders like Russ Shafer-Landau, he argues that moral properties constitute a sui generis category of reality. These properties supervene on natural facts but cannot be reduced to them, existing as brute features of reality requiring no further explanation. The article addresses standard objections to such views, including concerns about metaphysical queerness and epistemic access to non-natural properties.

The philosophical significance extends beyond metaethics to natural theology. By severing the purported link between moral objectivity and theism, Wielenberg undermines a major strand of argumentation for God's existence. His position suggests that atheists need not embrace either moral anti-realism or naturalistic reductionism to maintain intellectual coherence. This opens conceptual space for secular moral realism that neither reduces ethics to natural facts nor grounds it in supernatural reality.

The article engages seriously with theistic philosophy while defending a thoroughly secular metaethical position. Wielenberg demonstrates how robust moral realism remains viable without theistic commitments, challenging both religious philosophers who claim morality requires God and naturalists who reduce ethics to empirical facts. His work represents a significant contribution to debates about whether objective morality provides evidence for theism, arguing that moral facts stand as autonomous features of reality requiring neither divine nor naturalistic grounding.