Theological Incorrectness.. Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn't

This monograph examines the persistent gap between official religious doctrines and the actual beliefs and practices of religious adherents. Slone applies cognitive science of religion methodology to investigate why religious people systematically diverge from theological orthodoxy, even when they sincerely profess adherence to official teachings. The work contributes to understanding religious belief formation by demonstrating how universal cognitive constraints shape religious thinking in ways that often contradict theological sophistication.

Slone's central thesis challenges both theological and rationalist assumptions about religious belief. Drawing on experimental psychology and anthropological fieldwork, he argues that human cognitive architecture naturally produces "theologically incorrect" representations of religious concepts. For instance, believers routinely anthropomorphize God in their reasoning and prayers, despite theological doctrines emphasizing divine transcendence. This pattern appears across diverse religious traditions, suggesting underlying cognitive universals rather than cultural particularities.

The analysis engages with both theological expectations of doctrinal fidelity and skeptical dismissals of religious inconsistency. Against theologians who assume proper catechesis can align popular belief with official doctrine, Slone demonstrates that cognitive defaults persistently reassert themselves even among theologically educated believers. Against skeptics who cite such inconsistencies as evidence of religious irrationality, he shows these patterns reflect normal cognitive functioning rather than unique religious deficits.

Methodologically, Slone synthesizes laboratory experiments measuring real-time religious cognition with ethnographic observations of religious practice. This approach reveals how theological concepts undergo predictable transformations when processed through evolved cognitive systems. His findings suggest that abstract theological formulations inevitably yield to more intuitive, anthropomorphic representations in practical religious life.

The work's significance extends beyond documenting religious inconsistency to explaining its cognitive inevitability. Slone's framework helps explain why certain religious ideas spread successfully while others remain confined to theological elites, why religious traditions exhibit similar conceptual patterns despite doctrinal differences, and why religious education often fails to override intuitive religious thinking. Rather than viewing theological incorrectness as a failure of religious commitment or rationality, the work presents it as an expected outcome of how human minds process religious information. This cognitive perspective reframes debates about religious belief by shifting focus from evaluating truth claims to understanding the mental mechanisms that generate and constrain religious representations.