The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment

This monograph presents a systematic philosophical defense of freewill theism, a position asserting that God exists and has endowed humans with libertarian free will. Basinger develops his argument through careful analysis of the logical relationships between divine attributes and human freedom, positioning freewill theism as philosophically superior to both theological determinism and atheistic alternatives.

The work begins by establishing the conceptual framework of freewill theism, which maintains that humans possess genuine freedom to choose between alternatives in ways that are not predetermined by prior causes or divine decree. Basinger argues this view preserves both meaningful human responsibility and divine goodness, avoiding the moral difficulties inherent in deterministic theologies where God ultimately causes all events, including evil ones.

Central to Basinger's methodology is the examination of internal consistency within competing theological systems. He demonstrates how theological determinism faces insurmountable problems regarding petitionary prayer, divine-human relationships, and the problem of evil. If God determines all human actions, Basinger contends, then divine commands become meaningless, human moral responsibility evaporates, and God becomes directly responsible for evil. These conclusions, he argues, contradict core theistic commitments.

The monograph engages critically with prominent determinist theologians, particularly those in the Reformed tradition, while also addressing process theology as an alternative model. Basinger finds process theology's limitations on divine power unnecessary for preserving human freedom, maintaining instead that an omnipotent God can create genuinely free beings without logical contradiction.

Significantly, Basinger addresses the foreknowledge problem, examining whether divine omniscience is compatible with libertarian freedom. He explores various solutions, including the position that God voluntarily limits divine foreknowledge of free actions, though he ultimately suggests this issue need not be definitively resolved for freewill theism to remain viable.

The work's contribution lies in its rigorous philosophical analysis demonstrating that freewill theism offers the most coherent account of the God-world relationship. By showing how this position better handles traditional theological problems while preserving essential theistic commitments, Basinger provides important resources for contemporary philosophy of religion. His careful argumentation challenges both theological determinists who minimize human freedom and naturalists who deny divine existence, establishing freewill theism as a philosophically robust middle position that takes seriously both divine sovereignty and human moral agency.