The Skeptical Theist

This edited volume brings together leading philosophers to examine skeptical theism, a position that has emerged as one of the most significant developments in contemporary philosophy of religion. The collection explores whether human cognitive limitations undermine our ability to make judgments about what an omniscient, omnipotent God would or would not permit, particularly regarding the existence of apparently gratuitous evil.

The essays examine skeptical theism primarily as a response to evidential arguments from evil, which claim that the existence of seemingly pointless suffering provides strong evidence against God's existence. Skeptical theists argue that our inability to discern God's reasons for permitting certain evils does not justify concluding that such reasons do not exist. Contributors analyze this position from multiple angles, assessing both its defensive power against atheological arguments and its potential costs for religious belief and practice.

Several essays explore the epistemological foundations of skeptical theism, examining what kinds of skepticism about human cognitive capacities the position requires. Authors debate whether skeptical theists can consistently maintain their skepticism about our ability to judge divine reasons while preserving other knowledge claims essential to religious life, such as beliefs about God's goodness or the efficacy of prayer. This tension between skepticism and religious commitment receives sustained attention throughout the volume.

The collection also examines skeptical theism's implications for moral knowledge and agency. Critics argue that if we cannot judge whether God has reasons for permitting evils, we may lose grounds for moral action and belief. Defenders respond by attempting to show how skeptical theism can be limited in scope to preserve everyday moral reasoning. These exchanges illuminate fundamental questions about the relationship between divine sovereignty and human moral responsibility.

Methodologically, the essays employ rigorous analytic philosophy, with careful attention to modal logic, probability theory, and epistemology. Authors engage extensively with recent literature, particularly work by William Alston, Michael Bergmann, and Stephen Wykstra, who developed early formulations of skeptical theism. The volume advances these discussions by introducing new objections and refining the position's core commitments. By bringing together sympathetic and critical perspectives, the collection provides a comprehensive assessment of skeptical theism's viability as a response to the problem of evil, making it essential reading for understanding contemporary debates about God's existence and nature.