Cumulative Cases and the Failure of Natural Theology

This article examines the methodological foundations of natural theology, particularly the cumulative case approach to arguing for God's existence. Draper contends that natural theology fundamentally fails to establish its conclusions due to insurmountable evidential and methodological problems, even when multiple arguments are combined into cumulative cases.

The work begins by distinguishing between individual theistic arguments and cumulative case approaches. While acknowledging that single arguments for God's existence face well-documented objections, Draper focuses on the more sophisticated strategy of combining multiple lines of evidence. Proponents of cumulative cases argue that even if individual arguments fall short of proof, their combined weight can establish the probable truth of theism. Draper challenges this approach on several grounds.

Central to Draper's critique is an analysis of how cumulative cases function epistemologically. He argues that combining weak arguments does not necessarily produce a strong case, particularly when the arguments share common vulnerabilities or rely on similar questionable assumptions. The article examines specific examples from contemporary natural theology, including cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments, demonstrating how their apparent mutual reinforcement often masks shared weaknesses rather than compensating for individual deficiencies.

Draper develops a formal framework for evaluating cumulative cases, drawing on probability theory and confirmation theory. He shows that the mathematical models often invoked by natural theologians contain hidden assumptions about prior probabilities and evidential independence that are rarely justified. This technical analysis reveals that cumulative case arguments frequently commit subtle errors in probabilistic reasoning, overestimating the confirmatory power of converging lines of evidence.

The article also addresses the sociological dimension of natural theology's persistence despite its failures. Draper suggests that cognitive biases, institutional pressures within religious philosophy, and the psychological appeal of comprehensive worldviews contribute to the continued production of natural theological arguments even as their logical foundations remain problematic.

The work's significance lies in its systematic dismantling of what many consider natural theology's strongest strategy. By demonstrating that cumulative approaches cannot rescue natural theology from its fundamental evidential problems, Draper challenges both traditional apologetics and recent attempts to revive rational theistic belief through sophisticated probabilistic arguments. His analysis contributes to broader debates about the role of reason in religious belief and the limits of philosophical argumentation in establishing metaphysical conclusions.