Oxford studies in Metaethics.. Volume 2

This second volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, presents a collection of cutting-edge essays that advance contemporary debates in moral philosophy. While the volume does not directly address theological questions, it engages with foundational issues in metaethics that bear significantly on discussions about God, particularly regarding the relationship between morality and divine command, moral realism, and the metaphysical grounding of ethical truths.

The collected essays examine central metaethical questions through rigorous philosophical analysis, including the nature of moral properties, the epistemology of moral knowledge, and the semantics of moral discourse. Several contributions explore whether objective moral truths require metaphysical foundations that might point toward or away from theistic commitments. The volume's dialogical approach presents competing perspectives on these issues, allowing readers to assess various positions on moral realism, anti-realism, and quasi-realism, each carrying different implications for theological ethics.

Shafer-Landau's editorial selection reflects the contemporary landscape of moral philosophy, where questions about moral objectivity intersect with broader metaphysical concerns. The essays employ diverse methodological approaches within analytic philosophy, including conceptual analysis, logical argumentation, and engagement with empirical considerations from moral psychology. This methodological plurality enriches the volume's treatment of how moral facts, if they exist, relate to natural and supernatural explanations.

The intellectual context of the volume situates it within post-twentieth century metaethics, where the fact-value distinction, naturalistic fallacy, and open question arguments continue to generate sophisticated responses. Several contributors engage with the Euthyphro dilemma's contemporary formulations, examining whether moral truths depend on divine will or exist independently. Others explore evolutionary debunking arguments and their implications for both moral realism and religious ethics.

The significance of this volume for the God debate lies in its thorough examination of metaethical foundations that underpin arguments about divine command theory, moral arguments for God's existence, and the possibility of objective morality without theistic grounding. By presenting diverse perspectives on these foundational issues, the volume provides essential philosophical resources for assessing how metaethical commitments influence positions on God's relationship to morality. The work's descriptive approach avoids advocacy while illuminating the complex conceptual terrain where moral philosophy and philosophy of religion intersect.