Do Edward Feser's arguments based on intentionality succeed in proving that matter cannot be the basis of mind, or do they rely on controversial Aristotelian assumptions?

This debate lies at the heart of contemporary philosophy of mind, where Edward Feser—the American philosopher who converted from atheism to philosophical Catholicism—revives classical arguments about intentionality with contemporary analytical formulations. In his books "Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide" (2005) and "Aristotle's Revenge" (2019), Feser argues that intentionality constitutes decisive evidence that mind cannot be reduced to matter. The debate between him and his materialist critics reveals deep layers in the question of the nature of mind.

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of the immaterialist position:

"Feser has proven the impossibility of materialism, end of discussion." Excessive oversimplification. Even Feser himself admits that his arguments depend on accepting a certain metaphysical framework (Aristotelian-Thomistic realism). The claim that the debate is "over" ignores decades of published philosophical responses to this type of argument.

"Intentionality is self-evidently clear; whoever denies it denies the obvious." This confuses the phenomenon with its explanation. Materialists do not deny the existence of intentionality as a phenomenon, but differ in their interpretation of it. Daniel Dennett, for example, accepts intentionality but interprets it as an "intentional stance" rather than a basic metaphysical property.

"Computers don't really think, therefore matter doesn't produce intentionality." A logical leap. Even if current computers lack genuine intentionality, this doesn't prove the principled impossibility of material intentionality. The debate requires deeper philosophical analysis than merely pointing to current technological limitations.

From some materialists:

"Feser is just a Thomist recycling old arguments." Unproductive dismissal. Feser uses tools of contemporary analytical philosophy and engages with the latest debates in philosophy of mind. Evaluating his arguments requires dealing with their modern formulations, not rejecting them merely for their historical roots.

"Cognitive science will solve the problem soon." A future promise, not a philosophical argument. This is "promissory materialism"—relying on the hope that science will solve the problem without providing an actual solution. Feser poses a principled conceptual problem, and responding to it requires a conceptual argument, not a scientific promise.

Why These Responses Are Inadequate

They share a failure to distinguish between levels of debate: the phenomenal level (what is intentionality?), the metaphysical level (what is its nature?), and the epistemological level (how do we know its nature?). Feser works on all three levels, and evaluating him requires precision in determining which level we are discussing.

Structure of Feser's Argument from Intentionality

First: Defining Intentionality

Intentionality is the property of "directedness toward" (aboutness)—the ability of mental states to be "about" things outside them. My thought about the tree "is directed toward" the tree, my belief that Paris is the capital of France "relates to" Paris and France. This property seems fundamental to mind.

Second: The Basic Problem

Purely material things lack intrinsic intentionality. A rock is not "about" anything, an electron doesn't "direct toward" anything. Even the brain as a material structure—nerve cells and chemical signals—doesn't carry within itself "directedness toward" something outside it. This creates an explanatory gap.

Third: Original vs. Derived Intentionality

Feser distinguishes between:
- Original intentionality: what minds genuinely possess
- Derived intentionality: what we project onto things (words, maps)

The word "tree" refers to the tree only because our minds interpret it as such. But my thought about the tree has original intentionality. The question: where does original intentionality come from?

Fourth: The Impossibility of Purely Material Explanation

Feser argues that any attempt to explain intentionality materially falls into circularity or infinite regress:

- If we say the brain represents the world through "structural correspondence," correspondence itself needs a mind to perceive it
- If we say through "causal relations," mere causation doesn't generate intentionality (smoke is caused by fire but isn't "about" fire)
- If we say through "biological function," function itself is an intentional concept that presupposes purpose

Fifth: The Aristotelian-Thomistic Solution

Feser adopts the theory of forms: mind is capable of receiving "forms" of things without their matter. When I think of the tree, my mind contains the "form of the tree" non-materially. This explains intentionality: mind "becomes" what it knows formally.

This requires accepting:
- The distinction between matter and form
- An immaterial capacity of mind to receive forms
- Realism about forms/essences in things

Contemporary Materialist Criticism

Dennett and the Intentional Stance

Daniel Dennett argues that intentionality is not a metaphysical property but an "interpretive stance" we take toward complex systems. We "project" intentionality onto brains and computers because it's a successful predictive strategy, not because it genuinely exists.

Feser responds: This confuses derived and original intentionality. "Projection" itself is an intentional act that presupposes original intentionality in the projector. Dennett explains the phenomenon by assuming its existence elsewhere.

Dretske and Informational Semantics

Fred Dretske proposes an informational theory: intentionality arises from natural informational relations. When A carries information about B reliably, A represents B. The brain represents the world by carrying information about it.

Feser responds: Information by itself is not intentional. Tree rings carry information about age, but they are not "about" age in the intentional sense. Intentionality requires more than mere informational correlation.

Millikan and Biological Functions

Ruth Millikan connects intentionality to evolved biological functions: brain representations have "proper functions" determined by natural selection. This explains how representation can be correct or incorrect.

Feser responds: Biological function itself is a normative concept that presupposes "purpose." Saying the heart has the "function" of pumping blood assumes teleology. Teleology is either real (which supports Aristotelianism) or projected (which returns us to original intentionality).

The Controversial Aristotelian Assumptions

Realism about Essences

Feser assumes that things have real "essences" or "forms" that mind can receive. This is rejected by most contemporary philosophers who adopt nominalism—there are no essences, only individuals we classify by similarity.

The criticism: Without essences, how does mind receive the "form of the tree"? What exactly does it receive?

Teleology in Nature

Feser accepts Aristotelian teleology: things have natural purposes. This has been rejected since the modern scientific revolution, which replaced purposes with mechanical laws.

The criticism: Without teleology, how do we explain "function" or "purpose" in biology and psychology?

The Distinction between Matter and Form

Aristotelian hylomorphism (matter-form theory) is rejected in modern physics. Matter is not "pure potency" shaped by forms, but determinate particles and forces.

The criticism: How does material reduction explain the difference between a lump of carbon and a living being composed of the same carbon?

The Argument's Strength and Limits

Strengths:

1. Identifies a real problem: intentionality is a phenomenon difficult to explain materially
2. Reveals circularities in contemporary material explanations
3. Provides a coherent framework (for those who accept its premises)
4. Seriously engages with contemporary literature

Weaknesses:

1. Depends on metaphysics rejected by the philosophical majority
2. Doesn't prove absolute impossibility, but difficulty within current frameworks
3. The Aristotelian alternative itself faces problems (how does the immaterial interact with the material?)
4. There may be future material options not yet explored

Current Debate Positions

The "liberal naturalism" movement (Galen Strawson, Thomas Nagel) accepts the difficulty of explaining intentionality materially, but suggests expanding the concept of "nature" rather than abandoning it.

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

The period 2020-2026 witnessed notable developments in this debate. On one hand, Feser strengthened his position in revised editions and articles where he engaged with critics of "Aristotle's Revenge," emphasizing that strict naturalism has made no progress in bridging the intentionality gap. On the other hand, the "liberal naturalism" movement gained significant momentum: works such as those developed by Galen Strawson on panpsychism and Philip Goff's works—especially after his book "Galileo's Error" and subsequent discussions—suggest that consciousness and intentionality might be basic features of nature itself, neither added from outside nor reduced to mere mechanisms. This movement accepts much of Feser's criticism of reductionism but rejects the Aristotelian-Thomistic solution. The rise of generative artificial intelligence models (2022-2026) also sparked a new wave of debate: do these models display something resembling original intentionality, or do they precisely confirm what Feser says about computational processing not producing genuine "directedness toward"? The debate remains unresolved, but has become more precise and multifaceted.

From the Perspective of Rational Weighing (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

This debate clearly illustrates how the method of cumulative rational weighing operates. A single argument—however strong—is not expected to produce final certainty. The cumulative reading takes into account:

─ Feser's criticism of material explanations: reveals genuine circularities and structural problems in the theories of Dennett, Dretske, and Millikan. This criticism raises the probability that intentionality is not easily reducible.
─ The objection to Aristotelian premises: a serious objection that weakens the argument's force for those who don't accept realism about essences and natural teleology. However, rejecting the Aristotelian framework doesn't invalidate the problem Feser points to.
─ Panpsychism and liberal naturalism: provide third alternatives that complicate the picture and prevent the oversimplified dichotomy between "pure materialism" and "Aristotelian dualism."
─ The result: it is more rationally probable that intentionality poses a genuine challenge to reductive materialism, but the leap from this challenge to proving complete immaterialism in the Thomistic sense requires additional premises not everyone accepts. The rational weight leans toward the inadequacy of reductionism, without reaching a resolution about the nature of the alternative.