The Empirical Stance

This monograph advances a sophisticated defense of empiricism against scientistic realism, with significant implications for how philosophical naturalism relates to questions about God. Van Fraassen develops what he calls "the empirical stance," rejecting the traditional view that empiricism constitutes a doctrine about the limits of knowledge or the sources of belief. Instead, he reconceptualizes empiricism as a philosophical stance or attitude characterized by a rejection of metaphysical demands for explanation beyond empirical adequacy.

The work directly challenges scientific materialism's claim to exclusive rational authority. Van Fraassen argues that materialism, despite its scientific pretensions, remains a metaphysical position that cannot be empirically vindicated. He demonstrates how attempts to ground materialism in scientific success involve circular reasoning, since the interpretation of that success already presupposes materialist assumptions. This critique extends to naturalistic arguments against theism that rely on the supposed metaphysical implications of scientific theories.

Central to Van Fraassen's argument is his distinction between accepting a scientific theory and believing it to be true. The empirical stance involves accepting theories as empirically adequate without commitment to their literal truth about unobservable reality. This position undermines both scientific arguments for atheism based on the metaphysical completeness of physics and natural theology arguments that seek to infer God's existence from scientific theories.

The monograph engages extensively with objectifying epistemologies that treat philosophical positions, including religious beliefs, as factual hypotheses to be evaluated by theoretical virtues like explanatory power. Van Fraassen argues this approach misunderstands the nature of philosophical stances, which involve values, commitments, and attitudes not reducible to factual beliefs. This analysis suggests that both theism and atheism, when understood as stances rather than hypotheses, may be rationally permissible options not adjudicable by empirical or theoretical considerations.

Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism opens space for religious belief by denying science any special authority on metaphysical questions. While not defending theism, he dismantles the philosophical framework within which scientific materialism claims rational superiority over religious worldviews. The work's lasting contribution lies in showing how a rigorous empiricism, far from supporting naturalistic atheism, actually reveals the metaphysical character of materialist commitments and the legitimacy of alternative stances, including religious ones.