Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?

This monograph presents a robust defense of moral objectivism against the prevailing currents of moral relativism and nihilism in contemporary philosophy. Shafer-Landau confronts what he perceives as a widespread abandonment of objective moral truth, arguing that moral facts exist independently of individual beliefs, cultural practices, or divine commands.

The work systematically examines and refutes various forms of moral skepticism. Shafer-Landau first addresses cultural relativism, demonstrating that disagreement about moral matters does not entail the absence of objective moral truth, just as scientific disagreement does not negate objective physical facts. He then challenges the view that morality depends entirely on divine command, arguing that moral truths would retain their validity even in a godless universe. This position places him in direct opposition to divine command theorists who ground ethics in God's will.

Central to Shafer-Landau's argument is the claim that moral properties supervene on natural properties but are not reducible to them. He defends a form of ethical non-naturalism, maintaining that moral facts constitute a distinct realm of reality accessible through rational intuition and reflection. This approach draws on the tradition of moral intuitionism while incorporating contemporary metaethical insights.

The author employs accessible philosophical argumentation, avoiding technical jargon while maintaining analytical rigor. He uses everyday moral examples to illustrate abstract principles, making the case that our common moral experiences support objectivism rather than undermining it. The persistence of moral disagreement, he argues, reflects the difficulty of moral knowledge rather than its impossibility.

Significantly for discussions about God and morality, Shafer-Landau develops a secular foundation for objective ethics. He contends that theists and atheists alike can recognize moral truths through reason and experience. This position challenges both religious fundamentalists who claim exclusive access to moral truth through revelation and secular relativists who deny objective morality altogether.

The work's importance lies in its comprehensive defense of moral realism at a time when such views face considerable philosophical skepticism. By arguing for objective morality without relying on theological premises, Shafer-Landau opens space for productive dialogue between religious and secular ethical perspectives while maintaining that genuine moral knowledge remains possible regardless of one's stance on God's existence.