The Solitary Self: Darwin and the Selfish Gene

This monograph examines the philosophical implications of evolutionary theory's emphasis on competition and selfishness, critiquing the reductionist tendencies that have emerged from certain interpretations of Darwinian thought. Midgley challenges the notion that evolutionary biology necessarily leads to a worldview centered on isolated, competitive individuals pursuing self-interest, arguing instead that this represents a distortion of both Darwin's original insights and biological reality.

The work traces how Darwin's theory of natural selection became progressively narrowed through successive interpretations, culminating in what Midgley identifies as the "selfish gene" ideology popularized by Richard Dawkins and others. She contends that this reductionist approach, which explains all behavior through genetic self-interest, reflects not scientific necessity but rather the projection of contemporary individualistic values onto nature. This critique extends to the broader cultural impact of such thinking, which Midgley argues has reinforced atomistic conceptions of human nature and society.

Central to Midgley's argument is the claim that cooperation, sociality, and interdependence are equally fundamental to evolutionary processes as competition. She draws on evidence from ethology, ecology, and evolutionary biology to demonstrate that organisms exist within complex webs of relationships that cannot be reduced to simple competitive dynamics. The monograph particularly emphasizes how social mammals, including humans, have evolved sophisticated cooperative behaviors that challenge any simplistic reading of nature as purely selfish.

The work engages critically with the New Atheist movement's appropriation of evolutionary theory as a weapon against religious belief. Midgley argues that figures like Dawkins have overextended legitimate scientific insights into illegitimate metaphysical claims, creating what amounts to a secular mythology that replaces religious dogma with scientific dogma. She contends that this approach impoverishes both science and human self-understanding by eliminating consideration of meaning, purpose, and value from legitimate intellectual discourse.

Midgley's contribution to the God debate lies not in defending traditional theism but in challenging the philosophical assumptions underlying certain atheistic appropriations of evolutionary theory. She advocates for a more nuanced understanding of both science and human nature that acknowledges the limits of reductionist explanation while remaining open to questions of meaning and purpose. The monograph thus offers a critique of scientistic atheism from within a naturalistic framework, arguing for a richer conception of nature and human existence than either religious fundamentalism or scientific reductionism typically allows.